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BLACK INNOCENCE AND THE WHITE JURY 
Sheri Lynn Johnson* 
Racial prejudice has come under increasingly close scrutiny during the 
past thirty years, yet its influence on the decisionmaking of criminal juries 
remains largely hidden from judicial and critical examination. In this 
Article, Professor Johnson takes a close look at this neglected area. She 
first sets forth a large body of social science research that reveals a wide-
spread tendency among whites to convict black defendants in instances in 
which white defendants would be acquitted. Next, she argues that none of 
the existing techniques for eliminating the influence of racial bias on crim-
inal trials adequately protects minority-race defendants. She contends 
that this will remain so even if the prosecution-oriented rules of Swain v. 
Alabama (peremptory challenges) and Ristaino v. Ross (voir dire) are 
modified or overruled in cases currently before the Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, Professor Johnson details an equal protection argument that turns 
on accepting the social science data as proof of purposeful discrimination, 
and she proposes a prophylactic remedy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice is often painted with bandaged eyes, she is described in forensic 
eloquence as utterly blind to wealth or poverty, high or low, white or 
black, but a mask of iron however thick could never blind American 
justice when a black man happens to be on trial. . . . It is not so much 
the business of his enemies to prove him guilty, as it is the business of 
himself to prove his innocence. The reasonable doubt which is usually 
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interposed to save the life and liberty of a white man charged with crime, 
seldom has any force or effect when a colored man is accused of crime.1 
These words, spoken by Frederick Douglass in 1883, are now gen-
erally accepted as an accurate depiction of a distant and unfortunate 
past. 2 Of course, most contemporary judges - and laymen - would 
have denied Douglass' accusation. 3 This is not merely because hind-
sight is better than foresight; it is also because it is easier to detect the 
speck in another's eye than the log in one's own eye. 
Complaints that adjudications of guilt are biased against the mi-
nority-race defendant persist.4 Such complaints cannot be dismissed 
as the rantings of a few cranks with legal training, for survey data 
show that many minority group members perceive unfairness in the 
administration of the criminal law. 5 Do such perceptions reflect ongo-
ing, albeit increasingly subtle, injustices, or are they anachronistic, the 
psychological vestiges of a long history of convicting the innocent be-
cause of his color? 
The Supreme Court has never ventured an opinion on this question 
or even openly considered it. Furthermore, one cannot distill a coher-
ent approach to the problem of racial prejudice in the jury box from 
the cases involving minority-race defendants tried by all-white juries; 
the holdings in these cases instead reflect a variety of discrete criminal 
procedure doctrines. The Court has applied a fairly lenient standard 
for proof of discrimination in the selection of jury venires, 6 but its in-
sistence on nondiscriminatory selection of the venire sharply contrasts 
with its laxity concerning the selection of the panel that will try a par-
1. Frederick Douglass as quoted in Symposium on The Black Lawyer in America Today, 
HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Feb. 1971, at 6, 57. 
2. See, e.g .• D. CARTER, SCOTI'SBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); R. 
GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS (1962); Higginbotham, Racism and the Early American 
Legal Process, 1619-1896, 401 ANNALS 1, 15 (1973). 
3. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883): 
When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of beneficent legislation has 
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the pro-
gress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special 
favorite of the laws . . . . 
4. See, e.g .• FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (G. Ware ed. 1976); Bell, 
Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 165 
(1973); Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country?, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 5; Crockett, Racism in the Courts, 20 J. PUB. L. 385 (1971). 
5. See, e.g., Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in 
America, 88 AM. J. Soc. 329 (1982); see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 183 (1968) (noting that the courts "have lost the confidence of the 
poor"). 
6. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Compare this with the more stringent 
standard for the proof of purposeful discrimination in civil matters. See, e.g., Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
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ticular defendant. Under Swain v. Alabama, 7 a prosecutor may delib-
erately use his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from a jury 
trying a black defendant. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case challeng-
ing Swain on sixth amendment grounds, 8 and the state courts continue 
to consider state constitutional challenges to the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges,9 but this instability cannot be read 
to signal the evolution of a more unified - and sympathetic - judicial 
view of the minority-race defendant's plight. In the voir dire area, the 
Supreme Court has drastically cut back on the due process right to 
question potential jurors about their racial prejudice. 1° Finally, the 
Court remains unsympathetic to arguments that racial prejudice has in 
fact infected jury deliberations, most notably when it has ignored 
claims of racially discriminatory applications of the death penalty. 11 
Some commentators have deplored each of these developments 
while others have given their qualified approval, but virtually all have 
confined their critique to cases within a single doctrinal area. Thus, 
both the Court and its critics have largely ignored the question of 
whether the entire package of protections against racial discrimination 
in criminal trials is adequate. It is the purpose of this Article to ad-
dress that question and those that flow from its answer. 
Such an endeavor might seem peculiar, both misguided and 
naively optimistic: misguided, because it is unlawyerly to criticize the 
Court for adhering to doctrinal distinctions; naively optimistic, be-
cause it is impossible for the Court to assess the cumulative effective-
ness of any system of protections with respect to every possible policy 
objective. It is not my intention, however, to criticize the convention 
of doctrinal distinctions or to propose that the Court embark upon a 
long series of inquiries into how well the criminal process as a whole 
accomplishes each of the numerous specific objectives of the criminal 
justice system. Instead, my premise is that this particular holistic in-
quiry is constitutionally mandated, for if the amalgamated safeguards 
7. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
8. Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-SC-733-MR (Ky. Dec. 20, 1984) (mem.), cert. granted, 105 S. 
Ct. 2111 (No. 84-6263). 
9. See notes 249-81 infra and accompanying text. 
10. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). But see Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir,), 
cert granted sub nom. Turner v. Sielaff, 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. May 13, 1985) (No. 84-6646). 
11. See Wainwright v. Ford, 104 S. Ct. 3498 (1984) (denying state's application to vacate 
stay on other grounds); Wainwright v. Adams, 104 S. Ct. 2183 (1984) (vacating stay); Sullivan v. 
Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109 (1983) (denying stay of execution to allow evidentiary hearing on 
eighth amendment claims based on statistics showing race-of-victim effect); see also Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (reversing conviction but ignoring substantial evidence of racial 
disparities); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (same). 
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of general criminal procedure doctrines fail to shield completely crimi-
nal defendants from racial prejudice, then one would expect the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to fill in the gaps.12 
In fact, equal protection theory has played a very minor role in 
ferreting out racial discrimination in criminal trials; it is only in the 
area of venire selection that equal protection claims have been success-
ful.13 Even this limited role has diminished in importance with the 
rise of an overlapping "fair cross section of the community" require-
ment stemming from the sixth amendment.14 One might hypothesize 
two very different explanations for the negligible contribution of the 
equal protection clause to the rights of minority-race defendants. The 
optimistic explanation is that prejudice has been largely eradicated 
from the pool of white potential jurors and that standard criminal pro-
cedure safeguards eliminate the effects of any remaining bias. The pes-
simistic alternative is that current formulations of equal protection 
doctrine are ill-suited to the task of uncovering discrimination in non-
repetitive decisions in which the process of decisionmaking is not open 
to scrutiny: the emphasis on proving purposeful discrimination gener-
ally precludes relief for the defendant who has been convicted after a 
racially biased determination of guilt. For the individual minority-
race defendant, producing evidence showing that covert or perhaps 
even unconscious discrimination influenced the verdict in his case is 
impossible. 
Whether this impossibility is troubling depends upon whether 
Douglass' assessment of the position of the minority-race defendant 
remains accurate today. Part I of this Article will examine the evi-
dence that racial prejudice influences jury deliberations, using a cross-
disciplinary approach to surmount the problems of making inferences 
from isolated cases. Part II will consider existing legal protections and 
how they control - or fail to control - the effects of the prejudice 
documented in Part I. Finally, Part III will argue that the empirical 
evidence described in Part I constitutes proof of purposeful discrimi-
nation and will offer a proposed equal-protection-based remedy for 
persisting discrimination against minority-race defendants. Parts I 
and II focus on the black defendant because historically the injustice 
done to black defendants was most egregious, because prejudice 
against blacks is more virulent and more widespread than against any 
other minority race, and because researchers have collected the most 
12. See Part III. A. infra. 
13. See notes 193-213 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See notes 214-20 infra and accompanying text. 
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data on black defendants. Part III nevertheless proposes a remedy for 
all minority-race defendants who choose to claim it, because in some 
areas of the country, prejudice against Hispanics, Asians, 15 or Native 
Americans16 is likely to have similar consequences for defendants who 
are members of those groups. 
l. THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL BIAS ON THE DETERMINATION 
OF GUILT 
How does racial bias influence the determination of guilt? If juries 
were approximately half black and half white, we probably would not 
need to ask this question because any individual juror's biases would 
be unlikely to alter the verdict. But many American juries are all white 
or almost all white, 17 in part because of the racial proportions of our 
population and in part because of the system of juror selection. 18 This 
state of affairs leads to a more specific question: Are innocent black 
defendants tried by white juries disproportionately subject to 
conviction? 
Before turning to the empirical evidence, we must be clear about 
the kind of innocence and the kind of disproportion that are relevant 
to our inquiry. By the term "innocent" I mean to embrace all defend-
ants who are wrongfully convicted; we are interested in the totally 
blameless convicted defendants, the criminally culpable defendant 
guilty of a lesser offense than the offense of which he is convicted, and 
the factually guilty but legally not guilty convicted defendant. 19 Be-
cause some (unknown) number of wrongful convictions is inevitable, 
15. See Smith & Dempsey, The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice, 47 Pun. OPJN• 
ION Q. 584 (1983); see also Allcer, Hosticka & Mitchell, Jury Selection as a Biased Social Process, 
11 LAW & SocY. REv. 9, 31-32 (1976); Lipton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defend-
ant, 5 HISPANIC J. BEHAVIORAL Set. 275 (1983); J. Solernou, Effects of Ethnic Group Member• 
ship on Attribution of Responsibility (1977) (unpublished dissertation) (available at the 
University of Kentucky). 
16. Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, do not find a high level of antagonism toward Native 
Americans, and this is probably an accurate reflection of national opinion since most Americans 
do not have any contact with Native Americans. Stereotypes and even overt hostility are never-
theless present in areas with high concentrations of Native Americans - areas in which Native 
Americans are most likely to be tried. See United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908,909,912 
(8th Cir. 1974); see also C. O'Connor & S. Doherty, "Open Season" on Indians, NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 30, 1985, at 35 (reporting racial tensions in Wisconsin arising from the Chippewa tribe's 
hunting privileges, which prompted a campaign to plaster northern Wisconsin with bumper 
stickers reading "Save a Deer, Shoot an Indian" and other offensive slogans). 
17. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 28-32, app. G (1977), 
18. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 30; Alker, Hosticka & Mitchell, supra note 15, at 33 
(juror selection process underrepresents minorities in part because of reliance on voter registra-
tion lists and in part because of the higher mobility of the minority population). 
19. A defendant is legally not guilty if his guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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we need to know more than whether some black defendants are 
wrongfully convicted; we need to know how many of those wrongful 
convictions can be attributed to the defendant's race. The proper 
comparison then is to otherwise similar white defendants tried by 
white juries. If black defendants are convicted under the same circum-
stances in which white defendants are acquitted, then the fourteenth 
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law is implicated.20 
Assuming that by and large the institution of trial by jury works 
well, one would expect that if the defendant's race influences guilt de-
terminations, it would do so by increasing the number of times that 
innocent black defendants were convicted. However, an equal protec-
tion issue is raised even if the convicted black defendant is not inno-
cent in any sense of the word, so long as a white defendant in the same 
circumstances would have been acquitted. One might object that data 
showing that black defendants are convicted in situations where white 
defendants are acquitted do not show wrongful convictions; perhaps 
observed differences are due to unwarranted leniency toward white de-
fendants rather than unwarranted harshness toward black defendants. 
For the purposes of an equal protection claim, however, it is irrelevant 
whether own-race favoritism or other-race antagonism motivated the 
discriminatory treatment.21 If one is cynically convinced that white 
defendants are often improperly acquitted - because jurors misunder-
stand the reasonable doubt standard or because they display sympathy 
based on extralegal factors - then one is quarreling with the wisdom 
of the institution of trial by jury. One might advocate reform of this 
institution (or even its abolition through constitutional amendment), 
but the obligation to treat defendants the same regardless of their race 
remains. Just as a black defendant is entitled to the racially neutral 
application of the legal standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he 
is also entitled to the racially neutral exercise of the jury's traditional 
function of mitigating the harshness of the law. Whatever system the 
state uses to adjudicate guilt, that system must comply with the com-
mands of the fourteenth amendment. 
To answer the question of whether black defendants are more 
likely to be convicted merely because they are black means, in social 
science terms, testing the null hypothesis that race is not a factor in 
the determination of guilt. The data relevant to the testing of this hy-
20. See Part III. A. infra. 
21. Although some of the available data will not permit us to distinguish between dispropor-
tionate conviction of innocent black defendants and disproportionate acquittal of guilty white 
defendants, it is important to keep in mind that such a distinction is unnecessary. The black 
defendants' convictions are improper because similarly situated white defendants are acquitted. 
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pothesis may be divided into three categories: observations and statis-
tics from real criminal trials, results of mock jury experiments, and 
conclusions from general research on racial prejudice. Although each 
of these data sources considered in isolation is incomplete, taken to-
gether they provide sufficient evidence to warrant rejecting the null 
hypothesis. 
A. Trial Data 
Data from the field, or "real life," are intuitively attractive; if large 
numbers of events could be studied in great detail, the results of those 
studies would be extremely persuasive. Unfortunately, it is extremely 
expensive and time-consuming to study people's behavior in natural 
settings. Refusals to cooperate often make such studies completely im-
possible. Therefore, observers usually must choose between studying a 
small number of occurrences quite thoroughly and collecting rather 
limited information about a large number of occurrences. 
When an observer chooses the first alternative, he may label his 
endeavor a "case study," but whatever the label, he will be recounting 
essentially anecdotal information. Such information can provide great 
insight into a single occurrence, but is very difficult to generalize to 
other occurrences. Thus, data from those who have observed an entire 
trial or interviewed all of the jurors concerning their deliberations may 
convince us that prejudice did play a role in that particular trial, but 
this conclusion does not speak to the question of whether prejudice 
often affects verdicts. 
If the observer chooses instead to collect more limited information 
about a large number of occurrences, inferences from his observations 
are marred by a lack of control. The observer may take a large sample 
from court records and then calculate the correlation between race 
and length of sentence. If he finds a statistically significant correla-
tion, he can fairly confidently predict that the correlation will be pres-
ent in cases he did not sample. However, he cannot tell us much about 
what that correlation means. Correlations between two variables may 
be spurious; that is, they may not reflect a causal relationship, but may 
be due to a third intervening variable. For example, the correlation 
between race and sentence length may be caused by the fact that both 
race and sentence are correlated with prior criminal record. Although 
the influence of some obviously relevant variables - such as prior 
criminal record - may be statistically controlled for, it is impossible 
to make sufficiently detailed observations of each case to control for all 
of the variables that might produce spurious correlations. Because race 
in American society is correlated with a very large number of other 
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variables, it is difficult to control for even the obviously relevant vari-
ables, many of which may not appear in the court records used by the 
researcher. 
The inherent weaknesses of all field observations do not compel the 
conclusion that trial data are worthless. Those weaknesses certainly 
warn against heavy reliance on any one such study, regardless of the 
direction of the findings in that study. The trends from a number of 
different field observations, however, may have probative value, partic-
ularly when considered in conjunction with the outcomes of controlled 
experiments. 
l. Case Studies 
The widespread perception among minorities that the C?riminal jus-
tice system treats them unfairly22 probably has its origin in very large 
numbers of individual observations; experiences in particular cases are 
reported back to the minority community and form the basis of gener-
alizations. Of course, many such observations are far from unbiased 
because the observer has a strong and immediate stake in the proceed-
ings, but the case studies by detached court observers, though limited 
in number, tend to corroborate this perception. 
One of the earliest case studies was conducted by the University of 
Chicago Jury Project.23 All jury trials arising in a single northern 
United States district between January 1954 and June 1955 were ob-
served and, following each trial, all lawyers and jurors were exten-
sively interviewed. Of the twenty-three trials studied, four were 
criminal trials involving black defendants. The interviewer reported 
that racial prejudice influenced the jury deliberations in all four cases, 
including the one case in which the defendant was acquitted. 24 Several 
jurors explicitly argued during deliberations that the defendant should 
be convicted simply because he was black.25 Many other jurors ex-
pressed unsolicited derogatory views of blacks to the interviewer.26 
In the early 1960s Kalvin and Zeisel investigated the functioning 
of the jury through a different technique: they interviewed trial judges 
concerning their views of jury verdicts in 1191 cases.27 In 293 of these 
cases, the presiding judge disagreed with the jury's determination and 
was asked to explain the jury's behavior. If the judges' observations 
22. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
23. Breeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 20 n.3. 
24. Id. at 21-22. 
25. Id. at 23. 
26. Id. at 24. 
27. H. KALVEN & H. ZEJSEL, THE .AMERICAN JURY (1966). 
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and impressions are to be trusted, the race of the defendant affected 
jury deliberations in three ways. First, in only twenty-two cases did 
the jury vote to convict when the judge would have acquitted; in four 
of these cases, the judge saw substantial evidentiary problems and ex-
plained the jury's verdict as prompted by the jurors' antagonism to-
ward the defendant's involvement in interracial sex.28 Second, the 
juries tended toward undue leniency in black defendant/black victim 
assault cases. 29 Third, although judges thought that jurors often ac-
quitted guilty defendants out of sympathy for the particular defendant 
(this explanation was offered for 22 % of all judge/jury disagreements, 
or 4% of all verdicts rendered30), black defendants were much less 
likely than white defendants to be the recipients of such leniency be-
cause they were viewed as extremely unsympathetic.31 
There are no comparable recent studies. In part, this is because 
permission from the courts to engage in direct and systematic inquiry 
concerning the content of jury deliberations is very difficult to obtain. 
Occasionally a particular verdict is attacked based upon convincing 
evidence that jury deliberations were infected by racial prejudice.32 
Attorneys for black defendants who are allowed unusually extensive 
voir dire on the question of a prospective juror's racial prejudice report 
frequent instances where jurors initially deny any bias but eventually 
admit to strong antagonism toward blacks and strong presumptions 
about the defendant's guilt.33 It is difficult, though, to infer from these 
unsystematic observations that the frequency of prejudiced determina-
tions of guilt observed in the 1950s and 1960s persists today. 
2. Conviction Rates 
Three studies find significant differences in the conviction rates of 
black and white defendants. Gerard and Terry report their analysis of 
data gathered in several Missouri counties in 1962.34 The data were 
comprised of a randomly selected sample of all cases in which an in-
formation or indictment charging the commission of a felony had been 
filed; nineteen of these cases were tried by a jury.35 Juries convicted 
28. Id. at 409. At least three of these cases involved a black defendant. Id. at 398. 
29. Kalven and Zeise! reported four such cases. Id. at 340-41. 
30. Id. at 217. 
31. Id. at 343-44. 
32. See cases cited in notes 373-75 infra. 
33. See, e.g., Ginger, What Can be Done to Minimize Racism in Jury Trials?, 20 ]. Pua. L. 
427, 434-38 (1971). 
34. Gerard & Terry, Discrimination Against Negroes in the Administration of Criminal Law 
in Missouri, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 415. 
35. Id. at 430. 
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ten of thirteen black defendants but only two of six white defendants. 36 
Uhlman's sample of all felony cases docketed and disposed of between 
July 1968 and June 1974 in a large northeastern metropolitan area also 
found a statistically significant greater overall conviction rate for black 
defendants; 72% of all white defendants were found guilty and 75.9% 
of black defendants were found guilty.37 Uhlman did not isolate jury 
trial verdicts, but he did investigate 24,100 bench trials presided over 
by twenty judges. Both black and white judges convicted black de-
fendants more often than white defendants but the interracial disparity 
was greater for white judges than for black judges.38 Aggregating 
these rates across judges concealed enormous individual variation: for 
two white judges, the difference in conviction rates between black and 
white defendants differed by more than 70%, and for another two the 
conviction rates differed by more than 40%. 39 While it is possible that 
factors not controlled for by the researchers accounted for the overall 
difference in conviction rates of black and white defendants, it seems 
unlikely that the extraordinary differences reported for these four 
judges did not reflect racial bias. Finally, a study of all persons in-
dicted for first degree murder in twenty-one Florida counties between 
1972 and 1978 revealed that black defendants were significantly more 
likely to be found guilty than were white defendants.40 
Another kind of conviction rate datum bears indirectly on the 
question of prejudiced adjudication of guilt. When Baltimore jury 
commissioners switched in 1969·from a juror selection method that 
yielded at least 70% white jurors to one that yielded between 34% and 
47% black jurors, the jury trial conviction rate dropped from almost 
84% to less than 70%.41 Similarly, a temporary change in jury selec-
tion methods in Los Angeles County that led to the inclusion of more 
black and Hispanic jurors produced lower conviction rates: the per-
centage of convictions fell from 67% in 1969 to 47.2% in 1971 and 
36. Id. 
37. T. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 37, 78 (1979). A difference of 4% is statistically signifi-
cant, extremely unlikely to have been caused by chance-because of the large number of cases 
involved. Whether it is of practical importance depends upon the interpretation of the correla-
tion. Is it spurious, resulting from correlations with other variables, or does it represent the effect 
of racial prejudice in marginal evidence cases, as suggested by the mock jury studies described 
infra? If the former interpretation is correct, there is no practical importance in these findings; if 
the latter is correct, 4% of the black defendants who went to trial in that city were wrongfully 
convicted. 
38. Id. at 66. 
39. Id. at 68. 
40. L. Foley, The Effect of Race on the Imposition of the Death Penalty (1979) (paper 
presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York, Sept. 1979). 
41. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 33. 
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then rose again to 66.6% in 1972 when the older system of jury selec-
tion was reinstated.42 We cannot infer from these statistics alone that 
white jurors were improperly convicting black defendants because it is 
possible to explain the conviction rate changes either by reference to 
improper leniency by minority jurors toward minority defendants or 
by greater leniency by minority jurors to all defendants. Nevertheless 
the statistics do suggest that, for whatever reason, minority race jurors 
may evaluate evidence differently than do white jurors. Prosecutors' 
use of racially based peremptory challenges corroborates this impres-
sion; both empirical investigations and judicial observations show the 
overwhelmingly frequent use of peremptory challenges to rid the jury 
of black jurors when the defendant is black.43 
3. Death Penalty Statistics 
If one believes that the determination of guilt is influenced by ra-
cial prejudice, then one might expect that the determination to impose 
the death penalty would also reflect racial bias. Conversely, if one dis-
covered that imposition of the death penalty is infected by racial bias, 
then one might infer that such bias also affects guilt determinations. 
However, such inferences are risky, for they depend upon the nature 
of the racial bias one hypothesizes to be affecting jurors. A jury might 
be overtly and consciously hostile toward other-race offenders, in 
which case one would predict greater racial discrepancies in the impo-
sition of the death penalty than those observed in conviction rates; one 
would expect hostility to lead to greater punitiveness toward those 
judged guilty, but not necessarily to a greater willingness to find the 
innocent guilty. Alternatively, juries might be subconsciously swayed 
in their evaluation of the likelihood of guilt, in which case discrepan-
cies in conviction rates would not necessarily predict death penalty 
discrepancies; the task of guilt assessment probably would be more 
vulnerable to the influence of unconscious stereotypes than would be 
the selection of the appropriate penalty for a defendant already deter-
mined to be guilty. Thus, caution in interpreting death penalty statis-
tics is also necessary; whether racial discrepancies are or are not 
observed has a somewhat attenuated relationship to the question of 
whether guilt determinations are racially biased. 
42. Id. at 35. 
43. See id. at 154-56; Crockett, supra note 4, at 387; Hayden, Senna & Siegel, Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use in the Mas-
sachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REv. 768, 790 (1978); see also People v. 
Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 152-53, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-11 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing 
numerous Illinois cases in which prosecutors had exercised the peremptory challenge in a racially 
selective manner); cases cited in notes 243-99 infra. 
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Two older studies point in opposite directions. The most extensive 
death penalty study surveyed eleven southern states' death penalty 
sentences for the crime of rape for the years 1945 through 1965. This 
study produced overwhelming evidence that black defendants with 
white victims were executed in disproportionate numbers.44 The other 
study, which analyzed California's first degree murder death sentences 
imposed from 1958 to 1966, found no evidence of discrimination based 
upon the victim's or defendant's race.45 
In contrast, three modern studies, all examining sentences imposed 
after Furman v. Georgia, 46 produced consistent results. Bowers and 
Pierce studied death sentences under post-Furman statutes through 
1977 in Florida, Georgia, Ohio and Texas; in all four states they found 
that the victim's race was an important determinant of sentence, and 
that black offender/white victim cases were the most likely to result in 
the death penalty.47 Foley's study of data from twenty-one Florida 
counties from 1972 to 1978 statistically controlled for the effects of 
offender's and victim's occupations, number of prior convictions, and 
number of victims in the incident; she found that the important selec-
tion factor for the death penalty was the victim's race.48 Finally, 
Baldus' study of all the death sentences imposed in Georgia between 
1973 and 1979 found a statistically significant race-of-the-victim effect 
even when the effects of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
strength of evidence, and time period and geographical area of sen-
tence imposition were statistically controlled for.49 
4. Other Sentencing Data 
Because judges rather than juries determine noncapital sentences, 
other sentencing data are even less directly probative of the bias in 
guilt adjudications than are death penalty statistics. Nevertheless, evi-
dence of bias in sentencing would be especially disturbing because one 
would expect judges to be less racially biased - or to control their 
44. Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119 
(1973). 
45. Special Issue, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 1297, 1421 (1969). 
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman struck down standardless statutes that left imposition of 
the death penalty entirely within the jury's discretion. 
47. Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 578 (1980). 
48. L. Foley, supra note 40. 
49. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (describing findings of 
study and holding that they did not suffice to show an eighth or fourteenth amendment viola-
tion), petition for cert. filed, No. 84-6811 (U.S. May 28, 1985). 
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biases better - than jurors. so 
Early studies of sentencing all showed substantial race effects, but 
many such studies did not attempt to control for other factors, such as 
type of offense or prior criminal record.51 Numerous recent studies, 
some with adequate controls, have produced conflicting results.52 One 
commentator has attempted to reconcile these studies by pointing out 
that even those studies finding statistically significant discrepancies 
show them to be of a small magnitude. 53 However, other commenta-
tors have argued that the apparent disparities may be only the tip of 
the iceberg: several forms of racial bias may operate in the sentencing 
of individual defendants but statistically cancel each other out. 54 
There is some empirical support for this position. For example, har-
sher sentencing of black defendants convicted of interracial crimes 
may be offset by more lenient sentencing of black defendants convicted 
of intraracial crimes, as appears to be true in capital cases. 55 And, as 
another study has suggested, whites may be favored in the decision to 
incarcerate due to racial stereotypes about recidivism, but this may be 
offset by longer sentences for whites who are incarcerated, because 
their criminal success may be of a greater magnitude, particularly for 
larcenous crimes.56 Finally, the harshness of some judges toward 
black defendants may sometimes be "balanced" by the lenience of 
other judges toward black defendants. Thus, Gibson has found that 
aggregate statistics showing no racial discrimination masked a mixture 
of pro-black and anti-black judges. 57 
50. Cf. S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 94-95, 109 
(1969) (probation officers more often discriminated on the basis of race and economic class than 
did judges). 
51. See, e.g., Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52 
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 411 (1946) (classic study finding racial disparities in 
sentence length); Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOCIAL 
FORCES 369 (1949) (black offenders treated more severely than white offenders); Johnson, The 
Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS 93 (1941) (differential sentencing for black offenders, particularly 
those with white victims). 
52. For a review ofrecent studies, see R. McNEELY & C. POPE, RACE, CRIME, AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 17-21 (1981); Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assess-
ment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 357 (1974). 
53. Hagan, supra note 52, at 362-69. 
54. Nagel & Neef, Racial Disparities that Supposedly Do Not Exist: Some Pitfalls in Analysis 
of Court Records, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 87 (1976). 
55. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text. 
56. Nagel & Neef, supra note 54, at 90. 
57. Gibson, Race as a Determinant of Criminal Sentences: A Methodological Critique and a 
Case Study, 12 LAW & SOCY. R.Ev. 455 (1978). See also T. UHLMAN,supra note 37, at 37, 68, 78 
(Although overall conviction rates varied only 4%, for two white judges the difference in convic-
tion rates between black and white defendants was more than 70%, and for another two judges 
the conviction rates differed by more than 40%.). 
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B. Mock Jury Studies 
Mock jury studies provide the strongest evidence that racial bias 
frequently affects the determination of guilt. These studies, like other 
laboratory experiments, do not suffer from lack of control, for the 
good experimenter assures that the only variable altered is the one be-
ing investigated. The problem of external validity, however, now 
arises; there is always the risk that causal relationships found in the 
laboratory are not present in the real world. This may occur because 
the laboratory setting interacted with the measured variables; for ex-
ample, the condition of being observed might cause the subjects to try 
to conceal their racial bias. A second reason laboratory findings may 
not reflect real world phenomena is that the measured variables may 
not affect the subjects in the same way that their real world counter-
parts do; for example, the stimulus of reading that the defendant is 
black may not be functionally equivalent to the stimulus of seeing a 
black defendant through the course of a trial. Because of the strength 
and direction of the mock jury study findings, the question of external 
validity assumes particular importance. After reviewing the substance 
of these findings, that question will be considered in greater detail. 
1. Laboratory Findings 
Laboratory findings concerning the influence of race on white sub-
jects' perception of criminal defendants are quite consistent. More 
than a dozen mock jury studies provide support for the hypothesis 
that racial bias affects the determination of guilt. Of the handful of 
studies whose findings initially appear to support the null hypothesis, 
all, upon close examination, are ambiguous in their import. The mock 
jury studies may be divided into three categories: experiments investi-
gating race and guilt attribution, experiments investigating race and 
sentencing, and experiments investigating the interaction among race, 
attractiveness, and blameworthiness. 
a. Race and guilt attribution. Studies investigating the relation-
ship between race and determination of guilt provide subjects with a 
transcript or a videotape of a trial in which the race of one of the 
participants - the defendant, the victim, or the attorney, depending 
on the study - is randomly varied while all other aspects of the case 
are held constant. The subject is asked to determine whether the de-
fendant is guilty, and correlations between the race of the trial partici-
pant and the judgment of guilt are tested for statistical significance. 58 
Because the only factor that has been varied is a participant's race, 
58. Tests of statistical significance calculate the probability that the data obtained from an 
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statistically significant differences can be interpreted as reflecting a 
causal relationship between race and guilt attribution. 
i. Race of the defendant. Nine very recent experiments find that 
the race of the defendant significantly and directly affects the determi-
nation of guilt.59 White subjects in all of these studies were more 
likely to find a minority-race defendant guilty than they were to find 
an identically situated white defendant guilty. Four studies find a sig-
nificant interaction between the race of the defendant, guilt attribu-
tion, and some third variable. 60 The one study that did not find any 
differences based on the race of the defendant may be reconciled with 
these findings based upon a careful analysis of its methodology.61 Be-
cause of the centrality of these studies to the question of whether black 
defendants are treated fairly by white juries, it is appropriate to de-
scribe each study in some detail. 
The least complicated of these studies was published by McGlynn, 
Megas, and Benson in 1976.62 The subjects were 208 white college 
students at a Texas university. Subjects read a summary of a violent 
murder case in which an insanity defense was presented, and were 
asked to vote guilty or insane and to recommend a sentence for the 
defendant. Black males were found guilty in 69% of the cases and 
black females were found guilty in 56% of the cases; both white males 
and females were found guilty in 54% of the cases. 63 
Two experiments published by Ugwuegbu in 1978 systematically 
varied the victim's race, the defendant's race, and the amount of evi-
dence pointing toward guilt (near zero, marginal, or strong). 64 The 
subjects in the first experiment were 256 white undergraduates at a 
midwestem university; the subjects in the second were 196 black un-
dergraduates at the African American Affairs Institute. 65 After read-
ing case transcripts, subjects in both experiments were asked four 
experiment could be the result of a random occurrence. See D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 
143-45 (1983); note 37 supra. 
59. See notes 62-92 infra and accompanying text. 
60. See notes 93-95, 101-03, & 105-06 infra and accompanying text. 
61. See notes 96-100 infra and accompanying text. 
62. McGlynn, Megas & Benson, Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribution of Insanity 
in a Murder Trial, 93 J. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1976). 
63. Id. at 96. 
64. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 
J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1979). 
65. The responses of twelve white and ten black undergraduates were deleted from the data 
analysis for various reasons. 
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questions assessing the defendant's culpability;66 answers to those 
questions were then correlated with each of the independent variables. 
For white subjects, the correlation between the defendant's race and 
culpability was significant: those subjects rated a black defendant more 
culpable than a white defendant. 67 Additional statistical tests revealed 
that the significance of the defendant's race varied with the strength of 
the evidence: when the evidence of guilt was strong or near zero the 
white subjects rated black and white defendants equally culpable, but 
when the evidence was marginal they rated black defendants.more cul-
pable. As the author explained, "[W]hen the evidence is not strong 
enough for conviction a white juror gives the benefit of the doubt to a 
white defendant but not to a black defendant."68 
U gwuegbu's second experiment, investigating the responses of 
black subjects, revealed a similar pattern of own-race bias. Black sub-
jects rated the black defendant as significantly less culpable than the 
white defendant, and again the significance of the defendant's race de-
pended upon the strength of the evidence.69 Like white subjects, black 
subjects held a racially dissimilar defendant more culpable than a ra-
cially similar defendant when the evidence was marginal and were un-
affected by the defendant's race when the evidence was weak. 70 
Unlike white subjects, however, black subjects also judged a dissimilar 
defendant more harshly than a similar defendant k the strong evi-
dence condition; "black subjects tended to grant the black defendant 
the benefit of the doubt not only when the evidence is doubtful but 
even when there was strong evidence against him."71 
In a sophisticated study published in 1979, Bernard examined the 
66. The dependent variables include the following questionnaire items: 
1. I feel that the defendant's intention was to cause the plaintiff, Miss Brown: (No harm 
at all, Some harm, Extreme harm.) 
2. To what extent was Mr. Williams, the defendant, responsible for the rape?: (Not at 
all responsible, Moderately responsible, Very much responsible.) 
3. With respect to my verdict, I feel the defendant is guilty as charged: (Not guilty of 
any crime, Moderately guilty as charged, Exactly guilty as charged.) [sic] 
4. Based on the evidence, I feel I would recommend for the defendant as punishment: 
(No punishment at all; Suspended sentence; 1-5 years in the State Prison; 5-9 years; 10-14 
years; 15-20 years; Over 20 years but not life; Life imprisonment; Death penalty.) 
All of the items incorporated 9-point rating scales and were scored 1-9. The extremes 
and midpoints of items 1, 2, and 3 were verbally anchored with 1 indicating no culpability, 5 
average, and 9 strong culpability, respectively. Item 4 was rated on a scale of nine alterna-
tives. In each case, the higher the number the more punitive the judgment. 
Id. at 137-38 (emphasis in original). The four items were then summed for each subject to derive 
a total score. Id. at 138. 
61. Id. at 138-39. 
68. Id. at 139-40. 
69. Id. at 141. 
10. Id. at 141-42. 
71. Id. at 142. 
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effect of the defendant's race on the verdicts of juries with various ra-
cial compositions.72 To increase verisimilitude, the experiment 
presented a videotaped "trial" (rather than a transcript) to a panel of 
jurors who were first asked for an individual verdict and then asked to 
deliberate and arrive at a unanimous verdict. The charge was assault 
and battery on a police officer, to which a defense of provocation and 
police brutality was offered. Deliberately ambiguous evidence was of-
fered on the officer's propensity for violence and the defendant's intox-
ication. At the close of the testimony, the judge instructed the subjects 
on the applicable law. Five juries saw the videotape with a black de-
fendant and five saw the videotape with a white defendant; in each set, 
one jury was 100% black, one jury was 75% black and 25% white, 
one jury was 50% black and 50% white, one jury was 25% black and 
75% white, and one jury was 100% white. 
On the individual ballot, white jurors tended to find the black de-
fendant guilty more often than the white defendant, and black jurors 
showed a reciprocal tendency to find white defendants guilty more 
often than black defendants, although neither trend was statistically 
significant due to the small sample size. 73 There was a pronounced 
tendency for jurors to shift their votes toward acquittal as a result of 
group discussion, with one notable exception: white jurors who found 
the black defendant guilty on their first ballot tended to hold to this 
decision and not be influenced by group discussion. By the final indi-
vidual ballot, the number voting guilty had decreased to 15% and all 
of these guilty votes came from white subjects viewing the black 
defendant. 74 
An examination of the group verdicts is also anecdotally instruc-
tive. The only jury unable to reach a verdict was racially balanced 
(50% black and 50% white) and assigned to view the black defendant. 
By the second ballot, all white jurors in this jury voted guilty and all 
black jurors voted not guilty; this polarization persisted through two 
more ballots, when the jury reported itself incapable of reaching a de-
cision. A second jury with the same jury-defendant combination was 
run and this jury also reported itself unable to render a verdict. Fur-
thermore, only one jury ultimately reached a unanimous verdict of 
guilty: this was an all-white jury viewing the black defendant.75 
Lipton used a different methodology, examining the relationship 
72. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of Jurors in Determin-
ing Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY R.E.v. 103 (1979). 
73. Id. at 109. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 110. 
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between the ethnic composition of juries and their assessments of the 
guilt of Anglo and Hispanic defendants. 76 Realism was attempted in a 
unique way; although transcripts were employed, the subjects were 
students solicited by the Intercampus Grievance Committee of the 
University of California and told that persons involved in the discipli-
nary hearings had chosen to have their cases decided by a jury of their 
peers. All juries contained both Anglo and Hispanic jurors:77 one 
quarter were predominantly Hispanic, one quarter were predomi-
nantly Anglo, and half had three Hispanic and three Anglo jurors. 
Each jury decided two cases, one involving a Hispanic defendant 
("Horacio Garcia") and one involving an Anglo defendant ("Richard 
Nelson"). One of the cases involved an alleged cheating incident and 
the other involved destruction of campus property; overall, each de-
fendant was involved in each type of case an equal number of times. 
Jurors completed predeliberation questionnaires, then deliberated un-
til they reached a verdict or announced that they could not do so, and 
finally were asked to fill out a postdeliberation questionnaire. 
The jurors' ethnicity had significant effects on the predeliberation 
assessment of guilt of the Hispanic defendant, with Anglo jurors at-
tributing more guilt to the Hispanic defendant than did the Hispanic 
jurors. 78 In addition, Anglo jurors liked the Hispanic defendant less 
than did Hispanic jurors, thought that he was less intelligent than did 
Hispanic jurors, and rated him as more dishonest than did Hispanic 
jurors. 79 However, after deliberation with jurors of both ethnic 
groups, the jurors' ethnicity no longer exerted a significant influence 
on their verdicts. 80 Deliberations had similar effects in the Anglo de-
fendant cases: the predeliberation tendency for Anglo jurors to rate 
the Anglo defendant less guilty than the Hispanic jurors rated him 
diminished, with Anglo jurors tending to change their minds toward 
guilt and Hispanic jurors, toward innocence. 81 
Klein and Creech published the results of two studies on race and 
guilt attribution in 1982.82 In the first study they used white students 
as subjects, asking them to read two transcripts of four possible crimes 
(rape, murder, drug sale, and burglary) and then rate which defendant 
76. Lipton, supra note 15. 
77. Lipton refers to the defendants as Anglo and Hispanic, but to the jurors as Anglo and 
Chicano, without explanation. 




82. Klein & Creech, Race, Rape and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3 
BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1982). 
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they thought was more,likely to be guilty. The race of the male de-
fendant and of the female victim was systematically varied. The study 
yielded eight comparisons of the jurors' estimated probability that the 
defendant was really guilty. In seven out of the eight conditions, the 
estimated probability of guilt was higher for the black defendant than 
for the white defendant. 83 The disparities in two conditions were sur-
prisingly high. After reading otherwise identical transcripts, white 
subjects rated the probability that the white defendant had raped the 
black victim at 33%, but rated the probability of the black defendant's 
guilt of that crime at 52%; they also rated the probability that the 
white defendant had burglarized the white victim at 52% but the 
probability of the black defendant's guilt at 63%.84 
In their second experiment, Klein and Creech asked 133 white col-
lege students to watch the videotape of a trial and respond to seven 
different segments of testimony. 85 In fact, the videotapes were four 
versions of the same mock rape trial, all identical except for the race of 
the actors playing the defendant and of the actresses playing the vic-
tim; pretests of each actor's warmth, attractiveness, and sincerity re-
vealed no differences. The evidence was weak and entirely 
circumstantial: the victim could not identify the defendant and the 
medical tests were inconclusive. Each subject was asked to estimate 
the probability of the defendant's guilt at the conclusion of each seg-
ment of the videotape, and at the conclusion of the entire tape the 
subject was asked to vote guilty or not guilty. The black defendant 
was believed more guilty in the preverdict assessment of guilt, particu-
larly by male subjects during the detective's and the defendant's testi-
mony. 86 Oddly enough, this main effect disappeared when jurors were 
83. 
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Id. at 24. 
84. Id. 
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86. When data were aggregated for all subjects, the correlations were of marginal statistical 
significance, but the statistical relationship grew stronger when the responses of male subjects 
were analyzed alone. Id. at 26-28. 
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asked for their final votes, due to an interaction of sex of juror and 
race of defendant: the white female subjects were more likely to con-
vict the white defendant and the white male subjects were more likely 
to convict the black defendant. 87 
Feild's study, published in 1979, was conducted with 896 white 
Alabama citizens with an average age of thirty-five, 19% of whom had 
actually served as jurors. 88 One of the dependent variables in the 
study combined the sentencing and guilt-determination questions -
zero years were assigned to the innocent defendant - and the author 
decided to run statistical tests on this variable, rather than a pure 
guilty /not guilty determination. He noted, however, that the correla-
tion between this aggregated guilt-punishment variable and the pure 
guilt variable was extremely high, making it unlikely that the results of 
his analysis would have been different if the pure guilty /not guilty va-
riable had been used instead. 89 Feild found that the black defendant 
was judged much more culpable than the white defendant.90 
Solemou and Bray asked Cuban, white American, and black 
American junior high school students to determine the guilt of a juve-
nile accused of shoplifting.91 Cubans rated the white American de-
fendant most guilty, white Americans rated the black American 
defendant most guilty, and black Americans' assessments of guilt were 
independent of the race of the suspect.92 
Three studies fail to find a direct cause and effect relationship be-
tween the race of the defendant and guilt attribution. However, two of 
these studies found statistically significant interactions between race, 
guilt attribution, and a third variable, and all three of them suffer from 
a common methodological flaw so serious that the meaning of their 
findings is impossible to interpret. Gleason and Harris gave jurors 
"background material" on the defendant and a summary of testimony 
from a fictitious case; they found that socioeconomic status rather 
than race was the major determinant of simulated jurors' judgments of 
87. Id. at 28. 
88. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of Victim, 
Defendant and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1979). 
89. Id. at 270. 
90. Id. at 271. 
91. J. Solemou & R. Bray, Effect of Ethnic Group Membership on Attribution of Guilt, 
Sentence Length, and Liking for the Defendant (unpublished study reported in J. Solemou, supra 
note 15, at 14). Solemou's subsequent study examined the more nebulous concept of the "re-
sponsibility" of perpetrators and victims for injuries. Asking about "responsibility" produced 
much weaker race effects than had the earlier study inquiring about likelihood of guilt. 
92. Id. 
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guilt and sentencing.93 While they did not find race to exert a signifi-
cant direct effect on blameworthiness, they did find an interaction be-
tween race, socioeconomic status, and blameworthiness, with black 
lower class defendants and white middle class defendants judged most 
blameworthy. Andrews found significant sex-of-juror effects on the 
degree of guilt assigned to a rape defendant, but found no direct effect 
of the race of the defendant upon juror decisions when the decisions of 
male and female jurors were aggregated.94 However, a significant in-
teraction between the sex of the juror, the race of the defendant, and 
the certainty of guilt was uncovered: female subjects were more likely 
to convict white defendants, and male subjects were less likely to con-
vict white defendants.95 McGuire and Bermant failed to find a signifi-
cant effect of the race of the defendant on the verdict in a mock trial of 
a woman accused of murdering her husband. 96 
All three studies, however, are flawed by the failure to differentiate 
between the responses of white and black subjects.97 Because most 
studies investigating minority-race subjects have found that those sub-
jects display an own-race bias rather than a bias against minority-race 
defendants,98 mixing the responses of minority-race subjects with 
white subjects could very easily conceal offsetting tendencies to judge 
defendants of another race as more likely to be guilty than defendants 
of the same race. Moreover, the particular crime chosen by McGuire 
and Bermant may have further confounded their analysis. Because 
subjects are likely to interpret the murder of a spouse as the murder of 
a person of the same race as the defendant, the experiment may have 
inadvertently introduced the variable of race of the victim. As dis-
cussed below, subjects tend to attribute more guilt to the defendant 
when the victim is the same race as the subject.99 Thus, any guilt-
attribution effect of the black defendant may have been offset by an 
opposite effect from her black victim. 100 
93. Gleason & Harris, Race, Socio-Economic Status, and Perceived Similarity as Determi• 
nants of Judgements by Simulated Jurors, 3 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 175 (1975), 
94. F. Andrews, The Influence of Evidenciary [sic] and Extraevidenciary [sic] Factors on 
Decisions in a Simulated Rape Trial (1982) (unpublished dissertation) (available at the Univer-
sity of Michigan). 
95. Id. at 121. 
96. McGuire & Bennant, Individual and Group Decisions in Response to a Mock Trial: A 
Methodological Note, 1 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 220, 224 (1977). 
97. McGuire and Bennant describe their juries as "predominantly white," id. at 222, and 
neither of the other two studies discusses the race of their subjects. See Bernard, supra note 72, 
at 104-06. 
98. See Bernard, supra note 72; Lipton, supra note 15; Ugwuegbu, supra note 64. 
99. See notes 107-14 infra and accompanying text. 
100. Also, the crime of murdering one's husband, because it may conjure up a host of family 
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Two other studies relating to guilt attribution and the race of the 
defendant are worthy of discussion. Hypothesizing that the race of the 
defendant may affect guilt attribution in different ways depending on 
the crime with which the defendant is charged, Sunnafrank. and 
Fontes began their study by trying to identify what crimes were ra-
cially stereotyped.101 Seventy-eight college students at a Michigan 
university were given ten photographs, five of black individuals and 
five of white individuals, and told that each of these persons had been 
convicted of a crime. Subjects were then given a list of ten crimes and 
asked to match each criminal with the crime he had been convicted of 
committing. The forced choice aspect of the experiment precluded 
any absolute conclusion that subjects thought blacks were more likely 
to be guilty of a particular crime than were whites. For example, the 
fact that only 36% of the subjects chose a black photograph as depict-
ing the person convicted for rape102 could mean that they thought 
whites were more likely to commit rape than were blacks, but it might 
merely mean that if a white person were convicted of a crime, he was 
more likely to have committed rape than assault. Even with that ca-
veat, the results of the study were striking. Participants attributed to 
black criminals 83 % of the mugging assaults, 81 % of the auto thefts, 
72% of the assaults on a police officer, and 95% of the soliciting of-
fenses. To white criminals they assigned 65% of the frauds, 90% of 
the embezzlements, 79% of the child molestations, 64% of the rapes, 
and 77% of the counterfeiting offenses. Only with vehicular man-
slaughters were the disparities small enough to be explained by 
chance.103 These results provide strong evidence that crime-related 
racial stereotypes exist, but do not permit more specific conclusions. 
In their second study, Sunnafrank and Fontes investigated vehicu-
lar manslaughters, the one crime for which they did not find large 
discrepancies between the attribution to black defendants and the at-
tribution to white defendants. Using seventy-five college students as 
subjects, they found no significant effect of defendant's race. 104 This 
might be explained by the lack of a racial stereotype for this crime, but 
it might also have resulted from the failure to analyze the responses of 
black and white subjects separately. 
issues, may not have a consistent racial stereotype. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying 
text. 
101. Sunnafrank & Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial Stereotypes and Influence on 
Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1 (1983). 
102. Id. at 7. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 9. 
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Finally, Foley and Chamblin's 1982 study is relevant for its find-
ings on interracial and intraracial crime and guilt attribution.105 Sub-
jects, 191 students at a university in Florida, were asked to listen to a 
tape describing a trial in which an adult male was charged with sexual 
battery on an eleven-year-old child. The race of the offender and the 
race of the victim were randomly varied and each subject was asked to 
indicate an individual verdict on a five point scale (not guilty, possibly 
not guilty, undecided, possibly guilty, and guilty). White mock jurors 
were most likely to find a black defendant with a white victim guilty, 
but black jurors were much more likely to attribute guilt to intraracial 
offenses regardless of the race of the defendant. 106 
ii. Race of the victim. Three studies consider whether the race of 
the victim influences guilt attribution and all find a statistically signifi-
cant effect. 107 These findings are important in two ways. First, by 
revealing one way in which racial bias affects determinations of guilt, 
they increase the plausibility of the hypothesis that racial bias infects 
criminal trials in other ways, thus indirectly supporting the findings 
that the race of the defendant affects guilt attribution. Second, they 
pose the possibility of a cumulative effect of the race of the defendant 
and the race of the victim, such that the black defendant on trial for a 
crime against a white victim is doubly disadvantaged. 
Miller and Hewitt's subjects were 133 students at a Missouri uni-
versity, approximately half of whom were black and half of whom 
were white. 108 Subjects saw a videotape of the beginning of an actual 
court case involving rape, showing a judge and a defense attorney con-
versing in the courtroom with the accused, a thirty-year-old black 
male. Subjects were then given written summaries of the prosecution 
and defense arguments actually used in the trial. All subjects were 
told that the victim was a thirteen-year-old female, but half were told 
that the victim was black and half were told that she was white. Sub-
jects were then asked how they would have voted had they been on the 
jury. When the mock jurors were white, 65% voted for conviction in 
the white victim condition but only 32% voted for conviction in the 
black victim condition; when the mock jurors were black, 80% voted 
for conviction when the victim was black but only 48% voted for con-
105. Foley & Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. 
PSYCHOLOGY 47 (1982). 
106. Id. at 49. 
107. See notes 108-14 infra and accompanying text. 
108. Miller & Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Simi-
larity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1978). 
June 1985] Black Innocence and the White Jury 1635 
viction when the victim was white. 109 
Ugwuegbu's study, described earlier for its findings on culpability 
and the race of the defendant, also investigated the effect of the vic-
tim's race on culpability.11° For both black and white subjects, the 
defendant was rated significantly less culpable when his victim was 
racially different from the subject. 111 
Klein and Creech's study, also described above, 112 investigated 
only white subjects. Their first experiment revealed that for three out 
of four hypothetical crimes, regardless of the race of the defendant, 
subjects estimated the defendant's guilt to be greater if the victim were 
white than if the victim were black.113 In their second experiment, 
they found that the black victim of a black assailant was judged signifi-
cantly less truthful than other victims. 114 
m. Race of the defendant's attorney. Studies investigating the ef-
fect of the race of the defendant's attorney on guilt attribution may 
also be important in two ways. First, they are relevant because they 
provide evidence that racial bias affects guilt determinations in yet an-
other way, again indirectly increasing the plausibility of the hypothesis 
that the race of the defendant affects guilt attribution. Second, to the 
extent that black defendants are more likely to be represented by black 
attorneys than are white defendants, the black defendant is more likely 
to be disadvantaged by bias against clients of black attorneys. 
The only study investigating the effect of the defense attorney's 
race on the determination of his client's guilt found a consistent anti-
black defense attorney bias.115 Subjects who saw the photo of a black 
defense attorney were significantly more likely to find the defendant 
109. For both black and white subjects, the greater tendency to vote for the conviction when 
the victim was racially similar to themselves was significant at the .01 level. Id. at 160. 
110. Ugwuegbu, supra note 64. See text at notes 64-71 supra for a description of the study's 
methodology. 
111. Id. at 139, 141. 
112. Klein & Creech, supra note 82. See text at notes 82-87 supra for a description of the 
study's methodology. 
113. Klein and Creech reported positive results of statistical significance tests for the crime of 
rape. They did not calculate the statistical significance for the other three crimes, although for 
two of them (burglary and murder) the estimates of guilt were far higher.in the white victim 
situation than in the black victim situation. It was only for the drug sale, where there were no 
true victims, that the race-of-the-victim differences were small and interacted with the race of the 
defendant: the estimates of guilt were slightly higher for black defendants with black "victims" 
and for white defendants with white "victims." Id. at 24. 
114. Id. at 29. 
115. Cohen & Peterson, Bias in the Courtroom: Race and Sex Effects of Attorneys On Juror 
Verdicts, 9 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 81 (1981). The subjects were Los Angeles high school 
students. The discussion of the results strongly implies that the subjects were white, but no 
explicit racial description is provided. 
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guilty. 116 In addition, a black defense attorney made the subjects sig-
nificantly more likely to find the victim's mother a convincing witness, 
significantly more likely to feel sympathy for the victim's brother, sig-
nificantly more likely to find the description of the prosecution witness 
complete, and significantly more likely to find the prosecutor honest 
and convincing. 117 
b. Race and sentencing. The results of mock jury studies investi-
gating race and sentencing are not as consistent a~ those concerning 
race and guilt attribution. Reflection upon these inconsistencies sug-
gests that at least two different forms of prejudice may affect jurors' 
deliberations. 
Two studies found that the race of the defendant significantly af-
fected sentencing decisions. In a study done at North Carolina State 
University, Klein and Creech found that "convicted" black rape de-
fendants were sentenced more harshly by white subjects than were 
otherwise identical white rape defendants; furthermore, defendants 
convicted of raping white victims were sentenced more harshly than 
were defendants convicted of raping black victims. 118 In a study using 
white Alabama citizens as subjects, Feild obtained the same results: 
the subjects sentenced black rape defendants to significantly longer 
terms of imprisonment than white rape defendants, and they sen-
tenced defendants accused of raping white victims significantly longer 
than defendants accused of raping black victims. 119 However, this 
finding did not separate out the effects of differential guilt attribution: 
the zero-year sentences of defendants who were acquitted by the sub-
jects were included in the analysis of sentence length. 
Four studies found that the race of the defendant did not affect 
mock jurors' sentencing decisions.120 McGlynn, Megas, and Benson, 
using white Texas Tech University students, found that those students 
were significantly more likely to convict black defendants of murder, 
but of those defendants who were convicted, white male defendants 
received somewhat longer sentences. 121 Oros and Elman, using white 
student subjects at a large midwestern university, found no significant 
difference in the sentences assigned to black and white rape defend-
116. Id. at 84. 
117. Id. 
118. Klein & Creech, supra note 82, at 28-29. 
119. Feild, supra note 88, at 271. 
120. See notes 121-24 infra and accompanying text. 
121. McGlynn, Megas & Benson, supra note 62, at 96. 
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ants. 122 In this study, as in the Feild study, sentences of zero years 
assigned to defendants found not guilty were included in the tabula-
tion of results. Interestingly, subjects judging black defendants indi-
cated that they would have felt significantly more responsible for their 
decisions in a real trial than did subjects judging white defendants. 123 
The two other studies investigating the effects of race on sentenc-
ing varied both the defendant's race and his social attractiveness. 
Both of these studies found that subjects treated the socially attractive 
defendant more leniently than his unattractive counterpart, but found 
no disparity in the treatment of black and white offenders. 124 
These findings, read with those concerning race and guilt attribu-
tion, suggest that for most white subjects, bias against black defend-
ants is based upon subconscious stereotypes. Were the bias conscious 
and motivated by hostility, one would expect white subjects to treat 
blacks less favorably at every opportunity; because the bias seems al-
ways to operate at the guilt adjudication stage but only occasionally at 
the sentencing stage, conscious hostility seems an unlikely explanation 
for the white subjects' behavior. Instead, it appears that stereotypes 
concerning blacks' propensity to commit crimes subconsciously sway 
most white subjects' evaluations of a black defendant's guilt; these ste-
reotypes have little or no effect on decisions concerning the harshness 
of the penalty to be imposed upon a defendant already determined to 
be guilty. A few subjects - perhaps more frequently subjects from the 
South and perhaps particularly in rape cases - are also motivated by 
hostility and therefore penalize black defendants at the sentencing 
stage as well as at the guilt determination stage. This explanation of 
the mock jury studies on guilt attribution and sentencing is consistent 
with sentencing data from actual trials: racial discrepancies tend to 
show up only in records that (1) are older (perhaps thus increasing the 
likelihood of overt hostility toward black defendants), (2) are from 
Southern states, or (3) involve rape cases.125 As we shall see, this 
hypothesis is also supported by more general research on racial 
prejudice. 126 
An alternative, even more pessimistic explanation is possible. Per-
122. Oros & Elman, Impact of Judge's Instroctions Upon Jurors' Decisions: The "Cautionary 
Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE REsEARCH IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 28, 34 (1979). 
123. Id at 34. 
124. Feild & Barnett, Simulated Jury Trials: Students vs. "Real" People as Jurors, 104 J. 
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 287, 290 (1978); Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of 
the Defendant and the Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221, 226 (1973). 
125. See Parts I. A. 3. & 4. supra. 
126. See Part I. C. infra. 
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haps determining the guilt of a black defendant prejudices decision-
making in only one direction: white subjects will either be racially 
neutral or, because they are biased, will be more likely to convict black 
defendants than white defendants. This leads to a significant correla-
tion between the race of the defendant and findings of guilt. In deter-
mining the appropriate punishment for a convicted defendant, 
however, white subjects might respond in three ways: they may be 
racially neutral, they may be motivated by hostility and therefore treat 
black defendants more harshly, or they may believe that because 
bl_acks are inherently more likely to commit crimes they are less mor-
ally blameworthy and therefore treat them more leniently. Depending 
upon the exact composition of the sample of mock jurors, and the par-
ticular facts of the case, these last two attitudes could offset each other, 
thus appearing to reflect perfect neutrality, or they could be imper-
fectly balanced and thus appearing to reflect either greater harshness 
or greater leniency toward black defendants. The older case studies127 
would support this explanation and the sentencing data from actual 
trials could also be explained in this way. 
Actually, these two explanations need not be viewed as inconsis-
tent with each other, but may differ largely in the matter of emphasis. 
It may be that most jurors are subconsciously biased and this influ-
ences the determination of guilt, but that most jurors, in most circum-
stances, are not consciously hostile. However, some subjects are 
consciously hostile and some are consciously patronizing; the exact 
number of subjects reacting to these motivations varies depending 
upon the particulars of the crime and the demographic characteristics 
of the pool from which the subjects were drawn. 
c. Race, attractiveness, and blameworthiness. Studies relating at-
tractiveness, race, and blameworthiness provide additional support -
and perhaps a partial explanation - for the findings on race and guilt 
attribution discussed above. 
i. Attractiveness and blameworthiness. Investigation of the rela-
tionship between attractiveness and perceived blameworthiness has 
yielded consistent results. In their judgments of blameworthiness, 
subjects respond to the defendant's physical beauty, his social status, 
and the similarity of his attitudes to their own. One study found 
crime-specific facial stereotypes and correlations of those stereotypes 
with judgments of guilt, 128 while two more found that physically at-
127. See Part I. A. 1. supra. 
128. Shoemaker, South & Lowe, Facial Stereotypes of Deviants and Judgments of Guilt or 
Innocence, 51 Soc. FORCES 427 (1973). 
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tractive defendants are less likely to be judged guilty.129 Three mock 
jury studies found greater leniency in the sentencing of physically at-
tractive defendants. 13° Furthermore, as with findings on race and 
blameworthiness, the effects of physical attractiveness operate on sub-
jects through the victim's beauty as well as the defendant's: subjects 
tend to punish offenders whose victims were physically attractive more 
harshly than those whose victims were physically unattractive. 131 So-
cially desirable attributes, as well as physical beauty, appear to influ-
ence judgments of blameworthiness. One mock jury study found that 
defendants described as middle class were judged less guilty and as-
signed fewer years in prison than were defendants of a lower class 
background.132 Three studies found that defendants described as 
working class and divorced were sentenced more harshly than were 
defendants described as middle class family men. 133 Finally, jurors' 
judgments of blameworthiness are altered by the extent to which the 
defendant's attitudes resemble their own: two studies found that sub-
jects were more likely to find defendants with dissimilar attitudes 
guilty than defendants with similar attitudes.134 
ii. Race and attractiveness. The findings on attractiveness and 
blameworthiness assume significance when considered with findings 
relating race to attractiveness. White subjects have more trouble dis-
129. Solender & Solender, Minimizing the Effect of the Unattractive Client on the Jury: A 
Study of the Interaction of Physical Appearance with Assertions and Self-Experience References, 5 
HUMAN RIGHTS 201, 206-07 (1976). 
130. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal Attrac-
tion, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. REsEARCH IN 
PERSONALITY 45, 49 (1974); Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful But Dangerous: Effects of Offender 
Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 410, 413 (1975) (finding greater leniency in the sentencing of physically attractive 
defendants, except where the crimes involved capitalizing on the defendant's attractiveness); Sol-
omon & Schopler, The Relationship of Physical Attractiveness and Punitiveness: Is the Linearity 
Assumption out of Line?, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 483, 485 (1978). 
131. Kerr, Beautiful and Blameless: Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on 
Mock Jurors' Verdtcts, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 479, 480 (1978). 
132. Gleason & Harris, supra note 93, at 178. 
133. Feild & Barnett, supra note 124, at 290; Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Charac-
ter of the Crimtnal and His Victim on the Decistons of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 141, 148-51 (1969); Nemeth & Sosis, supra note 124, at 226; see also Kaplan 
& Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Information Intergratton: Combtntng Evtdenttal and 
Nonevtdenttal Information, 30 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 493, 496 (1974) (defend-
ants with negative personality characteristics were more likely to be found guilty and punished 
severely than were defendants with positive personal traits). 
134. Griffitt & Jackson, Stmulated Jury Decisions: The Influence of Jury-Defendant Attitude 
Stmtlarity-Disstmtlarity, 1 Soc. BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 1, 5-6 (1973); Mitchell & Byrne, The 
Defendant's Dtlemma: Effects of Jurors' Attttudes and Authoritarianism on Judtctal Decisions, 25 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125-26 (finding that similar attitudes influenced au-
thoritarian subjects but did not influence egalitarian subjects). 
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tinguishing black faces than white faces 135 and are likely to perceive 
black faces as less beautiful than white faces; 136 white mock jurors 
tend to perceive black defendants as coming from a lower socioeco-
no_mic class than white defendants despite otherwise identical descrip-
tions of the defendants; 137 and white subjects without information on 
the attitude of other persons assume greater attitude dissimilarity from 
black persons.138 It would appear that white subjects tend to assume 
less favorable characteristics about black defendants than white de-
fendants and that such assumptions contribute to these subjects' 
greater tendency to find black defendants guilty. 
2. External Validity 
Given that white subjects consistently display an own-race bias in 
guilt-attribution decisions as mock jurors in a laboratory setting, and 
that the more limited studies on minority-race subjects suggest that 
they display a reciprocal bias, can we infer that jurors in criminal trials 
will tend to convict other-race defendants under circumstances in 
which they would acquit same-race defendants? We will answer this 
question affirmatively if the laboratory experiments have external va-
lidity, that is, if there is nothing peculiar to the laboratory experiments 
135. See Barkowitz & Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own Race Bias, Incentive, and Time 
Delay, 12 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 255, 261 (1982); Brigham & Barkowitz, Do "They all 
look alike?'~· The Effect of Race, Sex, Experience and Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces, 
8 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 306, 314 (1978); Chance, Goldstein & McBride, Differential 
Experience and Recognition Memory for Faces, 91 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 243 (1975) (reporting on 
two experiments); Cross, Cross & Daley, Sex, Race, Age and Beauty As Factors in Recognition of 
Faces, 10 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 393, 394 (1971); Galper, "Functional Race Member-
ship" and Recognition of Faces, 31 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 455, 458 (1973); Luce, The 
Role of Experience in Inter-Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL, 39, 
40 (1974); Malpass, Racial Bias in Eyewitness Identification?, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL• 
OGY BULL. 42, 43 (1974); Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 330, 332-33 (1969); Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon, Ver-
bal and V'zsual Training in Face Recognition, 14 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 285, 288 (1973); 
see also Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification E"ors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 
(1984). 
136. Bernstein, Lin & McClellan, Cross vs. Within-Racial Judgments of Attractiveness, 32 
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 495, 500-501 (1982); see also Newman, Liss & Sherman, Ethnic 
Awareness in Children: Not a Unitary Concept, 143 J. GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 103 (1983) (chil-
dren prefer pictures of same-race children, with this effect particularly strong in white children). 
137. Foley & Chamblin, supra note 105, at 49. 
138. Byrne & Wong, Racial Prejudice, Interpersonal Attraction, and Assumed Dissimilarity of 
Attitudes, 65 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 246, 247 (1962) (prejudiced white subjects 
assumed greater attitude dissimilarity from blacks than whites, but unprejudiced subjects did 
not); Hendrick, Bixenstine & Hawkins, Race Versus Belief Similarity as Determinants of Attrac-
tion: A Search for a Fair Test, 17 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 250, 257 (1971); see also 
Stein, Hardyck & Smith, Race and Belief: An Open and Shut Case, 1 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOLOGY 281 (1965) (white teenagers responded to stimulus teenagers on the basis of simi-
larity of belief when extensive information on the target's belief was supplied, but when that 
information was withheld, responded on the basis of racial similarity). 
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that creates the race and guilt-attribution correlation. There are no 
field experiments on race and guilt attribution and such experiments 
are unlikely ever to be possible.139 Nevertheless, if we examine possi-
ble sources of external invalidity, we will see that there is no support 
for the position that the findings discussed above reflect a phenomenon 
that occurs solely in the laboratory. 
There are four sources of concern about generalizability: the sub-
jects, the independent variable (race), the dependent variable (the ver-
dict), and the setting. There is no basis for arguing that the subjects of 
the experiments are more likely to respond to the race of the defendant 
than are prospective jurors.140 Most of the subjects were students and 
they may differ in many respects from prospective jurors. However, 
the relevant differences suggest that prospective jurors would display a 
greater tendency toward racial bias in guilt attribution. Students are 
somewhat more lenient than other prospective jurors.141 More impor-
tant, because they are younger and better educated than much of the 
jury pool, they are likely to be less racially prejudiced.142 In addition, 
the one study designed to sample subjects whose demographic charac-
teristics resembled those of real jurors found a strong effect of race 
upon guilt attribution.143 
Similarly, there is no basis for arguing that the experimental ma-
nipulation of race has stronger effects upon subjects than does the race 
of a defendant on trial. Most of the mock jury studies simply state in 
words that the defendant is black or white; actually seeing the defend-
ant certainly would make his race more salient. Even those studies 
that use photographs or videotape clips exhibit the defendant for a 
much briefer period of time than jurors would view him at a trial; 
again, the increased exposure to the defendant at a real trial would 
tend to make his race more salient. The increased salience of the de-
fendant's race in a real trial would hardly lessen jurors' tendencies to 
infer guilt from race. Indeed, the weakness of the experimental ma-
139. More field studies, such as those described in the preceding section on trial data, are of 
course possible, but true field experiments would require tampering with real juries, which courts 
are unlikely to permit. 
140. Of course, it is possible that the jurors who actually decide cases are less biased than are 
the student mock jurors due to the selection process of voir dire. This possibility is addressed 
and rejected in Part II. B. 
141. See Feild & Barnett, supra note 124, at 290-91. 
142. See J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 74, 78 (1972). The fact that the one study using 
older subjects found some effects on guilt and sentencing also suggests that bias may be stronger 
in prospective jurors than in students. See Feild, supra note 88. However, the apparent correla-
tion between age and racism may be spurious; it may result from the correlations between age 
and education, and education and racism. See notes 177-81 infra and accompanying text. 
143. Feild, supra note 88, at 277-78. 
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nipulation of race suggests that the results of the experiments may un-
derestimate the magnitude of the effect of race upon guilt attribution 
in the real trials. 144 
The dependent variable in the experiment - the assessment of 
guilt - differs in two ways from verdicts in real trials. First, most of 
the experiments use individual assessments of guilt whereas real trials 
rely upon the group's consensus or the majority verdict reached after 
deliberation. 145 Second, real jurors would almost certainly feel more 
responsibility for their decisions than do mock jurors. Neither of these 
differences is likely to account for the effect of race upon guilt attribu-
tion observed in the laboratory.146 The two studies using group ver-
dicts suggest that the introduction of group deliberations, at least 
where the group would be racially homogenous, would not eradicate the 
effect of race upon guilt attribution. One of these studies found that 
deliberations actually increased the tendency of white jurors to find 
black defendants more guilty than white defendants; 147 the other 
found that group deliberations did eliminate the effect of race upon 
guilt attribution, but all of the juries in that study contained jurors of 
both races. 148 Nor is it likely that the greater responsibility placed 
upon real jurors would eliminate the correlation between race and 
guilt attribution. Perhaps if we thought that the white subjects were 
deliberately judging black defendants more harshly, we might expect 
some inhibition of anti-black bias among real jurors, whose hostility 
might be tempered by awareness of the grave consequences of their 
decisions. On the other hand, conscious hostility might produce more 
biased results in real trials than in the laboratory, for the knowledge 
that no real harm would ensue from decisions in the laboratory would 
seem to decrease the motivation to treat blacks more harshly than 
whites. In any event, such speculation is not only inconclusive and 
unhelpful, it is probably irrelevant. Because the process of attributing 
guilt on the basis of race appears to be subconscious, jurors are un-
144. Other attributes of real trials may operate to increase the effects of racial bias. One 
experiment suggests that adversarial presentations increase the likelihood that pro-guilt or pro-
innocence biases will affect jurors' decisions. Kaplan & Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror 
Bias, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1443, 1449-50 (1978). 
145. Although the requirement of a unanimous verdict is most common, some states permit 
convictions based upon a majority vote. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (sixth 
amendment does not require jury unanimity). 
146. Simulations may, however, be very different from real trials in other respects. For ex-
ample, the overall rate of acquittals may be quite different in simulations. See Bennant, Mc-
Guire, McKinley & Salo, The Logic of Simulation in Jury Research, 1 CRIM. JuST. & BEHAV. 
224 (1974). 
147. Bernard, supra note 72, at 109. 
148. Lipton, supra note 15, at 281-82. 
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likely either to be aware of or to be able to control that process.149 
The seriousness of the consequences of bias cannot motivate jurors to 
put that bias aside if they are unaware of that bias. 
The last validity concern is that the laboratory setting interacts 
with race and guilt attribution - that the condition of being observed 
creates a correlation that does not exist anywhere but in the labora-
tory. Although this is possible, it is extremely unlikely where, as here, 
the phenomenon observed is socially disapproved. Ordinarily we 
would expect that awareness of an observer would discourage con-
scious manifestations of racial bias. 
Thus, none of the ordinary sources of concern about external va-
lidity seriously threatens the significance of the laboratory findings on 
race and guilt attribution. Moreover, as reviewed above, the data from 
real trials generally support the laboratory findings that racial bias in-
fluences criminal trials. Although the case studies may be questioned 
because of their age and limited number, and the conviction and sen-
tencing data are accurately said to suffer from lack of control, their 
consistency with the results of the mock jury studies bolsters the argu-: 
ment that those results reflect real world phenomena. In tum, the 
mock jury studies supply what is lacking from the trial data: first, 
proof that the racial bias reported by the older case studies is not an 
outdated or freakish phenomenon, but still operates upon many white 
Americans; and second, evidence that the racial disparities found in 
court records are not entirely the product of spurious correlations -
and may in fact underestimate the bias against black defendants due to 
the offsetting effects of other variables not controlled for, such as the 
victim's race. Finally, both the trial data and the mock jury studies are 
supported by the results of research on prejudice in other settings, to 
which we will now tum. 
C. General Research on Racial Prejudice 
The third data source, the vast body of general research on racial 
prejudice, in large part avoids both the problem of lack of control and 
the concern about external validity because most of it was collected in 
controlled laboratory settings and has been corroborated using a vari-
ety of measurement techniques. Although this research cannot substi-
tute for a more specific inquiry into the effects of racial bias on guilt 
attribution, a brief review of its results is useful for two reasons. Most 
importantly, a review of the patterns observed in other research on 
racial prejudice supports the external validity of the mock jury studies 
149. See notes 118-27 supra and accompanying text. 
1644 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1611 
by demonstrating that the results of those studies are consistent with a 
more general social phenomenon. Second, a summary of selected as-
pects of the general findings on racial prejudice provides some insight 
into a matter not covered by the mock jury studies - the control of 
discrimination. 
1. The Nature of Racial Prejudice 
Allport, in his classic book on prejudice, defined ethnic prejudice 
as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization."150 
Prejudice differs from ordinary errors of prejudgment in that prejudg-
ments may be discussed and rectified without emotional resistance. 151 
Racial prejudice causes a person to ignore information about an indi-
vidual contrary to his generalization, or stereotype, about that per-
son's racial group, 152 to fail to recognize errors of logic that would be 
obvious to him were an object of his prejudice not involved, 153 and to 
resist any implication that his conclusions resulted from prejudice. 154 
In the United States, racial stereotypes of black people have been 
overwhelmingly negative, and have encompassed a wide range of char-
acteristics.155 This is not surprising. When a minority is required to 
perform menial, distasteful, and dangerous types of work, it is conve-
nient for the majority to believe that members of that minority are 
unsuited for any other kind of task because they are stupid, lazy, 
unambitious, unable or unwilling to plan for the future and thus ori-
ented only toward immediate gratification, unclean, and otherwise un-
pleasant to associate with. It is also convenient for the majority to 
profess a few trivial positive stereotypes of the disadvantaged minority 
in order to persuade itself that it is not being unfair; disadvantaged 
minorities are therefore often believed to be content, appreciative, 
humble, and perhaps possessed of unusual musical or athletic abilities. 
However, if the minority begins to show signs of rebelling, additional 
negative stereotypes of dangerousness, unruliness, and criminal pro-
150. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954). 
151. Id. 
152. Id.; H. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 41-42 (1973); see also 
Kruglanski & Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay Inferences: Effects on Impressional 
Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping and Numerical Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCHOL• 
OGY 448, 454-58 (1983) (discussing the effect of ethnic stereotypes of Ashkenazi and Sephardic 
Jews upon awareness of plausible alternative hypotheses and attention to inconsistent pieces of 
evidence). 
153. G. ALLPORT, supra note 150, at 168-69 (prejudiced subjects determined syllogisms iden-
tical in form to differ in validity depending upon whether the conclusion supported or contra-
dicted their prejudices). 
154. Id. at 169. 
155. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 21 (1982). 
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pensity are likely to be adopted. 156 One expert describes the evolution 
of white beliefs about blacks and Hispanics as the prototypical exam-
ples of this kind of stereotyping.157 
There is ample empirical support for this characterization of white 
attitudes toward blacks. Every ethnic group except blacks ranks 
blacks at or near the bottom of the hierarchy of social preference.158 
Among the negative traits ascribed to blacks is a propensity for com-
mitting crimes. As early as 1946, a study of stereotypes in magazine 
fiction found that blonde Americans tended to be the heroes, while 
minority characters appeared only in minor roles and conformed to 
ethnic stereotypes.159 Numerous studies have since established that 
the general populace also tends to ascribe unfavorable behavioral qual-
ities to those with dark skin color, of whatever race. 160 When the dark-
skinned person is black, this tendency is often greatly exaggerated. 
For example, Allport showed subjects a picture of several people in a 
subway car, including a white man holding a razor and apparently 
arguing with a black man. Over half of the subjects reported that the 
black man held the razor. 161 A recent study asked white children be-
tween eight and ten years of age to select from a biracial set of photo-
graphs those individuals they believed to be murderers. Black males 
were perceived primarily as murderers and white males were not. 162 
This study also found differential perception of other violent crimes 
such as homicide, robbery, and assault. 163 When reading news re-
ports, whites (1) overwhelmingly ascribed violent crimes to black per-
petrators even though the reports did not supply a basis for such 
ascription, (2) overwhelmingly ascribed nonviolent crimes to white 
perpetrators even when the report did not support such ascription, and 
(3) made substantially greater attributions of crimes to black perpetra-
tors than did black readers. 164 Another study found that newspaper 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 96; see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15 (reporting results of a variety of 
measures of ethnic social distance and prejudice, all of which show blacks to be a disfavored 
ethnic group). 
159. Berelson & Salter, Majority and Minority Americans: An Analysis of Magazine Fiction, 
10 PUB. OPINION Q. 168 (1946). 
160. See Secord, Facial Features and Inference Processes in Interpersonal Perception, in PER-
SON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 300, 303-04 (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo eds. 
1958) (reviewing the literature). 
161. G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 111 (1965). 
162. J. Mayas, Perceived Criminality: The Attribution of Criminal Race from News-Re-
ported Crime, 9 (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation) (available at the University of Michigan) (citing 
another study). 
163. J. Mayas, supra note 162. 
164. Id. 
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accounts overemphasized black-on-white rape - and that white sam-
ple respondents perceived reality as consistent with the biased newspa-
per accounts rather than actual rape statistics.165 
The prevalance of phrases in the English language that link black-
ness to evil suggests the depth of the psychological process that causes 
these distortions of reality: to name but a few, "black as sin," "black 
heart," "black sheep," "black deed."166 This imagery is so powerful 
that white subjects do not make distinctions of degree; regardless of 
actual color or proportion of ancestry, a person who is labeled black 
will be assumed to have the full complement, full strength, of stere-
otypical characteristics.167 If a person is described as black, white sub-
jects are less interested in the other traits he possesses, and his 
likeability will be less influenced by other attributes than would the 
likeability of a person described as white.168 Furthermore, a recent 
study found that when a white subject was supplied with negative in-
formation about a black person, the subject would judge the person 
more unfavorably than an otherwise identically described white per-
son.169 Finally, an earlier study found that both high and low 
prejudiced subjects describe blacks pictured in stereotyped settings 
(jazz trio, rural slum, large family) with twice the frequency of nega-
tive stereotypes as the subjects would use to describe the same person 
pictured in a nonstereotyped (generally interracial) setting. 170 These 
findings are especially disturbing since they suggest that even "unprej-
165. Abbott & Calonico, Black Man, White Woman-The Maintenance of a Myth: Rape and 
the Press in New Orleans, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: DIMENSIONS OF DEVIANCE 141, 147, 
149 (M. Riedel & T. Thornberry eds. 1974). 
166. See, e.g .• L. HUGHES, BLACK MISERY (1969) ("Misery is when you first realize so many 
things bad have black in them, like black cats, black arts, blackball."), 
167. See Secord, Bevan & Katz, The Negro Stereotype and Perceptual Accentuation, 53 J, 
ABNORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 78, 81 (1956). 
168. See EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 81-82 (citing Long, Ziller & Thompson, A Comparison 
of Prejudices: The Effects Upon Friendship Ratings of Chronic Illness, Old Age, Education and 
Race, 70 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 101, 108 (1966)); see also Linville & Jones, 
Polarized Appraisals of Out-group Members, 38 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 689 
(1980) (reporting several experiments showing that white subjects considered fewer dimensions 
in evaluating the personality traits and abilities of individuals described as black than of individu-
als described as white). 
169. Linville & Jones, supra note 168, at 701; see also Forgas & Brown, The Effects of Race 
on Observer Judgments of Nonverbal Communications, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 243 (1978) (for 
white subjects, effects of positive nonverbal communication from black stimulus models were 
weaker than effects of positive nonverbal communication from white stimulus models); White-
head, Smith & Eichhorn, The Effect of Subject's Race and Other's Race on Judgments of Causal-
ity for Success and Failure, 50 J. PERSONALITY 193, 200 (1982) (both black and white subjects 
tended to attribute the failure of another "more to lack of ability when the other [was] racially 
dissimilar than when he [was] similar''). 
170. EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 40 (citing Riddleberger & Motz, Prejudice and Perception, 
62 AM. J. Soc. 498 (1957)). 
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udiced" jurors will respond with many negative stereotypes to the im-
age of a black person as a defendant in a criminal trial (which 
newspapers and popular opinion deem an expected setting) and, that 
given negative information in the form of the prosecution's evidence, 
they will judge the defendant more harshly if he is black than if he is 
white. Although disturbing, these inferences from the general re-
search on racial prejudice are entirely consistent with the results of the 
mock jury studies. 
2. The Persistence of Racially Prejudiced Attitudes 
Some social commentators have argued that race relations in this 
country have undergone such fundamental changes in recent years 
that the opportunities of black individuals are more influenced by their 
economic position than by race discrimination.I7 I This argument 
might be taken as support for the quite different proposition that prej-
udice no longer significantly affects the thinking of white Americans. 
Whether or not the former is correct, the latter is untenable. All of the 
mock jury studies (and many of the studies cited in the preceding sec-
tion concerning other findings on racial prejudice) were performed in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, it is useful to note the ways in 
which attitudes have and have not changed because some of the 
changes carry implications concerning the control of discrimination. 
Replications of early research on social preference reveal a rela-
tively stable pattern of aversion toward blacks. 172 Blacks are still at or 
near the bottom of general social preference scales.I73 Many negative 
feelings and stereotypes persist;174 for example, a 1978 poll found that 
a majority of Americans still opposed interracial marriage and 31 % 
preferred to live in a neighborhood with no blacks as neighbors. 175 
However, negative stereotypes appear to be less extreme and less wide-
spread than in the 1950s and 1960s.I76 
The prospects for further change in the immediate future are not 
171. See, e.g., w. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978). But see Willie, 
The Inclining Significance of Race, SOCIETY, July-Aug. 1978, at 10. 
172. EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 36, 14-15;see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 586 
(polls show lessening hostility toward blacks but majorities still object to black/white intermar-
riage and sizable minorities are opposed still to black neighbors). 
173. Blalock, supra note 155, at 96; see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15 (reporting 
results of a variety of measures of ethnic social distance and prejudice, all of which show blacks 
to be a disfavored ethnic group). 
174. J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, FUNCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE 92-95 (1982) 
(reviewing several recent studies); Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15. 
175. Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 591, 590. 
176. J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, supra note 174, at 92-95; Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 
591 (comparing poll data from different time periods). 
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particularly bright. One study found that between 1972 and 1977 the 
liberalizing trend drastically slowed down in some areas, halted en-
tirely in other areas, and that in a few areas (such as attitudes toward 
integrated housing and black assertiveness) intolerance was actually 
increasing.I77 Initially, correlations between age and prejudice sug-
gested that society-wide decreases in prejudice would occur gradually, 
but constantly, as older, more prejudiced persons were replaced by 
younger, more enlightened persons. However, it now appears that 
such correlations were spurious. There is a strong negative association 
between anti-black attitudes and education, but the apparent relation-
ship between anti-black attitudes and age is due primarily to the asso-
ciation of those variables with education.I78 Furthermore, recent 
observations of young white children continue to show a strong own-
race preference;I79 the only change from earlier studies on children's 
racial preferences is that more minority-race children now display an 
own-race preference whereas in earlier studies they tended to prefer 
white children. I80 One recent study found that white children between 
three and six years of age found it funnier to see a child of another 
racial or ethnic group victimized in humor than a white child; black 
and Mexican American children did not display this racially selective 
lack of empathy.I8I 
Finally, any encouragement that might be drawn from the initial 
decrease in extreme negative stereotypes must be qualified by the like-
lihood that newer data reflect some fading of stereotypes - but also 
some faking. Sigall and Page investigated the possibility that a change 
in the social acceptability of prejudice has tainted responses in the 
newer studies. I82 White subjects were asked to indicate how charac-
teristic each of twenty-two traits was of either "Americans" or "Ne-
groes"; half of the subjects were presumably free to distort their 
responses, but the other half were led to believe that the experimenter 
had an accurate physiological measure of their true attitudes, and 
these subjects were asked to predict that measure. The subjects attrib-
uted the favorable traits of intelligence, honesty, and sensitivity more 
177. J. LEVIN & w. LEVIN, supra note 174, at 92. 
178. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 75. 
179. See Newman, Liss & Sherman, supra note 136, at 104, 108 (reviewing several studies 
and reporting the results of a new study). 
180. Id. at 108 (black, Hispanic, and white children all tended to prefer same-ethnic pictures, 
although white children displayed this preference most strongly). 
181. McGhee & Duffey, Children's Appreciation of Humor Victimizing Different Racial-Eth• 
nic Groups: Racial-Ethnic Differences, 14 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 (1983). 
182. Sigall & Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 18 J. PERSONAL• 
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 247 (1971). 
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often to "Americans" when they thought the experimenter would 
know their true feelings and they attributed these traits less often to 
"Negroes" when they thought the experimenter would know their true 
feelings. 183 Of particular significance for our purpose is the fact that 
the effect of being told that their physiological responses were being 
monitored was the greatest for attribution of the trait of honesty. 184 
Moreover, ratings of the unfavorable traits of ostentatiousness, lazi-
ness, ignorance, physical dirtiness, stupidity, and unreliability were 
consistent with the ratings of the favorable traits: white subjects at-
tributed them more often to blacks (and less often to whites) when 
they thought the experimenter would know their true feelings. 185 
These results, which suggest that many people may be more reluc-
tant to admit prejudice than they were in the past, are complemented 
by observations concerning the prevalence of two kinds of racism. 
Dominative racists express their bigoted beliefs openly, frequently 
through physical force, while aversive racists do not want to associate 
with blacks but do not often express this feeling. 186 Social scientists 
once described the aversive mode as characterizing the North and the 
dominative mode as characterizing the South, but now suggest that 
aversive manifestations of racism increasingly predominate in all parts 
of the country. 187 Thus one might expect that many whites would 
agree in principle with the general goal of racial equality yet strongly 
resist specific reforms and perhaps believe that blacks are largely re-
sponsible for their inferior socioeconomic status. Poll data confirm the 
prevalence of such response patterns.188 
3. Prejudice and Discrimination 
Attitude/behavior congruence is a c~mplex phenomenon: the doc-
umentation of a certain level of racially prejudiced attitudes does not 
necessarily imply the same level of discrimination. Many of the stud-
ies reviewed above have not inquired about "pure" attitudes toward 
blacks but have instead investigated people's predictions about what 
183. Id. at 252. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 121-24; J. KovEL, WHITE RACISM 54-55 (1970). 
187. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 121-22. 
188. I. KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 14-16 (1981) (reviewing a 
variety of studies finding conflicting attitudes and ambivalent feelings toward blacks); Pettigrew, 
The Mental Health Impact, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 97, 115 (B. Bowser 
& R. Hunt eds. 1981); cf Smedley & Bayton, Categories of Attitudes Toward Behavior and the 
Attitude-Behavior Relationship, 113 J. PSYCHOLOGY 277 (1983) (general attitudes toward blacks 
did not correlate with students' predictions of successful treatment of black patients but attitudes 
toward blacks in positions of superior status did). 
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they would do in certain situations. Nevertheless, it is still possible 
that individuals would predict one behavior, but, when actually con-
fronted with the situation, would engage in another. 
Either prejudice or discrimination may be present without the 
other. Discrimination may be inhibited despite virulent prejudice. 
Where discrimination is not legally or socially approved, social scien-
tists predict that it will be practiced only when it is possible to do so 
covertly and indirectly.189 On the other hand, discrimination may be 
engaged in without the presence of prejudiced attitudes when it will 
lead to social approval. 190 In some cases, a person might cooperate 
with another's discriminatory behavior without even being aware that 
discrimination is taking place: many whites are quite insensitive to 
cues of prejudiced behavior in others.191 Finally, discrepancies be-
tween measured attitudes and actual behavior may occur because of 
dissimulation in the reporting of attitudes. As the Sigall and Page 
study suggests, it now may be quite common to underreport 
prejudiced attitudes, which will result in attitudinal data that underes-
timate the number of persons likely to engage in discrimination. 
Thus, it is not possible to generalize across types of discrimination 
and settings as to whether the prevalence of prejudiced attitudes un-
derestimates or overestimates the likelihood of discrimination. Conse-
quently, we cannot be certain that the general findings on prejudiced 
attitudes can be translated into accurate predictions of discriminatory 
verdicts, just as we cannot be certain that the mock jury studies have 
external validity. But, as with the mock jury studies, there are good 
reasons to predict that these general findings do not overestimate dis-
criminatory behavior in the jury box. First, this discrimination would 
not require open acknowledgment of prejudicial attitudes to others: it 
can be accomplished covertly by arguments that never allude to race. 
Second, the prejudice may well be unconscious, and thus influence 
judgments of guilt without the juror's acknowledging the prejudiced 
attitudes even to himself. Finally, several studies investigating dis-
crimination in real life situations similar to the trial assessment of guilt 
189. G. ALLPORT, supra note 150, at 56-57. 
190. Id. at 56; Bowser & Hunt, Afterthoughts and Reflections, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON 
WHITE AMERICANS 245, 247 (B. Bowser & R. Hunt eds. 1981). See generally Liska, Emergent 
Issues in the Attitude-Behavior Consistency Controversy, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1974). 
191. Rollman, The Sensitivity of Black and White Americans to Nonverbal Cues of Prejudice, 
105 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 73 (1978); see also M. Sherman, N. Sherman, & R. Smith, Racial and 
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Fairness: When Race Is Involved in a Job Promotion, 57 
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 719 (1983) (blacks and women perceived more unfairness in 
situations where one employee was promoted over an equally qualified employee), 
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have reported discriminatory behavior.192 
II. EXISTING TECHNIQUES FOR ELIMINATING THE INFLUENCE OF 
RACIAL BIAS ON CRIMINAL TRIALS 
The compelling evidence that many prospective jurors walk into 
the courtroom predisposed to convict black defendants must be mea-
sured against existing legal procedures designed to eliminate the influ-
ence of racial bias upon the jury's ultimate decision to convict or 
acquit. If these procedures are adequate, the prospective jurors' pre-
dispositions are immaterial to the defendant. Unfortunately, all of the 
traditional protections against racially biased verdicts - the assurance 
of a representative jury, the screening out of biased jurors, or the con-
trol of the content of the jury's deliberations - are inappropriate tools 
for neutralizing the effects of the amount and kind of bias documented 
in Part I. 
A. Assuring a Representative Jury 
Whether the racial composition of a jury is representative of the 
population depends upon a two-step process: the selection of the ve-
nire panel and the selection of prospective jurors from that panel to 
serve on a particular case. Racially discriminatory procedures in either 
phase of jury selection will result in an unrepresentative jury, but the 
Court has taken a very different approach to the two varieties of 
discrimination. 
1. Selection of the Venire Panel 
In 1875, Congress enacted a criminal prohibition against excluding 
192. See, e.g., Dutton & Lake, Threat of Own Prejudice and Reverse Discrimination in Inter-
racial Situations, 28 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1973); Gaertner, Doviclio & 
Johnson, Race of Victim, Nonresponsive Bystanders and Helping Behavior, 117 J. Soc. PSYCHOL-
OGY 69 (1982) (white subjects in the presence of passive bystanders helped black emergency 
victims less quickly than white emergency victims); Lipton, supra note 15, at 277 (students who 
believed they were actually determining the punishment of another student discriminated against 
other-race students); Mukherjee, Shukla, Woodle, Rosen, & Olarte, Misdiagnosis of Schizophre-
nia in Bipolar Patients: A Multiethnic Comparison, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1571 (1983) (black 
and Hispanic mental patients more likely to be misdiagnosed as schizophrenic even when other 
variables are controlled for); Yee, Comment on Schulman's Anicle, 81 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 629, 
632 (1975) (discussing finding that white subjects delivered more painful shocks to failing black 
confederate than to failing white confederate). Dutton and Lake found that whites who had been 
told that their responses to a questionnaire had shown them to be racially prejudiced gave more 
money to black panhandlers than to white panhandlers, but that whites who had been told that 
their responses showed them to be egalitarian gave less money to a black panhandler than to a 
white panhandler. Would "passing" the voir dire examination have a similar effect, that is, 
would it assure white jurors that they were unbiased and thus "free" them to discriminate against 
black defendants? 
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any qualified citizen from a jury on the basis of race. 193 Five years 
later in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a 
statute excluding blacks from jury service as a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 194 The Court held 
that a defendant is entitled to a jury comprised of his "neighbors, fel-
lows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that 
which he holds"; 195 it further declared that denying blacks the right to 
participate in the administration of law branded them as inferior and 
stimulated prejudice. 196 Shortly thereafter the Court brought the 
same rules to bear upon the selection of grand jurors, 197 and the fol-
lowing year the Court extended Strauder to racially discriminatory ad-
ministration of facially neutral jury selection laws. 198 
The impact of these early cases was quite limited for several de-
cades because of the requirement that the defendant show a purpose to 
discriminate on the part of jury oflicials. 199 However, in the 1935 case 
of Norris v. Alabama the Court held that if a defendant in a criminal 
case could show (1) the existence of a substantial number of blacks in 
the community and (2) their total exclusion from jury service, then he 
had made out a prima facie case of discrimination.200 When he had 
shown these facts, the burden of proof shifted to the state to prove that 
the exclusion did not flow from discrimination. 201 The Court declared 
that this burden could not be satisfied by general denials; testimony 
that no one was excluqed because of his color or that qualified blacks 
were not known to the commissioners would not be deemed sufli-
cient. 202 As cases arose that did not involve total exclusion of blacks, 
the Court extended the burden-shifting rule of Norris first to cases of 
gross underrepresentation203 and then to cases where a substantial dis-
parity between minority group members in the population and in the 
jury list "originated, at least in part, at the one point in the selection 
·process where the jury commissioners invoked their subjective judg-
193. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982)). 
194. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
195. 100 U.S. at 308. 
196. 100 U.S. at 308. 
197. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
198. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 
199. Unless the defendant proved the contrary, state action was presumed constitutional and 
lower courts findings were presumed correct. See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); 
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896). 
200. 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
201. 294 U.S. at 598. 
202. 294 U.S. at 598-99. 
203. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 
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ment rather than objective criteria."204 This trend culminated in the 
1977 Castaneda v. Partida decision, which held that a prima facie case 
of discrimination was established by a showing that the population of 
the vicinage was 79.1% Mexican American but that only 39% of the 
persons summoned for grand jury service over an eleven-year period 
were Mexican American. 205 
Discriminatory jury (and grand jury) selection procedures may be 
attacked in several ways. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the 
federal government may bring a criminal action against state officials 
responsible for the discrimination, but such prosecutions have been 
quite rare.206 Most common are direct appeals through the state 
courts and petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
by black defendants who have been convicted or indicted by a jury or 
grand jury from which blacks were excluded. Defendants who have 
exhausted their appeals process may petition a federal district court 
for habeas corpus relief.207 Although civil rights era case law from the 
Fifth Circuit had been receptive to discrimination claims raised for the 
first time on habeas corpus,208 in 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that 
failure to comply with procedural rules concerning the timing of ob-
jections waived discrimination claims. 209 In the same year, the Court 
held that a voluntary guilty plea insulated prior constitutional defects 
from collateral review.210 Ironically, as these decisions limited the 
number of black defendants prevailing on jury selection claims, the 
Court contemporaneously broadened the class of litigants permitted to 
raise the issue of the jury selection. In Carter v. Jury Commission211 
and Turner v. Fouche, 212 the Court recognized the standing of black 
citizens to raise constitutional and statutory challenges to the system-
atic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries. The plaintiffs did 
not prevail in either Carter or Turner, however, and successful civil 
class actions have been rare. 213 
204. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970). 
205. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
206. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979). See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), 
for an early conviction. 
207. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 
(1977). 
208. See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967); 
United States ex rel Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 
(1959). 
209. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 
210. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
211. 396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
212. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
213. Most of the successful challenges appear to have arisen in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., 
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A more drastic doctrinal change was brought about by the Court's 
determination in Peters v. Kif! that a white defendant could raise the 
issue of the exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries.214 Justice 
Marshall's plurality opinion concluded that a defendant is denied due 
process of law when he is indicted or tried by grand or petit juries that 
are plainly illegal in their composition.215 He reasoned that 
[W]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded 
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of 
human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is 
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that 
the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, 
as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human 
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be 
presented.216 
Three Justices concurred in the judgment, but relied upon the statu-
tory policy of the 1875 Civil Rights Act rather than the due process 
clause.217 
Evolution away from an equal protection basis for jury exclusion 
claims was completed in Taylor v. Louisiana where the Court upheld a 
male defendant's right to challenge a law excluding women from jury 
service;218 a majority of the Court agreed that the sixth amendment's 
guarantee of an impartial jury required a jury selected from a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community.219 The Court declared that 
if large distinctive gro~ps were excluded from the jury pool, the pur-
poses of the jury trial requirement might be frustrated and public con-
fidence in the criminal justice system might be eroded. 220 
The venire selection cases present several paradoxes. The language 
of Strauder has been described as "the most vigorous statement of the 
antidiscrimination principle to be found in the United States Reports 
for a full century after Emancipation";221 yet, early Strauder progeny 
Broadway v. Culpepper, 439 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1971); Black v. Curb, 422 F.2d 656 (5th Cir, 
1970); cf. Bradley v. Judges of Superior Ct., 372 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Calif. 1974). 
214. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
215. But cf. Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), holding that race or sex discrim• 
ination in selection of the primarily ministerial position of foreman of a federal grand jury has no 
appreciable effect on a white male defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness and thus 
does not require reversal of his conviction and dismissal of the indictment. Whether the result 
would be different under an equal protection challenge by a female or black defendant was left 
unanswered. 
216. 407 U.S. at 503-04. 
217. 407 U.S. at 505. 
218. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
219. 419 U.S. at 530. 
220. 419 U.S. at 530-31. 
221. Schmidt, Juries, Jurisdiction and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise o/Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 61 TEXAS L. REv. 1401, 1414 (1983). 
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may be criticized as indifferent to the practicalities of enforcing 
Strauder's commands.222 Still, it is obvious that jury selection was one 
of a very few areas in which equal protection doctrine had any vitality 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.223 This enhanced 
solicitude about venire selection processes persisted into the period in 
which equal protection doctrine was more broadly applied: the stan-
dards for proof of discriminatory purpose developed in this area were 
far more lenient than in virtually any other kind of equal protection 
litigation.224 Nevertheless, the apparently powerful equal protection 
doctrine operating in this area was suddenly eclipsed by a broader 
sixth amendment right. 22s 
Perhaps even stranger than the historical development and demise 
of an equal protection theory to explain venire selection requirements 
is the Court's consistently sharp distinction between venire selection 
and the composition of individual juries. All the venire selection cases 
stress that the exclusion of minorities impairs the impartiality and le-
gitimacy of the jury system; one might assume that this reasoning 
would lead the Court to hold that a defendant's jury - and not simply 
the panel from which the jury is selected - must include minorities. 
Certainly bias can only manifest itself in individual cases and it is from 
individual cases that an impression of unfairness is formed. Yet the 
Court has adamantly maintained from Strauder to Taylor that all the 
Constitution forbids is systematic exclusion from jury panels. A de-
fendant may not "challenge the makeup of a jury merely because no 
members of his race are on the jury,"226 for there is no requirement 
that his particular jury be representative. 
It is not clear how successful the fourteenth or sixth amendment 
doctrines have been in increasing the representation of blacks in jury 
venires. While these doctrines should be credited with eliminating the 
most egregious exclusions of blacks, substantial underrepresentation 
222. Id. 
223. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (applying "separate but equal" doctrine to 
segregation of public transportation facilities). The equal protection clause was also alive during 
this period in cases involving property rights. See City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 
(1930); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
224. Compare, for example, the standard for proving discriminatory purpose in civil cases, as 
set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
225. But see Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), which dismissed a white male's 
due process claim that race or sex discrimination in the selection of the federal grand jury 
foreperson violated fundamental fairness without examining the impact of such discrimination 
upon his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury selected from a representative cross section 
of the community. 
226. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972). 
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persists.227 Regardless of the adequacy of these doctrines for their 
avowed purpose, they provide only incidental protection against the 
risk of wrongful, racially biased convictions. The prejudice docu-
mented in Part I operates in individual cases, altering the assessment 
of the guilt of particular defendants. Even if the jury venire includes a 
representative number of blacks, the black defendant may face an all-
white jury. This can occur when there are virtually no blacks in the 
community in which the defendant is being tried and thus virtually no 
blacks on the jury panel, or when the luck of the draw results in no 
blacks being drawn to serve on his case despite a large number of 
blacks being called for jury duty. It can even occur when blacks are 
among those called to serve on the defendant's case if the prosecutor 
uses his peremptory challenges to eliminate all prospective black ju-
rors. The reason for the absence of black jurors is immaterial; if a 
black defendant faces an all-white jury, he faces a substantial risk that 
the assessment of his guilt will be affected by his race. The most that 
can be said for the doctrines that assure the representative presence of 
blacks on the jury rolls is that they seem to be a logical first step in 
eliminating the influence of racial bias on verdicts. 
2. Racially Selective Use of Peremptory Challenges 
If the doctrines that govern the first stage of jury selection make 
only very modest progress toward eliminating racial bias in criminal 
trials, the permissive rules that shape the second stage of jury selection 
reverse even those limited gains. The procedures determining which 
of the jurors on the jury panel will decide a case frequently result in 
all-white juries trying black defendants even when a substantial 
number of blacks had been present on the panel. The process begins 
with a list of eligible jurors, from which the venire for a particular 
term is chosen. After some jurors are excused for health or hardship 
reasons, the venire is questioned and challenges are made. Prospective 
jurors may be struck from a panel in two ways: a judge may remove 
"for cause" any juror whose bias is demonstrated by either side, and 
either side may exercise a given number of "peremptory" challenges, 
for which no reason need be given. Although challenges for cause 
may affect the black defendant's chances of an unbiased determination 
of his guilt,228 it is the peremptory challenge that affects these chances 
by altering the representativeness of the jury's composition. 
227. See, e.g., Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968). 
228. These effects are discussed in Part II. B. 1. infra. 
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In Swain v. Alabama229 the prosecutor used his peremptory chal-
lenges to strike all six blacks from the defendant's jury panel. The 
Supreme Court held that it is "permissible to insulate from inquiry the 
removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the 
prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he 
is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime 
charged."230 The Court reasoned that the function of the peremptory 
challenge was "not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both 
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the 
case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and 
not otherwise."231 This function of the challenge could only be per-
formed if each side could act upon vague impressions and even 
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official ac-
tion, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of 
people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or de-
fense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or 
nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is 
less likely to be. 232 
Swain had further argued that his was not an isolated case of ra-
cially selective use of the peremptory challenge but that prosecutors in 
the county in which he was tried had systematically used their strikes 
to prevent all blacks on the petit jury venire from serving on the jury 
itself. The Court acknowledged that this claim "raise[d] a different 
issue," and that if the defendant could prove that regardless of the 
crime, the defendant, or the victim, the state were responsible for the 
removal of all blacks from juries, then the allegation that blacks were 
being denied the right to participate in the administration of justice 
would be supported. 233 This use of the peremptory challenge would 
pervert its purpose and raise ~ fourteenth amendment claim. 234 In 
short, if the peremptory challenge were used to circumvent the Court's 
jury venire selection requirements, thus denigrating the rights of pro-
spective black jurors, this might be unconstitutional. But if it were 
merely used in cases with black defendants, thus decreasing their 
chances of acquittal, this was entirely proper. 
The Court found no need actually to adjudicate the constitutional-
ity of a uniform use of the peremptory challenge to strike all black 
229. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
230. 380 U.S. at 223. 
231. 380 U.S. at 219. 
232. 380 U.S. at 220-21. 
233. 380 U.S. at 223-24. 
234. 380 U.S. at 224. 
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jurors because it deemed Swain's proof of this practice insufficient. 
Although Swain had shown that there had never been a black juror on 
a civil or criminal case in his county, the Court ruled that this evi-
dence did not demonstrate that the prosecutor alone was responsible 
for such absence, citing testimony concerning several other cases in 
which the defense had agreed with the prosecution not to include 
blacks in the jury.23s 
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Douglas, dissented on the question of whether the defendant had met 
the burden of proof on the systematic exclusion issue.236 The dissent 
viewed the testimony as establishing that "the general practice was not 
to include Negroes by agreement between the prosecution and defense 
or by the State acting alone."237 The dissent further objected that the 
defendant did not have an obligation to prove state involvement in the 
systematic exclusion; according to the previous systematic exclusion 
cases, proof that no black person had ever served on a petit jury in the 
county made out a prima facie case of unlawful exclusion that shifted 
the burden of proof to the state.238 The dissent did not, however, dis-
pute the majority's treatment of Swain's claim regarding the exclusion 
of blacks from the jury impaneled in a particular case.239 
The immediate effects of Swain were entirely predictable. As the 
lower courts applied the Swain standard for proving systematic chal-
lenge, it turned out that no defendant could satisfy it. Adhering to the 
language of Swain, the lower courts made clear that it was inappropri-
ate to present as evidence only those cases involving black defend-
ants. 240 Twenty years later, there are no reported cases in which a 
court has determined that invidious discrimination under Swain has 
been demonstrated.241 
235. 380 U.S. at 224-28. 
236. 380 U.S. at 228-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
237. 380 U.S. at 235. 
238. 380 U.S. at 238. 
239. 380 U.S. at 245. 
240. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
961 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the per-
emptory challenge was used against black jurors only when the defendant was black); McKinney 
v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C. 1974); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976); State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1975); Ford v. State, 530 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1975); State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769 (fex. 
Crim. App. 1972). 
241. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 
86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1715 n.4, 1723 n.36 (1977); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 14, 24 (1977) and 79 
A.L.R. 3d 14-73, 1984 Supplement 3. Several cases acknowledged the difficulty in meeting the 
Swain standard but concluded it is not an impossible task. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 
F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 
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Swain's total rejection of an equal protection claim based upon the 
exclusion of blacks from a particular jury provoked a steady stream of 
unusually harsh comments. 242 Initially these views found judicial ap-
proval only in sporadic dissenting opinions;243 even in extreme cases244 
the lower courts unanimously followed Swain until 1974.245 That year 
Judge Alvin Rubin rejected the defendant's equal protection claim, 
but, relying upon a combination of factors including the prosecutor's 
use of all his peremptory challenges to strike black jurors, granted a 
new trial "in the interest of justice" under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 33.246 In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit warned that 
it viewed with concern the practice of striking black persons from ju-
ries hearing cases with black defendants and suggested to trial judges 
that action in the exercise of their supervisory powers might be appro-
priate were abuses to continue.247 However, when then federal district 
Judge Jon 0. Newman held that a pattern of exercising peremptory 
challenges against blacks called for the exercise of his supervisory 
power to halt further abuses, the Second Circuit granted a writ of 
mandamus sought by the United States Attorney and vacated his 
order.248 
Hop·e for reform was rekindled by the 1978 decision of People v. 
1207 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Reed, 324 So. 2d 373 (La. 1975). The California Court of Appeals 
noted the impossibility of meeting the Swain standard as one reason to abandon it. People v. 
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); see also State v. Crespin, 94 
N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). One court has modified the Swain burden of 
proof. See notes 273-74 infra and accompanying text. 
242. Kuhn, supra note 227; Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic.-Exclusion of Prospec- _ 
tive Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, supra note 241; Note, Fair Jury 
Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322,325 (1965); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory 
Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Loms U. L.J. 662 (1974); 
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White 
Jury, 52 V-A. L. REv. 1157 (1966); Recent Development, United States v. Robinson-Racial 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977); see also Hayden, Senna & Siegel, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use 
in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REv. 768, 769 nn. 3-4 (1978). But 
see Recent Decisions, JURIES - Systematic Exercise of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Negro 
Jurors May Violate the Equal Protection Clause, 1965 U. ILL L.F. 588 (arguing that Court struck 
proper balance between competing concerns). 
243. See, e.g .• State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); State v. Gray, 
285 So. 2d 199 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 336 
A.2d 290 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting). 
244. See, e.g., State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970) (prosecutor used all of his 15 
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from defendant's jury). 
245. Annot., supra note 241, at 27-32. · 
246. United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974) (defendant failed to 
prove the systemic exclusion of blacks from juries). 
247. United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); see 
also United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). 
248. United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), revd. sub nom. United 
States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Wheeler. 249 In Wheeler, the Supreme Court of California held that the 
use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the sole 
ground of group bias violated the state analogue of the sixth amend-
ment to the federal Constitution, article 1, section 16 of the California 
constitution. 250 The opinion reasoned that the rationale of Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 251 requiring a cross section of the community as an indis-
pensable part of the right to an impartial jury, could not logically be 
confined to venire selection. 252 It concluded that a party is entitled to 
a petit jury that is as near an approximation of an ideal cross section of 
the community as a random draw permits;253 peremptory challenges 
were therefore permissible to eliminate "specific bias" but not to elimi-
nate bias presumed solely on the basis of group association.254 The 
court explained that the use of the peremptory challenge would be 
presumed proper unless a party could make out a prima facie case of 
improper use; this burden could be met by evidence such as proof that 
(1) the opposing party had struck from the venire most or all of the 
members of the identified group, or (2) the opposing party had exer-
cised a disproportionate number of his peremptory challenges against 
members of that group, or (3) the jurors in question shared only the 
characteristic of membership in that group and in all other respects 
were as heterogeneous as the community as a whole, or (4) the oppos-
ing party failed to engage those jurors in more than perfunctory voir 
dire.255 Upon such a showing, the party accused of using his peremp-
tory challenges improperly would have to satisfy the court that the 
challenges were not predicated upon group bias alone but based upon 
grounds relevant to the particular case, its parties, or witnesses.256 If 
the accused party failed to rebut the prima facie case, the trial court 
would be required to dismiss the jurors thus far selected and quash the 
remaining venire. 257 Throughout its opinion the court made clear that 
either the prosecution or defense could object to peremptory chal-
lenges based upon group bias, that the defendant need not be a mem-
ber of the group he claimed was being improperly challenged, and that 
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude any identifiable group 
249. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
250. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
251. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
252. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03. 
253. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
254. 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
255. 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06. 
256. 22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
257. 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
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cognizable under Taylor would be susceptible to this kind of attack.258 
Justice Richardson, dissenting, argued that the values protected by 
Swain - the jury's impartiality and the litigant's confidence in the 
jury's impartiality - were compromised by the majority's ruling.259 
He also objected that the remedy was standardless, ineffective, and 
time-consuming. 260 
A few months later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
decided Commonwealth v. Soares. 261 The defendants in Soares and its 
three companion cases argued that peremptory challenges could not 
be used to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their member-
ship within an ethnic group. The Massachusetts court agreed, and, 
reasoning from the premise of a fair cross-section requirement in much 
the same manner as the California court had in Wheeler, ruled that the 
use of peremptory challenges against discrete groups violated the state 
constitutional assurance of an impartial jury.262 To enforce the state 
constitutional guarantee of a petit jury as near to the ideal cross sec-
tion of the community as the process of a random draw permits, 
Soares adopted the mechanics worked out by the Wheeler court. 263 
Unlike Wheeler, however, Soares identified in advance those group af-
filiations that could not be the object of peremptory challenges: sex, 
race, color, creed, and national origin.264 This list was derived from 
the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, which prohibits denying 
or abridging equality under the law based upon any of these character-
istics. 265 The concurrence in Soares, joined by three justices, agreed 
that the extraordinary circumstances of the case (the prosecutor 
struck twelve of thirteen prospective black jurors) warranted reversal, 
but found it unnecessary and unwise to establish the broad rule 
adopted by the majority.266 
Wheeler and Soares have received substantial attention, both from 
commentators and from other state courts. While much of the com-
mentary has been favorable,267 many critics dispute the Wheeler/ 
258. 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06. 
259. 22 Cal. 3d at 292, 294, 583 P.2d at 771, 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14 (Richardson, J., 
dissenting). 
260. 22 Cal. 3d at 293,583 P.2d at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
261. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). 
262. 377 Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516. 
263. 377 Mass. at 488-91, 387 N.E.2d at 516-18. 
264. 377 Mass. at 488-89, 387 N.E.2d at 516. 
265. 377 Mass. at 488-89 n.33, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.33. 
266. 377 Mass. at 493-94, 387 N.E.2d at 519 (Braucher, J., concurring). 
267. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK § 4.01-4.04 (1983); Note, Systematic Exclusion 
of Cognizable Groups by Use of Peremptory Challenges, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927 (1983); Note, 
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Soares premise that an impartial jury panel is necessarily obtained 
from a random draw approximation of a fair cross section of the com-
munity, 268 and a few stress the practical difficulties pointed out by the 
Wheeler dissent.269 Only New Mexico has followed California in rul-
ing that the state constitution prohibits the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate any cognizable group.270 However, four state 
courts have procrastinated in interpreting their state constitutions by 
ruling that the specific defendant before the court had failed to make 
out a prima facie case under the Wheeler/Soares test,271 and two state 
c9urts have abandoned Swain and adopted intermediate positions.272 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that the defendant's show-
ing that the prosecutor in his case had been involved in six cases in 
which a disproportionate number of blacks had been struck from the 
venire was sufficient to establish "systematic exclusion" of blacks,273 
and that this showing shifted the burden of proof to the state to show 
that no discrimination on the basis of race had been practiced. 274 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court postponed resolution of the question of 
whether _use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate black jurors in a 
single case would have violated the right of individual dignity guaran-
teed by article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.275 
Florida has chosen a different compromise. Relying on Florida's 
People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely for Group 
Association, 58 N.C. L. REv. 152 (1979); Comment, Discrimination in Jury Selection Via Peremp• 
tory Challenge: Many are Called, But Few Are Chosen, 5 N. ILL U.L. REV. 71 (1984); Com-
ment, Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Racial Minorities from Criminal 
Juries, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 71 (1984); Comment, People v. Wheeler: California's Answer to 
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 897 (1979); Casenote, Prosecutoria/ 
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups from the Petit Jury: Common-
wealth v. Soares, 21 B.C. L. REv. 1197 (1980). 
268. Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and 
Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to 
Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, The Defendant's Right]; Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury 
Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177 (1980). 
269. See Note, The Defendant's Right, supra note 268; Comment, A New Standard for Per• 
emptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REv. 189 (1979). 
270. State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). 
271. Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1981); Saunders v. State, 401 A.2d 629 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980); 
Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa. 359, 424 A.2d 1231 (1981). 
272. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 
1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979). 
273. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979). 
274. 371 So. 2d at 754; see also People v. Frazier, 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 469 N.E.2d 594 
(1984) (deciding to publish the names of prosecutors whose use of peremptory challenges have 
been questioned to help defendants meet the Swain burden of proving systematic exclusion). 
275. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979); see State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 
1979) (Dennis, J., concurring) (proposing broader protection under article I, section 3). 
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constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury, the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled that neither party may use peremptory challenges to ex-
cise a distinct racial group from a jury;276 the court explicitly reserved 
decision on the applicability of its rationale to the striking of other 
cognizable groups such as those based on sex, ethnicity, or religion.277 
This alternative was first advanced in a New York intermediate appel-
late court case, People v. Thompson, 278 which has since been disap-
proved. 279 The New York Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed its 
adherence to Swain, 280 as have at least a dozen other state courts.281 
In May of 1983 the Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition 
for certiorari in the New York case, McCray v. New York, 282 despite 
the State of New York's request that the petition be granted.283 Two 
Justices dissented.284 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, 
noted that Swain had been decided before the Court had held the sixth 
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment and well before the Court had interpreted the sixth amendment 
to require a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.285 
He expressed the view that the fair cross-section right is "rendered 
meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury,"286 and then concluded 
that the Court should reexamine Swain to determine whether it could 
276. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). 
277. 457 So. 2d at 487. 
278. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981). 
279. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). But see 57 N.Y.2d at 552 n.l, 443 N.E.2d at 920 n.1, 457 N.Y.S.2d 
at 446 n.1 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
280. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (198i), cert 
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). 
281. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 450 So. 2d 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Blackwell v. State, 
248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981); People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983); 
Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 1982); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 
(1979); Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1984); Lawrence v. State, 51 Md. 
App. 575, 444 A.2d 478 (1982), affd., 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983); State v. Sims, 639 
S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981), 
review denied, appeal dismissed, 305 N.C. 306, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982); Lee v. State, 637 P.2d 879 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Thompson, 276 S.C. 616, 281 S.E.2d 216 (1981), habeas corpus 
granted on other grounds sub nom. Thompson v. Leeke, 590 F. Supp. 110 (D.S.C. 1984), order 
affd., 756 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979); see also 
Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981) (white defend-
ant challenging use of peremptory challenges to exclude all whites from his jury). 
282. 461 U.S. 961 (1983). The Court also denied certiorari in two companion cases, Miller v. 
Illinois and Perry v. Louisiana. 
283. 461 U.S. at 970 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
284. 461 U.S. at 963. 
285. 461 U.S. at 967. 
286. 461 U.S. at 967. 
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be reconciled with the sixth amendment.287 Justice Stevens' opinion, 
joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, explained that his vote to 
deny certiorari did not reflect disagreement with the dissent's ap-
praisal of the importance of the underlying issue, 288 but rather the 
view that sound exercise of the Court's discretion dictated "allow[ing] 
the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives 
further study before it is addressed by this Court."289 
Four months later, in Gilliard v. Mississippi, 290 the majority again 
declined to review the use of peremptory challenges to remove black 
jurors from a black defendant's jury. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined 
by Justice Brennan, addressed the position taken by Justices Stevens, 
Powell, and Blackmun in McCray: 
When a majority of this Court suspects that such rights are being regu-
larly abridged, the Court shrinks from its constitutional duty by awaiting 
developments in state or other federal courts. Because abuse of peremp-
tory challenges appears to be most prevalent in capital cases, the need for 
immediate review in this Court is all the more urgent. If we postpone 
consideration of the issue much longer, petitioners in this and similar 
cases will be put to death before their constitutional rights can be vindi-
cated. Under the circumstances, I do not understand how in good con-
science we can await further developments, regardless of how helpful 
those developments might be to our own deliberations.291 
Reviewing the steadfast adherence of most state courts to Swain even 
in the face of egregious factual circumstances, Justice Marshall also 
expressed doubt that many states would engage in meaningful recon-
sideration of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges - at 
least in the foreseeable future.292 
In 1984 the Court twice more avoided the peremptory challenge 
issue. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, reiterated his sixth 
amendment objections in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in 
three companion cases from Illinois.293 In the more recent case, 
Thompson v. United States, 294 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, voiced a second reason for reexamining Swain. Brennan, who 
had joined the majority's opinion in Swain in 1965, argued that the 
decision's equal protection analysis was wrong: 
287. 461 U.S. at 970. 
288. 461 U.S. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
289. 461 U.S. at 963. 
290. 104 s. Ct. 40 (1983). 
291. 104 S. Ct. at 42. 
292. 104 S. Ct. at 42-44. 
293. Williams v. Illinois, decided with Dixon v. Illinois and Yates v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 2364 
(1984). 
294. 105 s. Ct. 443 (1984). 
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With the hindsight that two decades affords, it is apparent to me that 
Swain's reasoning was misconceived. Stripped of its historical embellish-
ments, Swain holds that the state may presume in exercising peremptory 
challenges that only white jurors will be sufficiently impartial to try a 
Negro defendant fairly. In other words, Swain authorizes the presump-
tion that a Negro juror will be partial to a Negro defendant simply be-
cause both belong to the same race. Implicit in such a presumption is 
profound disrespect for the ability of individual Negro jurors to judge 
impartially. It is the race of the juror, and nothing more, that gives rise 
to the doubt in the mind of the prosecutor. Whatever the justification 
for permitting the idiosyncratic use of peremptory challenges in the run 
of cases, that justification ought not extend to permit the Government to 
make use of an unfounded racial presumption that disparages Negroes in 
this way.295 
In the meantime, the defendant in McCray v. New York sought 
relief from a federal district court by filing a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, alleging the violation of his sixth amendment rights. 
The Eastern District of New York granted the writ296 and the Second 
Circuit affirmed in part, holding that McCray had established a prima 
facie case of a sixth amendment violation, but remanded the case for a 
hearing to enable the state to rebut the showing. 297 The Second Cir-
cuit acknowledged that the defendant had no right to a petit jury of 
any particular composition, but reasoned that the sixth amendment 
prohibits a state from unreasonably restricting the possibility that the 
petit jury will comprise a fair cross section of the community.298 The 
court then outlined a procedure for implementing its holding similar 
to those adopted in Wheeler and Soares. 299 The dissent objected that 
the result reached by the majority was both unworkable and unsup-
ported by the Supreme Court's sixth amendment decisions. 300 In 
March of 1985 a majority of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
voted to deny rehearing in bane. 301 
Perhaps because McCray created a ~onflict between the circuits, 302 
the Supreme Court finally voted to consider a sixth amendment attack 
on the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges; on April 
22, 1985, the Court granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certi-
295. 105 S. Ct. at 445. 
296. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
297. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). 
298. 750 F.2d at 1128-29. 
299. 750 F.2d at 1131-32. 
300. 750 F.2d at 1136-39 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
301. McCray v. Abrams, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985). 
302. Cf. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting a Jack 
of conflict between the circuits as one reason to postpone Supreme Court review). 
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orari in Batson v. Kentucky. 303 Batson is pending as this Article goes to 
press.304 
These developments are encouraging, but it is easy to overestimate 
their significance for the black defendant. Swain itself is worse than 
useless in protecting the black defendant from racial prejudice, for it 
affirmatively sanctions the very practice that threatens equal justice: 
the elimination of black jurors in cases involving black defendants. In 
its focus on the rights of prospective black jurors, Swain neglects the 
more compelling interests of the black defendant; in its focus on the 
possibility of a pro-black bias on the part of black jurors, Swain ig-
nores the existence of anti-black bias on the part of white jurors. Un-
fortunately, similar flaws also mar the reformers' proposals. 
Because the Swain Court looked at the peremptory challenge issue 
through the lens of the jury venire exclusio~ cases, it saw no equal 
protection violation. In the jury exclusion cases, black citizens were 
being denied the right to participate in the administration of justice -
and stigmatized as unfit to do so. Absent proof that the peremptory 
challenge was being used to prevent blacks from ever participating as 
jurors, the Court concluded that the analogy to the venire selection 
cases (and hence, the constitutional claim) must fail. This analysis 
forgot the interests of the person asserting that the Constitution had 
been violated. From the defendant Swain's perspective, the opportu-
nity of black jurors to sit on other juries was of no interest at all; his 
sole concern was the racial composition of the jury determining his 
guilt or innocence. Ironically, Justice Brennan's criticism of Swain's 
equal protection reasoning does not depart from this focus on the pro-
spective black juror. Instead, he refines the analysis of that perspective, 
noting that black jurors are stigmatized even if permitted to partici-
pate in other cases because the exclusion from cases involving black 
defendants presumes that black jurors are unable to be impartial to-
ward persons of their own race. 
To a lesser extent, the impartial jury/fair cross section of the com-
munity argument for overruling Swain, whether expressed in sixth 
amendment or state constitutional terms, also fails to focus on the de-
fendant. The state court decisions have been clear that the right to a 
fair cross section of the community is not solely the defendant's right, 
303. 105 S. Ct. 2111 (No. 84-6263). 
304. Also pending is the state's petition for certiorari in the McCray case. McCray v. 
Abrams, 53 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985) (No. 84-1426). When the Court granted certio• 
rari in Batson, the defendant-respondent in McCray moved for expedited consideration of the 
state's petition and consolidation with Batson, but this motion was denied. McCray v. Abrams, 
105 S. Ct. 2318 (1985) (order denying motion to expedite consideration and consolidate), 
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but may be asserted by either party; really it is the community's right 
to a representative jury that is being protected. Despite some ambigu-
ity, both Justice Marshall's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Mc-
Cray v. New York305 and the Second Circuit's opinion in McCray v. 
Abrams306 suggest that a sixth ~endment attack on the racially moti-
vated case of the peremptory challenge would only be available to the 
defendant. But even if the sixth amendment argument prevails and 
the right is assigned only to the defendant, the focus is still blurred and 
a significant gap will be left in the protection of individual d~fendants. 
All formulations have described the fair cross-section right as the right 
to as fair a cross section as a random draw produces. This will cer-
tainly protect more defendants from the influence of racial bias than 
does Swain. For the individual defendant whose randomly drawn jury 
turns out to be unrepresentative, however, the racial prejudice docu-
mented in Part I still may affect the determination of his guilt; that 
other defendants will have representative juries is neither consolation 
nor compensation. Furthermore, in nearly all-white communities, 
even random draws that do produce a representative cross section of 
the community will not eliminate the effects of racial prejudice; for 
black defendants tried in such communities, a jury composed of a rep-
resentative cross section provides no protection at all. 
The second oversight in Swain is also worthy of comment, first, 
because it has served to justify Swain and is empirically wrong, and 
second, because the opponents of Swain attack the oversight but pro-
ceed upon empirically incorrect assumptions of their own. Swain jus-
tifies the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate black jurors from 
cases involving black defendants as based upon the prosecutor's suspi-
cion - which the Court views as reasonable - that these jurors will 
be prejudiced in favor of black defendants. It is analogous, reasoned 
the Court, to striking persons of the same religion, nationality, occupa-
tion, or affiliation as the defendant; the question for the prosecutor is 
"not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact par-
tial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be."307 A 
305. Justice Marshall writes only of the defendant's right to question the prosecutor's use of 
his peremptory challenge, but he does note that the effect of excluding minorities is not limited to 
the individual defendant, but produces "injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to 
the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts." 
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballard v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)). 
306. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit also speaks only of the defendant's 
right to challenge the prosecutor's striking of minorities, but does not address the dissent's con-
tention, 750 F.2d at 1138 (Meskill, J., dissenting), that its ruling will have a negative impact on 
the defense's use of peremptory challenges. 
307. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965). 
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federal district court judge rephrased this position more graphically: 
[I]f statistics were compiled on the basis of any particular religion, e.g., 
Jewish, Catholic, or any particular nationality, e.g., Italian or Chinese, 
similar results might be found, i.e., there is a pattern by state prosecutors 
to peremptorily challenge veniremen from the same genetic, religious or 
national background on the unstated grounds that such persons might be 
partial toward a defendant of like kin. 308 
Despite the superficial appeal of this comparison, it is inapt, for it 
ignores the extraordinarily vulnerable position of black Americans, a 
position not shared by religious, occupational, or white ethnic groups. 
The history of widespread and virulent prejudice against blacks can 
hardly be compared to the typical juror's sentiments about Italian 
Americans or about carpenters. As the empirical evidence reviewed in 
Part I demonstrates, white jurors discriminate against black defend-
ants in the assessment of their guilt; one would not expect that white 
jurors of non-Italian ancestry who work in other occupations will dis-
criminate against Italian American carpenters. Instead of acknowl-
edging the virulence of anti-black sentiment among whites, the Court 
permitted the prosecutor to presume a pro-black bias among blacks. 
But the mock jury studies revealed no distorting pro-black bias; black 
jurors judged black defendants as white jurors judged white defend-
ants. It may or may not be true that eliminating Italian American 
carpenters from an Italian American carpenter's jury will result in a 
more impartial jury, but, in any event, it is unlikely to result in a less 
impartial jury. For this reason, a prosecutor's action in striking Ital-
ian American carpenters from an Italian American carpenter's jury 
fits the Court's characterization of seeking a juror who is more likely 
to be impartial. But this description does not fit the action of striking 
a black juror from a black defendant's jury; the prosecutor hopes to 
replace the black juror with a white juror - who is more likely to be 
biased in the assessment of the defendant's guilt than was the black 
juror.309 
All critics of Swain argue that black jurors will be as impartial to 
black defendants as will white jurors, but they do not point out that 
308. McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D.S.C. 1974). 
309. The comparison is also inapt for its inattention to numerical considerations pertaining 
to the victim's group affiliation. If the defendant is a Swedish American and the victim is a 
Norwegian American, in most communities the prosecutor will use his peremptory challenges to 
eliminate Swedish Americans while the defense attorney will use his peremptory challenges to 
eliminate Norwegian Americans. This leaves none of the jurors with a sense of ethnic identifica-
tion with either defendant or accuser. However, the black defendant with a white victim usually 
cannot counteract the effects of the prosecutor's challenges in this manner because there are so 
many more whites on the jury venire than blacks. 
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they are more likely to be impartial.310 Moreover, the reformers some-
times suggest that black jurors as a whole will not differ from white 
jurors in their assessment of black defendants' guilt,311 and this of 
course is incorrect. The advocates of a "cross section of the commu-
nity" approach to overruling Swain have an additional empirical blind 
spot: they fail to recognize that prejudice against blacks differentiates 
use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate racial groups from use of 
the peremptory challenge against other kinds of cognizable groups. It 
might be argued that this indifference to the kind of group being ex-
cluded only results in broader protection for the defendant, but its 
broader "protection" doubtless stiffens resistance to the adoption of 
this approach. As a practical matter, it also precludes evolution from 
the currently advocated standard of "as representative a cross section 
of the community as a random draw provides" to a standard looking 
at the actual composition of particular juries. 
Neither Strauder and Swain nor their likely successors protect the 
black defendant from the racial prejudice prevalent among white ju-
rors. While this "failure" is in part attributable to unsupported and 
unsupportable empirical assumptions, it is also an inevitable conse-
quence of the intended function of these doctrines, assuring representa-
tive juries. The goal of assuring representative juries only partially 
coincides with the goal of protecting minorities from prejudicial as-
sessment of their guilt. For this reason, the possible successors to 
Swain could improve the prospects of an unbiased determination of 
guilt for many black defendants, but such an improvement would not 
approach comprehensive protection against racial prejudice for all 
black defendants. 
B. Eliminating Biased Jurors 
Perhaps it is not so surprising that the procedures required to as-
sure a representative jury do not provide much protection to the mi-
310. Quarrels with terminology are possible here. One might say that black jurors are partial 
toward black defendants and that white jurors are partial toward white defendants rather than 
that black jurors are impartial only toward black defendants and that white jurors are impartial 
only toward white defendants. This dispute rehashes the question of whether disparities in the 
tendency to convict result from inappropriate lenience toward own-race defendants or inappro-
priate harshness toward other-race defendants. As explained in Part I, for the purposes of an 
equal protection argument, the interpretation of the disparity makes no difference. It is of some 
importance in argument based upon the right to an impartial jury, but here I think it is necessary 
to deem the white jury judging the white defendant as the standard for impartiality, rather than 
lenient partiality; otherwise we must say that the overwhelming majority of defendants are 
judged by partial juries, and this conclusion seems at odds with the intention behind the use of 
the word "impartial" in the sixth amendment. 
311. See notes 294-95 supra and accompanying text. 
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nority race defendant. What is much more surprising is that the 
procedures designed to eliminate biased jurors - voir dire of individ-
ual jurors and change of venue - provide even less protection. These 
procedures have never been adequate to the task of eliminating racially 
prejudiced jurors and recent developments in the voir dire area are 
particularly discouraging, for the Supreme Court has virtually elimi-
nated any constitutional right to question jurors concerning their ra-
cial prejudice. 
1. Voir Dire of the Venire 
The primary purpose of voir dire is to uncover biases in jurors that 
would prevent their impartial evaluation of the facts and application of 
the law to these facts. When such a bias is uncovered, the juror will be 
dismissed by the court "for cause." Voir dire also serves to facilitate 
the use of peremptory challenges; the prospective juror may reveal 
facts that do not establish a disqualifying bias, but suggest to one party 
or the other an unsympathetic attitude. That party will then exercise 
one of its peremptory challenges to strike the juror in question. 
Neither purpose of voir dire can be fulfilled, however, unless sufficient 
questions are asked to probe relevant attitudes. In the federal courts, 
these questions are usually asked by the judge, following the submis-
sion of proposed questions by each party.312 In most state courts, voir 
dire is conducted by the parties themselves, but is subject to limita-
tions imposed by the judge.313 Regardless of who conducts the ques-
tioning, two issues may arise: first, what questions must be permitted, 
and second, what answers to those questions establish bias as a matter 
of law and thus require dismissal for cause. In some kinds of litiga-
tion, such as death penalty cases, the second issue has provoked the 
most controversy,314 but in recent cases concerning jurors' racial prej-
udice, disputes over what questions must be allowed overwhelmingly 
predominate.315 
In the earliest Supreme Court case on point, Aldridge v. United 
312. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides that the court has discretion either to conduct the voir 
dire itself or to permit counsel to do so. 
313. Ten states follow the federal rule and about the same number permit examination only 
by the judge; twenty-two states provide for examination by both the judge and the attorney, and 
in the remaining states counsel conducts the examination. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. 
lsRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1344 (5th ed. 1980); see also G. BERMANT & J. 
SHAPARD, THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, JUROR CHALLENGES, AND ADVERSARY ADVO-
CACY 22 (fig.I) (1978). 
314. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
315. See notes 320-44 infra and accompanying text. For a review of the cases (most of which 
are quite old) concerning racially biased juror views that require dismissal for cause, see Annot., 
94 A.L.R.3d 15, 47-51 (1979). 
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States, 316 the Court held that refusal to permit inquiry into racial prej-
udice was reversible error, at least where the defendant was black and 
the victim white.317 The basis for the Court's ruling was unclear; the 
opinion merely cited state court cases recognizing the black defend-
ant's right to question potential jurors about their racial prejudices318 
and reasoned that "[d]espite the privileges accorded to the negro, we 
do not think that it can be said that the possibility of [racial] prejudice 
is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry."319 Al-
dridge was decided in 1931, and it was not until the Court's 1973 deci-
sion in Ham v. South Carolina320 that the Court returned to the issue 
ofvoir dire about racial prejudice.321 Ham concerned a bearded black 
civil rights worker convicted of possession of marijuana. Ham's de-
fense was that law enforcement officials had framed him on the drug 
charge because of his civil rights activities. During voir dire, the trial 
judge asked general questions concerning the jurors' possible 
prejudices, but refused to inquire specifically into possible prejudice 
against the defendant due to his beard or race. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that under these facts the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause required the judge to question the jurors on the subject 
of racial prejudice, although it did not require a particular form or 
number of questions.322 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distin-
guished inquiry about prejudice against people with beards, explaining 
that the inquiry regarding racial prejudice derived its constitutional 
status "from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those 
who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment."323 
Most state courts interpreted Ham as requiring questions concern-
ing racial prejudice in all cases in which a black defendant requested 
such an inquiry324 until the Supreme Court drastically curtailed Ham 
316. 283 U.S. 308 (1931). 
317. 283 U.S. at 311. 
318. 283 U.S. at 311-13. 
319. 283 U.S. at 314. 
320. 409 U.S. 524 (1973). 
321. In the interim, some state courts followed Aldridge. See, e.g., State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 
138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956); Matthews v. State, 276 A.2d 265 (Del. 1971); Brown v. State, 220 Md. 
29, 150 A.2d 895 (1959). Others did not. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 88 
N.E.2d 713 (1949); State v. Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 180 S.E.2d 628 (1971), rev'd sub nom., Ham v. 
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Preston v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 228, 242 S.W.2d 436 
(1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952). 
322. 409 U.S. at 527. 
323. 409 U.S. at 528. Justices Douglas and Marshall both dissented in part, arguing that 
Ham should have been permitted to inquire about prejudice against bearded people as well as 
about prejudice against blacks. 409 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 534 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
324. State v. Marsh, 168 Conn. 520, 522, 362 A.2d 523, 525 (1975); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. 
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only five years later in Ristaino v. Ross. 325 Over the dissents of Justices 
Marshall and Brennan,326 the Court ruled that Ham did not announce 
a rule of "universal applicability,"327 but "reflected an assessment of 
whether under all the circumstances presented there was a constitu-
tionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial 
prejudice, the jurors would not be [impartial]."328 The Court ex-
plained that the nature of Ham's defense and his prominence as a civil 
rights activist made race an issue in the conduct of his trial; the fact 
that Ross was a black man accused of committing violent crimes 
against a white man was not as likely to distort his trial as were the 
special factors present in Ham. 329 The Court then concluded that 
"[t]he circumstances . . . did not suggest a significant likelihood that 
racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial"330 and that the demands of 
due process therefore were satisfied by the trial judge's general ques-
tions about impartiality.331 Although the Court's grant of certiorari in 
Turner v. Sielaff332 raises the possibility that Ristaino will be modified, 
the facts of Turner suggest that the most the Court will do is create a 
narrow exception to the Ristaino rule: the defendant in Turner is 
black, his victim was white, and the case was tried in a state where 
statistics show that the death penalty is disproportionately imposed on 
defendants with white victims. 
The majority in Ristaino commented in a footnote that it thought 
that voir dire questioiµng directed at racial prejudice was generally 
"the wiser course" and could have been required of a federal court 
faced with the circumstances of Ristaino as a matter of the Supreme 
Court's supervisory power.333 However, in Rosales-Lopez v. United 
States, 334 the Court upheld a federal trial court's decision to reject the 
defendant's request for voir dire on racial prejudice toward persons of 
Mexican descent in an illegal immigration case. The Court explained 
that the trial judge might be reluctant to inquire about racial prejudice 
App. 657, 658, 200 S.E.2d 454,455 (1973); People v. Wray, 49 Mich. App. 344, 346, 212 N.W.2d 
78, 79 (1973); People v. Williams, 41 A.D.2d 611, 611, 340 N.Y.S.2d 504, 504 (App. Div. 1973). 
325. 424 U.S. 589 (1976). 
326. 424 U.S. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White concurred in the result only. 
424 U.S. at 598 (Ham should not be applied retroactively). 
327. 424 U.S. at 596. 
328. 424 U.S. at 596. 
329. 424 U.S. at 596-97. 
330. 424 U.S. at 598. 
331. 424 U.S. at 598. 
332. 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. May 13, 1985) (No. 84-6646). 
333. 424 U.S. at 597 n.9. 
334. 451 U.S. 182 (1981). 
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for fear of creating an impression that justice might tum upon skin 
color335 and that unless there was a "reasonable possibility that racial 
or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury," this reluctance 
would not be deemed reversible error.336 The plurality opinion cau-
tioned that this "reasonable possibility" supervisory rule would, how-
ever, encompass cases where a defendant was accused of a violent 
crime against a victim of another race.337 Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.338 
Although commentary on Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez has been 
universally negative, 339 the lower courts have viewed these decisions 
with enthusiasm. Very few state courts have recognized a universal 
state statutory or constitutional requirement for voir dire on racial 
prejudice, 340 and most do not recognize the right even under inflam-
matory factual circumstances. At least four states have already de-
clined to adopt a rule requiring that black defendants accused of 
violent crimes against white victims be permitted to question jurors 
concerning racial prejudice;341 two state appeals courts have upheld 
335. 451 U.S. at 190. 
336. 451 U.S. at 191. 
337. 451 U.S. at 192. But see Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, arguing that no flat rule should be pronounced. 451 U.S. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
338. 451 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
339. Gaba, Vair Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into Prejudice, 
48 U. CoLo. L. R.Ev. 525 (1977); Hicks, Vair Dire on Racial Prejudice, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 180 
(1975-1976); Note, Constitutional Law: The Right of an Accused to Question Prospective Jurors 
Concerning a Specific Prejudice at Vair Dire, 20 HOWARD L.J. 527 (1977); Note, The Right to 
Question Jurors on Racial Prejudice, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 412 (1976); Comment, Racial Bias and the 
Right to an Impartial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Vair Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959 
(1982); see also Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Vair Dire: Constitutional Requirements and 
Policy Considerations, 54 B.U. L. R.Ev. 394 (1974) (criticizing a predecessor of Ristaino, Com-
monwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)). 
340. See, e.g., Swan v. State, 268 Ind. 317, 321, 375 N.E.2d 198, 201 (1978) (dicta); State v. 
Taylor, 423 A.2d 1174, 1175 (R.I. 1980); see also State v. Marsh, 168 Conn. 520, 522-23, 362 
A.2d 523, 525 (1975) (citing both state and federal constitutions); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 
657, 657-58, 200 S.E.2d 454,455 (1973) (citing both Ham and a general statute permitting voir 
dire); cf, e.g., Thornton v. State, 31 Md. App. 205, 215, 355 A.2d 767, 772 (1976) (noting that 
Maryland does not always require voir dire on racial prejudice); State v. Long, 137 N.J. Super. 
124, 131, 348 A.2d 202, 205-06 (1975) (voir dire on racial prejudice is required constitutionally 
only in "cases involving special circumstances pointing to the presence of racial overtones or 
prejudices."). 
341. Neal v. State, 372 So. 2d 1331, 1341 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 1348 
(Ala. 1979) (robbery and murder); Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 214, 418 N.E.2d 
585, 595 (1981) (assault); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 365 Mass. 66, 67, 309 N.E.2d 491, 493 
(1974) (murder); State v. Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 234, 233 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1977) (rape and 
armed robbery); State v. Gibbs, 267 S.C. 365,368,228 S.E.2d 104, 105 (1976) (robbery); Turner 
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981) 
(brutal and wanton murder); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 36, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323 
(1977) (murder of white prison guard). But see State v. Sims, 140 N.J. Super. 164,173,355 A.2d 
695, 700 (1976) (interracial mur~er requires voir dire on racial prejudice); Commonwealth v. 
1674 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 83:1611 
the conviction of a black defendant accused of raping a white woman 
despite the trial court's refusal to permit voir dire on racial 
prejudice. 342 
Moreover, even when trial courts permit questions concerning ra-
cial prejudice, questions are often limited to one or two, 343 and some-
times are directed at the entire venire panel rather than addressed to 
individual jurors. 344 Despite commentators' repeated pleas for more 
probing voir dire on all subjects, 345 no trend in that direction is likely; 
curtailing voir dire recently received a moral boost from the Supreme 
Court, which gratuitously criticized the length of the voir dire in a 
rape and strangulation killing of a fifteen-year-old white girl by a 
twenty-six-year-old black man with a prior conviction for forcible rape 
on an adolescent white girl.346 
There are, then, several reasons why voir dire does not protect the 
black defendant from a racially biased determination of his guilt. The 
most obvious is that it is not required in every case involving a black 
Holland, 298 Pa. Super. 289, 292, 444 A.2d 1179, 1181 (1982) (black defendant/white victim 
case requires voir dire of jury where all jurors are white). 
342. State v. Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 234, 233 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1977); see Braxton v. Estelle, 
641 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying habeas corpus petition after unsuccessful appeal in Texas 
state court; the reported opinion in the state case does not discuss the voir dire issue, Braxton v. 
State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)). Two circuit courts have upheld state court 
determinations that refusal to allow voir dire into racial prejudice in interracial rape cases does 
not violate due process. Braxton v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1981); Dukes v. 
Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469, 470 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976), But see Common-
wealth v. Sanders, 383 Mass. 637, 640-41, 421 N.E.2d 436,438 (1981) (in future trials involving 
interracial rape, jurors are to be examined with respect to interracial prejudice, but not reversible 
error in instant case). 
343. See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d ISO, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1981) (two questions 
sufficient); Johnson v. Maryland, 425 F. Supp. 538, 540-41 (D. Md. 1976) (one question suffi-
cient); see also United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119, 1129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 
969 (1972), 413 U.S. 919 (1973); Annot., supra note 315, at 39-41 and cases cited therein. But see 
Commonwealth v. Christian, 480 Pa. 131, 137-40, 389 A.2d 545, 547-49 (1978) (defendant enti-
tled to probe specific prejudices bearing on the case, such as juror's views regarding blacks' sex-
ual drives in rape case). 
344. See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Dixon, 596 F.2d 178, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124-25 (3d 
Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Maryland, 425 F. Supp. 538, 540-41 (D. Md. 1976); People v. Harrell, 398 
Mich. 384, 392, 247 N.W.2d 829, 832 (1976). 
345. See, e.g., A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, ch. 10 (1975); Babcock, 
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power': 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975); Bush, The Case/or 
Expansive Voir Dire, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 9 (1976); Soler, ·~ Woman's Place • •• ·~ 
Combatting Sex-Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW, 535 
(1975); Note, Juror Bias -A Practical Screening Device and the Case for Permitting Its Use, 64 
MINN. L. REV. 987 (1980). 
346. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 n.9 (1984); see also 
People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 819, 506 P.2d 193, 195, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1973) ("excess 
rococo examination" endangers structure of trial). But see Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 829-31 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (criticizing as "gratuitous" the Court's comments on the length ofvoir 
dire). 
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defendant - and is not even required in white victim cases, which are 
likely to provoke a double dose of bias. The Court's view that such 
factual situations do not create a "significant likelihood" that racial 
prejudice will infect the defendant's trial can only be described as ludi-
crous in light of available empirical evidence. 
But even if the Court were to reverse Ristaino, voir dire would still 
be ineffective in eliminating the effect of racial bias on jury delibera-
tions. First, superficial questions concerning whether the jurors har-
bor prejudice against blacks that would prevent them from being 
impartial are extremely unlikely to provoke disclosure of such bias. 
General questions do not reach hidden inconsistent attitudes, which 
research has shown are now prevalent about race. Asking a general 
question about impartiality and race is like asking whether one be-
lieves in equality for blacks; jurors may sincerely answer yes, they be-
lieve in equality and yes, they can be impartial, yet oppose interracial 
marriage and believe that blacks are more prone to violence. Those 
attorneys who have been permitted to conduct extended voir dire re-
port that it is only when numerous sensitive and specific questions are 
asked that prospective jurors reveal racial prejudice. 347 Furthermore, 
even if extensive questions were asked, jurors might not answer hon-
estly. Most prejudiced attitudes are now highly disapproved, and ju-
rors would naturally be reluctant to admit them, particularly since 
they know that social disapproval will be publicly expressed by dis-
missing them from the venire. This natural reluctance is probably ex-
acerbated by the practice of questioning the entire venire as a group, 
for it is easier to stay quiet untruthfully than to respond untruth-
fully. 348 Even if extensive individual questioning were routinely per-
mitted in black defendants' cases, fear of social disapproval would 
probably inhibit many individuals from expressing their true views. 
Finally, even if the courts were to adopt the extremely time-con-
suming practice of extensive individual voir dire and arrange the set-
ting to encourage disclosure of prejudice, voir dire could not eliminate 
all white jurors whose guilt assessments will be affected by the race of 
the defendant. Social scientists say it would be possible to encourage 
disclosure in several ways. For example, voir dire might be made pri-
vate as well as individual; the process might be lengthened by a cordial 
347. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 267, at§ 10.03[4]; Ginger, supra note 
33, at 434-38; Soler, supra note 345; see also notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text. 
348. The jurors' natural reluctance to admit prejudice may be further exacerbated by judge-
conducted voir dires. When the distinguished white-haired, black-robed judge seated above the 
jurors (and below the American flag) asks "Do you have any racial prejudice that will prevent 
you from rendering a fair verdict?" honest responses may be further inhibited. 
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chat with the potential juror; and the attorney might encourage ex-
pression of prejudice by disclosing his own (real or imagined) biases.349 
Of course, this would make voir dire even more expensive and time-
consuming than it already is. Unfortunately, voir dire would still not 
be entirely effective in weeding out biased jurors, because the research 
suggests that most jurors are unaware of their bias; the process of race 
affecting guilt attribution is probably most often an unconscious 
one.350 
2. Change of Venue 
Defendants occasionally seek a change of venue to avoid the effects 
of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In Invin v. Dowd, 351 the Supreme 
Court held that voir dire of individual jurors and the striking for cause 
of those who admitted bias was an inadequate assurance of impartial-
ity when a "'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' [was] shown to be 
present throughout the community."352 The Court reasoned that 
upon such a showing, the declarations of impartiality by individual 
jurors could be given little weight, and a refusal to grant a change of 
venue denied the defendant due process. 353 
Recent cases indicate that the standard for showing that a fair trial 
was precluded in a given community is quite difficult to meet, 354 but 
the exact dimensions of the right to a change of venue are irrelevant to 
most black defendants. Occasionally racial prejudice may be inflamed 
by pretrial publicity and a change of venue would therefore be man-
dated, 355 but the kind of bias documented in Part I would never sup-
port a change of venue motion. More to the point, a change of venue 
would probably be useless in these "ordinary" cases, since it is almost 
certain that the same kind of bias would affect the guilt determinations 
of white jurors in a neighboring county. Only if the change of venue 
349. Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. 
L.J. 245, 267 (1981) (reviewing the literature); see also NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 
267, at § 10.01[3]. 
350. See notes 124-27 & 182-88 supra and accompanying text; cf. Efran, supra note 130 (93% 
of subjects thought attractiveness of defendant should play no role in judicial decisions, yet sub-
jects' actual decisions showed a strong effect of attractiveness on certainty of guilt and severity of 
punishment). 
351. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
352. 366 U.S. at 727 (quoting local newspaper reports on the jury selection process). 
353. 366 U.S. at 728. 
354. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2889-91 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 
794, 802-03 (1975). 
355. See, e.g., Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d 1171, 1183-84 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (reversible 
error not to grant a second change of venue when atmosphere of community in which defendant 
was tried was racially polarized by publications concerning trial). 
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fortuitously resulted in a change of the racial composition of the jury 
would it be useful in combatting the effects of routine racial bias. 
The difficulty, then, with relying upon either voir dire or change of 
venue for eliminating biased jurors, is that these techniques are 
designed to check extraordinary bias, bias peculiar to a person or lo-
cale. 356 If prejudice is narrowly conceived as open animosity toward 
blacks, these techniques offer significant protection to black defend-
ants. If we focus instead on the forms of racial bias that are less overt 
and less hostile but much more prevalent, then attempting to eliminate 
all biased jurors is futile. 
C. Controlling Jury Deliberations 
The last set of doctrines arguably bearing on racially biased ver-
dicts are those relating to the control of the content of jury delibera-
tions. Courts try to regulate the content of deliberations in three ways: 
first, by prohibiting inflammatory arguments (and those that have no 
foundation in the evidence); second, by instructing the jury as to the 
proper subjects of deliberation; and third, by reviewing allegations of 
juror misconduct. These techniques for controlling bias can be dis-
posed of rather quickly, for their shortcomings are both obvious and 
not easily remedied. 
1. Prohibiting Racially Inflammatory Arguments 
A closing argument that addresses irrelevant issues or contains an 
appeal to passion constitutes a federal constitutional violation if the 
argument "so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the result-
ing conviction a denial of due process. "357 This due process standard, 
sometimes bolstered by state constitutional or statutory requirements, 
has been fairly strictly applied to arguments by the prosecutor tending 
to inflame racial animosity.358 Although an isolated racial innuendo 
usually is not deemed reversible error if followed by instructions from 
356. Another technique aimed at extraordinary situations is removal of an action from state 
court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982). The statute provides that criminal pro-
ceedings commenced in state court may be removed if the defendant is denied or cannot enforce 
a right in the courts of such state under any Jaw providing for the equal civil rights of United 
States citizens. Early liberal interpretations of the statute failed to survive and the right of re-
moval is now sharply limited. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). See 
generally Note, Racial Discrimination in a State Court as a Basis/or Removal to a Federal Court, 
13 WAYNE L. REv. 456 (1967) (analyzing the Court's decision in City a/Greenwood and other 
cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1443). 
357. Donelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 
358. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 303 (1956), and cases cited therein. 
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the court to disregard it, 359 extreme or repeated racial slurs and argu-
ments obviously designed to ignite racial tensions or promote racial 
fears are generally held to require a new trial.360 
Certainly the lower courts' refusal to tolerate racially inflam-
matory remarks is a desirable development. The large number of cases 
in which prosecutors persist in making such arguments,361 however, is 
less than encouraging, for prosecutors must believe that juries will re-
spond to such appeals. Of course, the attitudes upon which those 
prosecutors are trying to get the jury to fixate are present regardless of 
whether or not an unprincipled advocate calls attention to them. As 
was made clear in Part I, the influence of race upon guilt attribution 
does not depend upon overt manipulation of racial hostility. Control-
ling prosecutors' arguments, therefore, can do nothing to interrupt 
those more subtle mental processes. 
2. Instructing the Jury to be Impartial 
The Supreme Court has imposed only modest jury instruction re-
quirements: the judge must instruct the jurors that the defendant is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty;362 he must instruct that the 
prosecution is required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt;363 and he must avoid instructions that infringe upon the 
defendant's constitutional rights.364 Nevertheless, virtually all courts 
provide some general or cautionary instructions as well as instructions 
concerning the specific offense with which the defendant is charged. 
Model instructions commonly include an admonition to consider 
359. See Id. at§ 7; see also id. at§§ 8-9 (admonishment of, or retraction by, counsel sufficient 
to remove prejudice in some instances). 
360. One notable exception is the repeated use of the word "colored" or "nigras" to refer to 
black defendants, despite defense objections. See, e.g., State v. Kirk, 205 Kan. 681, 472 P.2d 237 
(1970); Rouse v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1957); State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 
233 So. 2d 891 (1970), revd. on other grounds sub nom., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 
(1972); State v. Crockett, 421 P.2d 722 (Mont. 1967). 
361. See Later Case Service, 45 A.L.R.2d 303 (1980); Annot., supra note 358, at 303. 
362. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978). But see Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 
786, 789 (1979) (per curiam) (failure to give instructions on presumption of innocence does not 
violate federal constitution if other instructions adequately convey the principle). 
363. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (prosecution must prove every element of 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt). The federal courts of appeals have held that failure to in-
struct the jury regarding the prosecution's burden is reversible error if properly objected to. See, 
e.g., United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1008 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 
(1978); United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1977). 
364. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (forbidding comments by the prose-
cution or instructions by the court that suggest that silence of the accused can be taken as evi-
dence of guilt). 
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the evidence in the case "without prejudice, fear, or favor,"365 or some 
equivalent phrase. 366 Model instructions generally do not provide for 
a specific admonition regarding racial prejudice, 367 although some 
judges may choose to include such an instruction at their discretion. 
Even if use of instructions were to become more widespread, though, 
the black defendant facing an all-white jury would gain little protec-
tion against racial bias. One reason to doubt the efficacy of racial bias 
instructions is that general research indicates that jurors often do not 
comprehend or attend to jury instructions. 368 A second reason is spe-
cific to the problem of race and guilt attribution: because the process 
involved is probably unconscious for most jurors, instructing them to 
put racial prejudice out of their minds or to ignore the defendant's 
race in assessing the evidence is unlikely to be productive. Jurors who 
believe they are being fair will not be affected by even the sternest 
warnings that they must be fair. Finally, there is some evidence from 
mock jury studies that instructing jurors to disregard a fact results in 
greater emphasis being given to that fact. 369 Thus, instructing jurors 
to ignore the defendant's race might exacerbate the effect of race upon 
guilt attribution. 
3. Reviewing Juror Allegations of Misconduct 
The general rule that jurors may not impeach their verdicts is very 
old370 and widely accepted.371 In 1966 the Supreme Court carved out 
a narrow exception to that rule, holding that where jurors alleged that 
a bailiff had, in effect, become a witness against the defendant, this 
violated the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to be 
confronted with witnesses against him and required reversal. 372 
365. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE CoMMITIEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 2.03 (1965). 
366. See, e.g., COMMITIEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISrRICT JUDGES AssOCIA-
TION OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2A (1979) ("without prejudice or 
sympathy"). 
367. See sources cited at notes 365-66 supra. 
368. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTAND-
ABLE (1982); Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 
480-82 (1976). 
369. Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated 
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973); Wolf & Montgomery, 
Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judg-
ment of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1977). 
370. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915); Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 
(K..B. 1785). 
371. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1J 606[03], at 606-22, 23 
(1982); Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule 
606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924-25 (1978). 
372. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966). 
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One lower federal court has extended the exception to allegations 
that extraneous racial issues were improperly introduced into delibera-
tions by a juror, reasoning that introduction of those issues violated 
the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.373 This 
reasoning would seem to swallow the entire rule against jurors im-
peaching their own verdicts, since virtually all allegations of juror mis-
conduct involve a denial of the right to an impartial jury. Most courts 
have not thus far adopted this view of the Constitution's requirements 
and seem unlikely to do so. 374 A few jurisdictions have, however, 
ruled that statutory language permitting juror testimony on an 
"outside influence" affecting jury deliberations encompasses testimony 
concerning racial prejudice expressed by one of the jurors. 375 
The concerns of finality and protecting jurors from harassment 
make it unlikely that the rule against jurors' impeachment of a verdict 
will totally give way to the desire to inhibit expression of racial preju-
dice in the jury box. But even if a racial prejudice exception to the rule 
were widely adopted, very few cases of biased adjudication of guilt 
would be affected. In part this is due to the fact that the jurors who 
participated in the biased deliberations are the only source of informa-
tion, and it would be surprising if very many of them came forward. 
More importantly, current social patterns make it unlikely that overt 
expressions of bias would often be manifested. Jurors who are aware 
of anti-black sentiments are unlikely to voice them for fear of social 
disapproval, and most jurors will not be aware of any hostile feelings. 
That bias is not openly manifested is no assurance that it does not 
affect outcomes. 
Thus, like the prohibitions against racially inflammatory argu-
ments and the giving of instructions concerning impartiality, review of 
jurors' statements during deliberations is oflimited help in eliminating 
the effect of the defendant's race upon his chances of conviction. All 
three means of controlling the content of jury deliberations focus on 
373. Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
374. See, e.g., United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 1024 (1971), 401 U.S. 943 (1971); State v. Folck, 325 N.W.2d 368, 371-73 (Iowa 1982); 
State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 614 (N.D. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981); State v. 
Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167, 168-69 (S.D. 1983). 
375. State v. Callender, 297 N.W.2d 744, 745-46 (Minn. 1980); see also People v. Leonti, 262 
N.Y. 256, 258, 186 N.E. 693, 694 (1933) (affidavit admissible to show juror lied during voir dire 
and verdict therefore was null); cf. State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 271-72, 176 A.2d 465, 467-68 
(1961) (religious prejudice); After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 
738-40, 324 N.W.2d 686, 689-90 (1982) (religious prejudice in a civil case). Contra Smith v. 
Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 489-90 (S.D. Iowa 1978); Cherensky v. George Washington-East 
Motor Lodge, 317 F. Supp. 1401, 1403-04 (E.D. Pa. 1970); see also Johnson v. Hunter, 144 F.2d 
565, 567 (10th Cir. 1944). 
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conscious and deliberate injection of the defendant's race into the deci-
sionmaking process. Because racial prejudice in the 1980s rarely takes 
this form, these doctrines do little to eliminate its effects. 
Ill. DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION FOR MINORITY 
RA.CE DEFENDANTS 
Of the existing techniques for eliminating racially biased adjudica-
tions of guilt, none even approaches comprehensive protection. Each 
of these procedures could be improved to provide more effective pro-
tection, but even liberal (and unlikely) changes will not cure their in-
adequacies, because all of the surrounding doctrines evolved to control 
somewhat different kinds of bias. Nonetheless, that overruling Swain 
and Ristaino would not provide complete protection for the black de-
fendant does not argue against doing so. The equal protection analysis 
in Swain is fundamentally flawed by its failure to consider the use of 
peremptory challenges from the defendant's viewpoint and its errone-
ous assumptions regarding the partiality of white jurors; the due pro-
cess reasoning of Ristaino is contradicted by empirical findings on the 
prevalence of prejudice. Thus, the minimal accommodation to the re-
alities of racial prejudice would seem to be the overhaul of peremptory 
challenge and voir dire doctrines. The more difficult question is 
whether the equal protection clause requires more than largely passive 
accommodations, and if so, what measures might be suited to the task 
of providing the black defendant with comprehensive protection 
against racial bias. 
A. The Equal Protection Argument that Further Safeguards 
Are Required 
To determine whether further safeguards are required, one begins 
by asking whether the status quo violates the assurance of equal pro-
tection of the laws. This question may be divided into three parts. 
First, do equal protection constraints apply to the activity in question? 
Second, assuming that equal protection constraints do apply, what 
level of scrutiny do they impose on the classification at stake? Third, 
can that classification survive the appropriate level of scrutiny? 
1. The Pertinence of Equal Protection Constraints 
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides 
that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."376 Equal protection constraints 
376. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
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therefore do not impinge upon purely private activities;377 governmen-
tal action is a prerequisite to equal protection scrutiny.378 When a 
government employee acts in his official capacity, there is no doubt 
that governmental action has been taken. Although this obvious form 
of state action is not present when jurors - ordinary citizens - deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, such determinations never-
theless do constitute state action and hence compel equal protection 
review. 
The state cannot evade the fourteenth amendment's mandates sim-
ply by delegating discrimination to private individuals. When individ-
uals perform traditionally public functions, 379 or when the state 
actively encourages or participates in the questionable activity,380 ac-
tion taken by private individuals will be deemed state action. In recent 
years the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive view of earlier state 
action decisions,381 but even under the newer cases the jury's determi-
nation of a defendant's guilt would constitute state action. The Court 
has limited the public function strand of state action doctrine to those 
few functions "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,"382 but 
even the narrowest reading of that phrase would include the adjudica-
tion of criminal liability. Moreover, the jurors' deliberations and ver-
dicts might also meet the alternative test for the involvement strand of 
state action doctrine. The Court's requirement of "significant involve-
ment"383 and even its hint that only a "symbiotic relationship"384 
would suffice is easily satisfied here; the state calls together the individ-
377. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
378. The fourteenth amendment by its language does not reach action by the federal govern-
ment, but the Court has interpreted the fifth amendment's due process clause to include an equal 
protection component. Although the Court has not explicitly compared the reach of the four-
teenth and fifth amendment equal protection requirements, they appear to be coextensive. See, 
e.g., Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Kore• 
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
379. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
380. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 
U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
381. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (shopping center not within public 
function strand of state action doctrine); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 
(1974) (termination of service policies by heavily regulated utility not state action despite state 
approval of termination provision where provision never the subject of regulatory body's hear-
ings or scrutiny); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (operation of state liquor 
regulation scheme did not sufficiently involve state in discriminatory guest policies of licensed 
private clubs so as to make those policies state action). 
382. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). 
383. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369, 380 (1967)). 
384. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). 
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uals that form the jury, instructs them as to their task, and then relies 
upon their conclusions to determine whether imprisonment or fines 
may be imposed upon the defendant. Because the sixth amendment 
prevents the state from trying criminal offenses without the participa-
tion of a jury, the state is totally dependent upon the action of jurors 
for the enforcement of its criminal laws. It is hard to imagine more 
significant benefit to the state from the activity of private 
individuals. 385 
2. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny 
That guilt determinations are made by jurors does not insulate 
them from equal protection scrutiny, but not all equal protection scru-
tiny is stringent. In assessing an equal protection claim, a court "must 
first determine what burden of justification the classification created 
thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and 
the individual interests affected."386 Although the individual interests 
affected by verdicts - freedom from stigma, incarceration, and mone-
tary penalties - are of great importance, they have never been deemed 
"fundamental interests" for equal protection purposes. For this rea-
son, most criteria for determining guilt need only bear "some fair rela-
tionship to a legitimate public purpose."387 This minimal scrutiny 
would seem to be satisfied through ordinary evidentiary requirements 
that facts given to the jury for consideration must bear some probative 
relationship to the issues in dispute. 388 Imposing a more stringent 
standard of review based upon the individual interest affected would 
subject all decisionmaking criteria (all facts submitted to the jury) to a 
heavy burden of justification, probably making proof of guilt 
impossible. 
Thus, not all factors that enter into a jury's decision require close 
review, but some do. Classifications that disadvantage a suspect class, 
such as a racial minority, must be "precisely tailored to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest."389 If a racial classification is used to 
385. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) states that normally non-neu-
tral involvement in the discriminatory activity (which is not present here) is required, but makes 
an exception where the result of neutral involvement "would be • • . to enforce a concededly 
discriminatory private rule," as barred by Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and that excep-
tion is applicable here. 
386. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974) (citations omitted); see 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). 
387. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (describing standard to be used in reviewing 
most forms of state action). 
388. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 401-02. 
389. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
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determine guilt, this greater burden of justification should be imposed 
on the government. The question then becomes whether verdicts in-
fluenced by racial prejudice are racial classifications. 
Were judges to instruct jurors that some weight should be given to 
the defendant's race because black defendants are more likely to be 
guilty, there would be no question that a racial classification had been 
employed. That race was to be only one factor in the jury's verdict 
would not alter the equal protection analysis; if an explicit racial clas-
sification contributed to the decision to impose a substantial unpleas-
ant consequence, strict scrutiny would be required.390 Similarly, if a 
prosecutor argued that race should be a factor in the determination of 
guilt, or jurors acknowledged that it had been a factor influencing de-
liberations, strict scrutiny's heavy burden of justification would be im-
posed. But in most cases no explicit racial classification is at issue. 
Race appears to influence guilt determinations primarily through an 
unconscious process, and even when the process is conscious, the pros-
pect of social disapproval renders disclosure of that process unlikely. 
That a policy or action is facially neutral with respect to race, how-
ever, does not preclude a finding that a racial classification has been 
used.391 The black defendant's claim is that these apparently legiti-
mate determinations of guilt are discriminatory in effect. In other 
such "disproportionate impact" cases, the Supreme Court has stressed 
that "the invidious quality of a [governmental action] claimed to be 
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrim-
inatory purpose."392 Thus, the level of scrutiny that should be applied 
to white jurors' determinations of the guilt of black defendants depends 
upon whether the empirical findings discussed in Part I establish a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose. 
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corporation, 393 Justice Powell's majority opinion, "without pur-
porting to be exhaustive,"394 summarized some "subjects of proper 
inquiry"395 in the determination of racially discriminatory purpose. 
An "important starting point," declared Powell, would often be the 
390. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-
66 (1977) (if race is a motivating factor in decision, then choice presumed to be illegitimate). 
391. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
392. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9 
(1944). 
393. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
394. 429 U.S. at 268. 
395. 429 U.S. at 268. 
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impact of the official action. 396 He explained: 
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legis-
lation appears neutral on its face. . . . The evidentiary inquiry is then 
relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that 
in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the 
Court must look to other evidence. 397 
This passage contains two interesting footnotes. In the first, Powell 
acknowledged that several of the jury selection cases fell into the 
"clear pattern" category despite the fact that the statistical pattern did 
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion, for the "nature of 
the jury-selection task" led to a finding of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion. 398 The other relevant footnote explained why less extreme statis-
tical patterns usually were insufficient proof of purposeful 
discrimination: "In many instances, to recognize the limited probative 
value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the 'hetero-
geneity' of the Nation's population."399 
If the conclusions of Part I are accepted and the external validity 
of the mock jury studies discussed in Part I therefore acknowledged, 
the evidence that racial bias is a factor in guilt adjudication would 
seem to fall within the "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other 
than race" category, even though the studies do not display the ex-
treme statistical pattern described as the norm for "clear pattern" evi-
dence. Not all white jurors find all black defendants guilty or acquit 
all white defendants; nevertheless, the "clear pattern" standard should 
be deemed satisfied for a reason analogous to that found in the jury 
selection cases. 
The "nature of the jury-selection task" demands a lesser statistical 
disparity because ordinarily it relies upon random chance; if the state 
has not interfered with random chance, a substantial underrepresenta-
tion of minorities on the jury venire would be extremely unlikely. In 
contrast, in most governmentally made decisions, many factors are 
evaluated and considered; it is quite likely that correlations between 
race and other decision outcomes are spurious, or, in the Court's 
phrase, the consequence of "the 'heterogeneity' of the Nation's popu-
lation." The results of the mock jury studies are, like the jury selec-
tion cases, "unexplainable on grounds other than race," albeit not 
because random chance should have determined the jurors' decisions. 
396. 429 U.S. at 266. 
397. 429 U.S. at 266 (footnotes omitted). 
398. 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. 
399. 429 U.S. at 266 n.15 (citations omitted). 
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In the laboratory experiments, it is careful control, rather than ran-
dom chance, that eliminates noninvidious explanations. Although 
many factors were evaluated and considered by the mock jurors, none 
of these factors can account for the correlation between race and the 
final decision. Because all of the other factors were held constant, 
spurious correlations between race and guilt attribution were not pos-
sible. In these studies, the "heterogeneity of the Nation's population" 
could not create the appearance of reliance on race when it did not 
exist, for the mock trials were not heterogeneous but identical with 
respect to all factors except the defendant's race. Under these circum-
stances, the risk of erroneously inferring discrimination on the basis of 
race disappears; any intelligible version of the purposeful discrimina-
tion requirement has been met. 
Moreover, several of the factors deemed relevant in Arlington 
Heights to proving purposeful discrimination absent a "clear pattern" 
showing are present here. The historical background of the decisions, 
"particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes,"400 is one of these factors. In a broad sense, the long history 
of deliberate exclusion of blacks from jury venires in southern states is 
an example of this factor, and the cooperation of law enforcement offi-
cials in vigilante lynchings and farcical trials is another. 401 The second 
factor suggested by Powell, the "specific sequence of events leading up 
to the challenged decision,"402 does not heighten suspicion in these 
cases, but the third, "[d]epartures from the normal procedural se-
quence,"403 is arguably present in the repeated use of peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate black jurors. 404 The mock jury studies and the 
capital sentencing data provide evidence in the fourth category men-
tioned in Arlington Heights, substantive departures from routine deci-
sions.405 Finally, "contemporary statements by members of the 
400. 429 U.S. at 267. 
401. See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, 2 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1357, 1371 (3d ed. 1967); R. GINZBURG, supra note 2. 
402. 429 U.S. at 267. 
403. 429 U.S. at 267. 
404. In cases that challenge a single governmental decision (such as Arlington Heights) de-
partures from the normal procedural sequence are gauged by comparing the decision at issue 
with all prior decisions. In contrast, when a group of decisions are challenged (such as in Yick 
Wo or Washington v. Davis) the meaningful comparison is between the procedures used in most 
instances and those used in the disputed decisions. Thus, we should compare the procedures 
used in cases with black defendants with the procedures used in all other cases, rather than look 
for historical changes in the treatment of black defendants. 
405. 429 U.S. at 267. Here the relevant substantive departure is not a historical one, as it 
would have been in Arlington Heights; the appropriate comparison is between the outcomes in 
cases involving black defendants and outcomes in all other cases. See note 404 supra. 
June 1985] Black Innocence and the White Jury 1687 
decisionmaking body,"406 in this case jurors' statements describing bi-
ased deliberations, provide sporadic evidence of discriminatory 
purpose. 407 
Critics of the purposeful discrimination requirement have often ar-
gued that proving purposeful discrimination is virtually impossible 
under Arlington Heights. 408 Some have stressed that those who wish 
to discriminate will hardly be stupid enough to leave evidence of the 
Arlington Heights variety,409 while others have pointed out that be-
cause bias often operates at the margins of consciousness, even forth-
right decisionmakers will rarely supply litigants with indications of 
their true purposes.410 This subconscious bias is precisely the obstacle 
confronting the individual black defendant. Whether or not race has 
been a factor in the determination of his guilt, h~ will almost never be 
able to demonstrate its influence. It is the presence of aggregate data 
that makes his case. Perhaps this is not so surprising; claimants who 
have been successful in proving purposeful discrimination despite 
facia}Jy neutral classifications have always relied on aggregate data.411 
To take an extreme example, Yick Wo could never have prevailed 
without showing how many other Chinese Americans had been denied 
laundry permits.412 Even at that time, the only tracks left by the dis-
criminating body were statistical. That black defendants have a claim 
depends upon the happenstance of social scientists being interested in 
investigating race and guilt attribution, not upon the actual existence 
of discrimination in the guilt adjudication process. Should the Court 
refuse to accept the mock jury studies and the other empirical evi-
406. 429 U.S. at 268. 
401. See notes 33 & 373-74 supra and accompanying text. 
408. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theones of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, 125 U. PA. L. RE.v. 540 (1977); Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights 
and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; Si-
mon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban 
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. RE.v. 1041 (1978). 
409. Eisenberg, supra note 408, at 47-48, 115; Perry, supra note 408, at 551; Schwemm, supra 
note 408, at 1031; Simon, supra note 408, at 1070. 
410. See, e.g., Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163, 
1165 (1978). . 
411. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and cases cited in notes 194-207 
supra, with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
412. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Permits to operate laundries in wooden 
buildings were granted to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants, but to none of about 200 
Chinese applicants. There were over 300 laundries in the city and all but about ten were con-
structed of wood. Two hundred forty had Chinese owners. Yick Wo and more than 150 other 
persons of Chinese descent had been arrested for violating an ordinance prohibiting the operation 
oflaundries in wooden buildings without a permit, but all of the 80 or so noncomplying laundries 
owned by Caucasians had been left alone. 
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dence, the equal protection claim would collapse and could not be 
revived. 
Even if this evidence were accepted, and despite the fact that the 
Arlington Heights "clear pattern" standard appears to have been met, 
one might still object that discrimination that is the result of a primar-
ily unconscious process - which is what the empirical evidence points 
to here - cannot be denominated "purposeful." However, in this 
context the adjective "purposeful" may be a misnomer and certainly is 
misleading,413 for subconscious reliance on race also triggers strict 
scrutiny. 
The cornerstone of the purposeful discrimination requirement is 
the underlying policy of the equal protection clause that "all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."414 The term "pur-
poseful discrimination" was coined to differentiate de facto discrimina-
tion from de jure, 415 not to differentiate between conscious and 
unconscious reliance on race in decisionmaking. De facto discrimina-
tion, or disproportionate impact, standing alone does not implicate 
equal protection concerns because the persons differently treated may 
not be "similarly circumstanced" with respect to other relevant attrib-
utes or policies. In contrast, the victim of unconscious racial discrimi-
nation, exactly like the victim of conscious discrimination, is treated 
differently by the decisionmaker despite being "similarly circum-
stanced" with respect to all relevant criteria. The focus is not on the 
badness of the decisionmaker, but on the fairness of the decision.416 If 
a state were to delegate hiring decisions to a personnel officer who 
always found black applicants to be "incompatible" or "unattractive," 
the honest statement of that officer that he believed his decisions were 
413. Terminology has always been difficult in equal protection doctrine; witness the confu• 
sion engendered when the Court stated in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), that racial 
"motivation" alone did not render state action constitutionally suspect. The Court's explanation 
that "the focus [in prior cases that alluded to discriminatory motive] was on the actual effect of 
the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did," 403 U.S. at 
225, led many lower courts to hold that "de facto" discrimination invoked strict scrutiny. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,244 & n.12, 245 (1976) (citing and disapproving these cases). 
414. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (striking down state tax 
law favoring local corporations that did no local business); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356, 374 (1886) (classification violates equal protection mandate if it "make[s] unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances"). 
415. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). 
416. This, I think, is the only reasonable interpretation of Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 
(1971). The reason that the racial animus that motivated the decision to close the Jackson, 
Mississippi, swimming pools did not invoke strict scrutiny was that the record showed "no state 
action affecting blacks differently from whites." 403 U.S. at 225. While the Court's conclusion 
that blacks in the Palmer case were not affected differently than whites is certainly open to dis-
pute (at the very least, stigma flowing from the decision was not equally distributed), the Court's 
premise that different treatment must be the basis of an equal protection claim seems correct. 
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never affected by the applicant's race certainly would not allow the 
state to avoid the heavy burden of justification imposed by all racial 
classifications.417 Likewise, when we know that the defendant's race 
will probably affect the decisions of white jurors, their honest but inac-
curate assertions to the contrary should not preclude strict scrutiny. 
3. Applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard 
At least in theory, not all racial classifications violate the Constitu-
tion; they are subject to strict scrutiny but may be justified by a com-
pelling state interest and narrowly tailored means.418 Thus, one last 
issue must be resolved before we can reach a conclusion concerning 
whether racially biased determinations of guilt are violating the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection mandate: ~an the use of race as 
a factor in guilt determination be justified under the strict scrutiny 
standard? 
I would hope the answer to this question is self-evident. It is hard 
to imagine a more offensive use of race than as a factor deemed proba-
tive of guilt of a criminal offense. Nevertheless, it might be argued that 
offensive or not, it is rational for jurors to incorporate their knowledge 
that blacks commit proportionately more crime than do whites.419 
This argument fails for two reasons: first, this use of race to escalate 
the likelihood of guilt probably is not rational, and second, even if it 
were rational, mere rationality does not satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Jurors might assume from their familiarity with newspaper reports 
of crime or crime statistics that a black (or Hispanic or Native Ameri-
can) is more likely to engage in common law crimes than is a white 
person; at a subconscious level, this is probably what they do assume. 
But such an assumption is erroneous for several reasons. First of all, 
arrest records are not accurate indicators of disproportionate involve-
ment; to some extent they reflect selection biases in the criminal justice 
system.42° Consequently, experts disagree on the extent to which 
417. In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court has held that a jury commis-
sioner's honest statement that he did not know any blacks qualified to serve on juries and for this 
reason, rather than prejudice, did not select any blacks to fill the jury rolls, carries little weight in 
assessing whether an equal protection violation has occurred. See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 
U.S. 584 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). 
418. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). 
419. Some courts have accepted similar reasoning in probable cause determinations. For 
example, in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals approved the Drug Enforcement Administration's use of "Hispanic background" as a 
factor increasing the likelihood that the suspect is a drug courier. For a criticism of this decision 
and others permitting the use of race as a factor in detention decisions, see Johnson, Race and the 
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983). 
420. See Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc. 
REv. 93, 94-97 (1978) (discussing numerous studies). Self-report studies show negligible racial 
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arrest rates should be attributed to differential involvement or differen-
tial processing.421 Although most experts would agree that dispropor-
tionate involvement explains some of the arrest statistic differential, 
the problem remains that there is no way of knowing how much more 
likely it is that a black person will commit a common law crime than 
that a white person will do so. Jurors who read crime statistics will 
overestimate the differential involvement; those who read newspapers 
will grossly overestimate the differential involvement.422 
Even if the differential involvement could be accurately assessed 
and jurors were familiar with such an assessment, factoring that as-
sessment into the likelihood that a defendant on trial has committed a 
crime of which he is accused would be irrational. Although it may be 
that, knowing nothing about a person but his race, it is more likely 
that a black person committed a common law crime than that a white 
person did so, 423 it does not follow that it is more likely that a black 
defendant accused of such a crime is more likely to be guilty than a 
white defendant similarly accused. More blacks are arrested and 
brought to trial than are whites; earlier processes - the gathering of 
evidence and the decision to bring charges - have already swallowed 
any predictive power that the race of an individual may have. Only if 
we thought that arrest rate differences underestimated racial differ-
ences in criminal activity would it be rational to factor race into the 
determination of guilt.;24 
Even if using race as a factor in the determination of guilt were 
rational, this would not satisfy strict scrutiny. Only once has the 
Supreme Court sustained a nonremedial425 racial classification after 
applying the strict scrutiny test, 426 and this decision has been widely 
differences in criminal involvement, thus suggesting a selective processing interpretation of arrest 
·statistics. Id. at 96-97. Victim surveys show disproportionate black involvement, but a smaller 
disproportion than is reflected in arrest statistics. Id. at 97-99 (summarizing studies), 
421. Compare McNeely & Pope, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crime: A 
Response to Hindelang, 8 REv. BLACK PoL. EcoN. 405 (1978), with Hindelang, supra note 420. 
422. J. Mayas, supra note 162, at 49, 56. 
423. Certainly if all criminal activity, including white collar crime, is considered, the propor-
tionate involvement of any group is entirely speculative. This is because whites are much more 
frequently involved in white collar crime than are blacks and the extent of white collar crime is 
largely unknown. See generally C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-
47 (1978). 
424. Because we know that arrest rates overestimate differential involvement to some extent, 
it would actually be more rational to assume that, ceteris paribus, a white defendant on trial is 
more likely to be guilty than is a black defendant. See notes 421-21 supra and accompanying 
text. 
425. The Court upheld a remedial classification in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980), but the classifications at issue here are certainly not remedial. 
426. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 
June 1985] Black Innocence and the White Jury 1691 
criticized.427 Certainly the arguments for permitting jurors to con-
sider the defendant's race do not come close to meeting the require-
ments of a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means.428 
"Convicting the guilty" could be viewed as a compelling state in-
terest, at least in the abstract. But even if the interest in convicting the 
guilty were held to satisfy the ends requirement, the use of race as a 
factor in guilt adjudication is not a necessary or precisely tailored 
means to the accomplishment of that end. As discussed above, it is 
probably not even a rationally related means; certainly it is unneces-
sary, for the state could produce other, far more reliable indicators 9f 
guilt.429 
B. A Miranda-Model Proposal 
That the use of race as a factor in guilt determinations is depriving 
black defendants of the equal protection of the laws may be clear, but 
this does not automatically imply that relief must be granted to the 
recipients of unequal treatment. Even if the right to a racially neutral 
adjudication of guilt is recognized, it can be argued that when the 
right is covertly violated, there can be no remedy. This would not be 
because there is no appropriate remedy; the appropriate remedy would 
be reversal of the conviction and a new trial by unbiased jurors. The 
difficulty is instead in recognizing when the right has been violated. 
Because the proof that violations are occurring comes entirely from 
aggregate data (including the mock jury studies) it is not possible to 
ascertain whether a violation has occurred in a particular case. 
This argument is probably correct with regard to individual reme-
dies. 430 To reverse all convictions of black defendants tried by white 
juries because some of them are-tainted by a constitutional violation is 
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding earlier West Coast military curfew on persons of Japanese ances-
try without explaining the standard of review). 
427. See, e.g., M. GR0DZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949); Dembitz, Racial Discrimina-
tion and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 
C0LUM. L. REv. 175 (1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 
489 (1945); cf. Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28 
CoRNELL L.Q. 414 (1943) (criticizing military evacuation of Japanese Americans from certain 
west coast areas). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20.(1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (defending Korematsu). 
428. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (stating in dicta that the defendant's race 
is an impermissible factor in the sentencing process). 
429. See FED. R. Evrn. 404(b), which provides that evidence of the defendant's prior crimes 
is inadmissible to show propensity to commit crime - the evidence is considered more prejudi-
cial than probative. Consideration of crimes committed by other same race people would be even 
less probative of whether a specific defendant committed a specific crime. 
430. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (upholding denial of motion to have 
one-third of the venire be composed of blacks). 
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extreme.431 Moreover, reliance on individual remedies may create 
endless circles: conviction, reversal, new trial, conviction, and so on. 
Any feasible remedy must be a group remedy and any attractive rem-
edy must be prophylactic. At this point, the analogy of Miranda v. 
Arizona 432 comes to mind. 
1. The Need for Prophylactic Measures 
The parallels between the problem confronting the Court in Mi-
rq,nda and the one at issue here are instructive. Prior to Miranda, the 
Court had been engaged in case-by-case attempts to determine which 
police methods rendered a defendant's confession involuntary.433 One 
of the frustrations of this approach was that an infinite variety of com-
plex factual patterns was possible, which rendered the precedential 
value of earlier cases - to police and to the lower courts - quite 
limited. But the primary impetus to Miranda was the majority's sense 
that vigilance on the voluntariness front was not sufficient to protect 
the defendant from compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted 
first that because interrogation takes place in private, it is difficult to 
know exactly what has occurred.434 The opinion also stressed "that 
the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically 
rather than physically oriented."435 The switch from physically coer-
cive methods to psychologically coercive methods made line drawing 
extremely difficult; at what point should a psychological ploy be 
deemed compulsion rather than "enlightened and effective" police 
detective work?436 After reviewing some of the interrogation tech-
niques recommended by experts, the Court expressed its concern that 
"[e]ven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the specific 
stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation ex-
acts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
431. If we knew that all of the convictions were obtained through unconstitutional proce-
dures, the fact that most of them would have been obtained even if proper procedures had been 
employed would not argue against wholesale reversal of all the tainted convictions. For example, 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel required in all felony cases), was properly 
given full retroactive effect. Here, however, not all of the convictions were obtained through an 
unconstitutional procedure (biased guilt determination), although some were. 
432. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
433. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 
(1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 1192 (1944); see 
also Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amend-
ment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 102-03 (1966) (arguing that the 
Court's workload precluded adequate review of voluntariness cases). 
434. 384 U.S. at 445, 448. 
435. 384 U.S. at 448. 
436. 384 U.S. at 449. 
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individuals."437 Finally, the Court concluded that "without proper 
safeguards" the process of custodial interrogation contained "inher-
ently compelling pressures" that undermined the privilege against self-
incrimination. 438 The "proper safeguard" imposed by the Court con-
sisted of a prophylactic measure designed to counteract the "inher-
ently compelling pressures,"439 namely, the now famous "Miranda 
warnings."440 
As with custodial interrogation, earlier doctrinal paths focusing on 
case-by-case analysis of the presence of unconstitutional factors have 
failed to solve the problem of the influence of racial bias in jury delib-
erations. 441 The reasons for the failure of this individualized approach 
are also similar. First of all, jury deliberations, like custodial interroga-
tion, are conducted in private. Actually, jury deliberations are even 
less accessible to analysis than is custodial interrogation because with 
custodial interrogation, unlike jury deliberations, a witness for the 
other side (the defendant) is present and all witnesses are deemed com-
petent to testify concerning their observations. 
The second reason for the failure of the individualized approach to 
juror bias also parallels a factor stressed by the Miranda Court: the 
replacement of blatant forms of unconstitutional action with more 
subtle violations. Just as interrogation techniques have shifted from 
the physical to the psychological, the manifestation of prejudice has 
shifted from the overt, and often hostile, to the covert, and often un-
conscious. Techniques, such as voir dire, that may have aided in the 
elimination of the openly prejudiced from the jury are largely futile 
with their modern counterparts. The Court's description of the new 
interrogation techniques as "trading on the weaknesses of individuals" 
is also an oddly apt characterization of the process of white jurors 
evaluating the evidence against a black defendant; it is not the malevo-
lence of white jurors that threatens constitutional values, but their sus-
ceptibility to culturally dictated distortions of judgment. But of course 
this historical shift from animosity to unconscious stereotyping does 
not diminish the harm wrought by racial bias; as with psychological 
437. 384 U.S. at 455 (footnote omitted). 
438. 384 U.S. at 467. 
439. 384 U.S. at 467-74. 
440. [The defendant] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
384 U.S. at 479. The Court also required that the exercise of these rights be "scrupulously 
honored," 384 U.S. at 479, and described the government's burden of proving that the defendant 
waived these rights as "heavy." 384 U.S. at 475. 
441. See Part II supra. 
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pressure in custodial interrogation, "a heavy toll on individual liberty" 
is the consequence. 
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Miranda that prophylactic 
measures were required to counteract the inherent compulsion of cus-
todial interrogation thus would seem to require prophylactic measures 
to counteract the inherent bias arising when white jurors are assigned 
to determine the guilt of black defendants. The most obvious counter-
balance to the bias of white jurors is the mandatory inclusion of black 
jurors in the decisionmaking process. Before turning to the details of 
such a counterbalance, however, I will digress a moment to consider 
the objection that choosing Miranda as a model is building one's house 
upon sand. 
Miranda has been widely criticized, both from the right and from 
the left,442 and the Supreme Court continues to chip away its edges.443 
But whether or not Miranda was rightly decided, the Court's underly-
ing logic is unassailable - or at least, unassailed: When serious 
breaches of constitutional norms frequently occur in a setting where 
they cannot be discovered (and thus cannot be remedied after the 
fact), prophylactic protection of those norms is appropriate.444 Actu-
ally, Miranda is not the only case that proceeds on this logic,445 but I 
chose it as a model because its reasoning on the necessity for prophy-
lactic measures is more explicit than that found in most cases and be-
cause the steps in that reasoning have close parallels in the problem of 
racial bias and guilt adjudication. 
Criticism of Miranda has focused not on its underlying logic, then, 
but on its doctrinal and empirical premises. Some critics dispute the 
442. See notes 446-49 infra; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968) (congressional effort to overrule 
Miranda by authorizing the admissibility of all confessions that are "voluntarily given"). 
443. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) (failure to give Miranda warnings to 
defendant questioned while in custody in his home did not bar admissibility of subsequent station 
house confession immediately preceded by Miranda warnings); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 
2626 (1984) (Miranda warnings requirement is subject to a "public safety" exception); Harris v. 
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to 
impeach defendant's credibility). 
444. For a recent affirmation of that logic, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) 
(''Thus, in the individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the 
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."). 
445. Most commonly, prophylactic remedies have been imposed to safeguard the rights of 
criminal defendants. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (exclusionary rule im-
posed to deter fourth amendment violations); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (impos-
ing requirement of counsel at post-indictment line-ups to combat potential of suggestiveness); 
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (potential for prejudice for defendant tried on 
recidivist charges requires assignment of an attorney); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) 
(potential for prejudice in capital cases requires assignment of an attorney); cf. Green v. County 
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice" plan unconstitutional where plan did not 
result in a unitary school system). But see United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (exclusionary rule imposed to avoid implicating judiciary in constitutional violations). 
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premise that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
implicated by psychological pressure on the defendant, at least when 
the pressure is not applied in the courtroom. 446 Other critics argue 
that such psychological pressure rarely was brought to bear upon de-
fendants and contend that the "evidence" provided by interrogation 
manuals was insufficient proof that constitutional violations occurred 
with any frequency.447 Finally, critics have contended that the rem-
edy imposed by Miranda will not have the counterbalancing effects 
hypothesized by the Supreme Court; those on the right have argued 
that Miranda only provides the guilty with more room to manipulate 
the criminal justice system,448 while those on the left have protested 
that Miranda is doomed to be ineffective, in part because the warnings 
are underinclusive, and in part because the ruling relies upon the po-
lice, who create the pressure to confess, to counteract that pressure.449 
Obviously, none of these particular criticisms applies to the problem of 
racially biased jury deliberations or to a solution involving the inclu-
sion of black jurors. The constitutional right to equal protection of the 
laws is well established and clearly applies to the criminal trial setting; 
the evidence that racial bias frequently affects criminal trials is strong; 
and the proposed remedy does not suffer either the defect of letting the 
guilty go free or of relying upon the violators of that right for the 
enforcement of the remedy. Thus, Miranda is good authority for the 
general proposition that prophylactic measures are necessary to pre-
vent a constitutional violation such as racially biased determinations 
of guilt, although the question of whether any particular proposal is an 
appropriate and effective safeguard can only be answered by consider-
ing its advantages and disadvantages in some detail. 
2. The Defendant's Right to a Jury Including Racially 
Similar Jurors 
Although the United States Supreme Court has summarily rejected 
446. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505-14 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 526 (White, 
J., dissenting); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 
926-37 (1979). 
447. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499, 501 (Clark, J., dissenting), 532-33 (White, J., dissenting). 
448. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting), 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Grano, 
supra note 446. But see Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh -A Statistical Study, 29 U. 
PITI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1967) (conviction rates of law enforcement agencies unaffected). 
449. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: 
The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1394-98 (1968); Faculty Note, A 
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); 
Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1549-79, 
1612-14 (1967); cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (critic on the right noting 
that the new rules "do nothing to contain the policeman who is prepared to lie from the start"). 
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a right to racially similar jurors,450 acknowledging such a right is less 
innovative and less radical than it may sound. Several African coun-
tries, mindful of the realities of racial prejudice, have recognized some 
variation of this right.451 For analogous reasons, English law for a 
time provided alien defendants with juries composed of six aliens and 
six citizens;452 this practice was sporadically mimicked in the new 
world colonies, but eventually faded into obscurity.453 At least two 
commentators have argued that the English practice should be revived 
in this country for minority race defendants.454 
Because the aim is to prevent a wrong rather than to make a victim 
whole, the details of any system for mandatory inclusion of racially 
similar jurors are not inevitable. Any plan will be somewhat arbitrary, 
just as the exact content of the Miranda warnings is somewhat arbi-
trary. I am not wedded to any of the details that follow, for they are 
not crucial. What is crucial is commitment to some realistic plan for 
eliminating the effects of racial bias on the determination of guilt. I 
make the following proposal then, not in the belief that it is perfect, 
but with the hope that an outline of one possible system for including 
racially similar jurors will spawn further discussion. 
The first issue to be confronted is what is meant by "racially simi-
lar." The meaning of this phrase is least problematic for black defend-
ants: a black defendant has the right to some blacks on the jury 
panel.455 The same right to "racially similar" jurors should be af-
forded to Native American and Hispanic defendants; although the em-
pirical evidence concerning prejudice against Native Americans and 
Hispanics is less extensive, the available evidence does suggest that at 
least in some parts of the country, stereotypes of these groups are as 
450. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,413 (1972) (brief statement that there is no 
right to the inclusion of racially similar jurors). 
451. See Mittlebeeler, Race and Jury in Nigeria, 18 How. L.J. 88, 97 (1973) (right to mixed 
juries recognized for a time); Mittlebeeler, Race and Jury in Rhodesia, 15 How. L.J. 181, 196 
(1969) (accused blacks tried by judge and two black assessors); see also Mittlebeeler, Race and 
Jury in South Africa, 14 How. L.J. 90, 94-95 (1968) (right to judge trial to avoid prejudice by 
white jurors). 
452. See Ordinance of the Staples, 21 Edw. 3 st. 2, c. 8 (1353) and 28 Edw. 3, c. 13 (1354); see 
also Trial by Jury; and the Abolition of de medietate linguae by s. 5 of the Naturalization Act, 
1870, 68 Souc. J. 949 (1924). 
453. See LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 850-62 (1976); Potash, 
Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80, 93 (1973). 
454. LaRue, supra note 453; Potash, supra note 453; see also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LA w 273-74 (1980) (posing the split jury as a hypothetical for discussion). 
455. Even here questions concerning classification may arise; they are best answered by refer-
ring to social definitions rather than fractions of ancestry. 
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strong as stereotypes ofblacks.456 Moreover, these stereotypes include 
some traits relevant to propensity to commit crime, and thus might be 
expected to affect guilt attribution.457 "White" defendants should be 
granted a reciprocal right to some "white" jurors because the mock 
jury studies show that black jurors treat white defendants much the 
same way that white jurors treat black defendants. This leaves defend-
ants of Asian ancestry. Here the question is a close one. Prejudice 
against Asian Americans appears to be much less intense and wide-
spread than prejudice against other minority racial groups458 and, 
even among the prejudiced, stereotypes of Asian Americans less com-
monly include propensity to commit crime.459 On the other hand, a 
rule that accords the same rights to all racial groups is likely to seem 
fairer to the layperson, and therefore might generate fewer undesirable 
side effects. This consideration, coupled with the fact that in a few 
areas stereotypes of Asian American criminality may be made com-
mon, seems to tip the scale toward extending the right to defendants of 
Asian ancestry.460 
I would not extend this right to individual white ethnic groups. 
The cost of doing so would be exorbitant, and the benefits are not 
apparent. Ethnicity, unlike race, is most often not apparent to jurors, 
and thus usually could not be the basis for distortion of judgment. 
More significantly, the empirical evidence provides no support for the 
claim that ethnicity alters the attribution of guilt.461 It would be in-
correct, however, to assume that because all ·"whites" should be 
lumped together, all "nonwhites" should also be treated as inter-
changeable. The phrase "nonwhite" in itself suggests racism; is the 
only distinction worth making whether one may be considered white? 
Moreover, such a bifurcation of the population does not accord with 
456. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Lipton, supra note 15; Smith & Dempsey, 
supra note 15, at 593, 594; J. Solemou, supra note 15, at 58, 72; see also note 16 supra. 
457. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Lipton, supra note 15; J. Solemou, supra 
note 15; see also United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 1974); W. DOUGLAS, 
WE THE JUDGES 399 (1956) ("Experience shows that liquor has a devastating effect on the North 
American Indian and Eskimo."). 
458. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 593. 
459. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21. 
460. In some cities, such as San Francisco, "Chinatown" gangs are widely feared, and may 
be the source of stereotypes about Asian American criminality. In more remote communities, 
any racially different person may be deemed more likely to commit a crime. 
461. One might hypothesize that mere ethnicity would alter the attribution of guilt in a com-
munity where two white ethnic groups were engaged in intense competition. But to produce 
such competition, it is likely that the number of persons in each group would be quite large and 
this would make the elimination of all sympathetic or neutral jurors from the jury a very rare 
event. At least at this time, the risk of ethnic bias infecting guilt determination seems both 
speculative and small. 
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the relevant empirical data, which shows that minority group mem-
bers replicate the majority's view of all racial minorities except their 
own.462 Thus, granting a black defendant the right to some Hispanics 
on his jury would probably not diminish the likelihood of biased guilt 
adjudication. 
The next question is the number of racially similar jurors to which 
a defendant should be entitled. Perhaps the obvious candidate is the 
historically split jury, which would entitle the defendant to six jurors 
of twelve, or half the total number of jurors in jurisdictions using 
smaller juries.463 The disadvantage to the split jury is that six jurors of 
the defendant's race might be difficult to obtain in some areas. More-
over, a split jury requirement would provide an incentive for the state 
to elect the use of smaller juries, a change generally deemed undesir-
able. 464 The extreme response to practical difficulties is to limit the 
defendant's right to one racially similar juror. Unfortunately, this al-
ternative would probably render the right meaningless. Twelve Angry 
Men 465 to the contrary, jury dynamics research shows that a single 
dissenting juror virtually never succeeds in hanging a jury, let alone 
reversing its predisposition.466 Both laboratory and field studies show 
that without a minority of at least three jurors, group pressure is sim-
ply too overwhelming: one or two dissenting jurors eventually and 
inevitably accede to the majority's view.467 
These findings suggest that a reasonable compromise between ex-
462. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 96; G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CUL• 
TURAL MINORmES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 195-98 (1972); see 
also J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, supra note 174, at 74-75 (studies show an unwillingness among 
Americans of diverse ethnic backgrounds to have close social relations with blacks, Japanese, 
Chinese, Hindus, and Turks, and a widespread preference for individuals of European descent). 
463. The Supreme Court has approved juries as small as six. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 
(1970). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-member jury unconstitutional). 
464. See, e.g., M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 107 (1977); Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: 
Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1004 
(1980); Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18; Zeise!, Twelve Is 
Just, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 13; Zeise!, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367 
(1972); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978) (reviewing articles and studies 
critical of the six-person jury and refusing to uphold a five-person jury). But see, e.g., Thompson, 
Six Will Doi, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 12 (arguing that smaller juries expedite trial process and 
thereby fulfill guarantee of the right to a speedy trial). 
465. Twelve Angry Men is a classic movie about jury deliberations. Eleven jurors initially 
vote for conviction, but the lone dissenter, played by Henry Fonda, convinces them all to reach a 
verdict of acquittal. 
466. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 463; M. SAKS, supra note 464, at 16-18 
(reviewing several studies); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV, 
744, 748 (1959) (not a single jury hung with a minority of less than three on the initial vote); 
Simon & Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 211, 227 (S. Nagel ed. 
1972); see also Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judg-
ments, in GROUP DYNAMICS 189, 190-93 (D. Cartwright ed. 1960). 
467. M. SAKS, supra note 464, at 16-18; Broeder, supra note 466, at 748; Simon & Marshall, 
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pediency and effectiveness is to assure the defendant three racially sim-
ilar jurors. It is true that were this proposal to operate as planned, 
hung juries (rather than verdicts of acquittal) would result in those 
cases where an all-white jury would have acquitted a white defendant. 
To render acquittal the predicted result, however, would require ten 
racially similar jurors. The likelihood that practical obstacles would 
then be deemed insurmountable makes it preferable to focus on 
preventing wrongful convictions. Furthermore, it seems likely that 
prosecutors would often choose not to retry the defendant in cases 
where subsequent interviews with jurors revealed racial polarization. 
Of course, one would expect that in most cases involving minority race 
defendants the strength or weakness of the evidence will result in a 
unanimous verdict just as it does in most cases involving white defend-
ants; it is only in marginal evidence cases that we would expect to find 
some different verdicts than would be obtained under the current 
system. 
The right to racially similar jurors would belong to the defendant 
and not to the prosecution or the public. The defendant could waive 
the right if he wished, but his decision to do so would have to meet the 
traditional standard of "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege."468 
It seems prudent to leave open the door for experimentation with 
alternative remedies. The Miranda Court's reasoning on this point, 
too, is apposite: 
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protect-
ing the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the 
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot 
say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particu-
lar solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as 
it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional 
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it in-
tended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to 
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protect-
ing the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of 
our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures 
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right 
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the 
following safeguards must be observed.469 
supra note 466, at 227 (hung juries extremely rare unless initial minority was at least four jurors); 
see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 463. 
468. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
469. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). See also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413-14 
(1984) ("The Court has . . . not seriously questioned, 'in the absence of a more efficacious sanc-
tion, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence ... where a Fourth Amendment 
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A state might develop sophisticated voir dire techniques or other effec-
tive devices for screening out unconsciously biased jurors; a state 
might develop a comprehensive and demonstrably effective set of in-
structions; or a state might prove that its educational system had elim-
inated the relationship between race and guilt attribution among its 
citizens. Any of these developments would be preferable to the race 
conscious, inconvenient measures here proposed, but until the Court is 
shown "other procedures which are at least as effective," it should 
require the safeguards described above. 
These requirements should not invalidate convictions obtained 
before their imposition, for two reasons. First, the proposed rules fall 
into the category of a "clear break with the past," and under the 
Court's current retroactivity doctrine, the impact of such a rule should 
be limited to subsequent cases.470 Second, whether or not one agrees 
with this general view of retroactivity, it is probably a necessary com-
promise where truly prophylactic requirements are involved;471 retro-
activity of prophylactic requirements would impose enormous law 
enforcement and finality costs, most of which could not be justified as 
redressing identifiable constitutional violations. 
C. Meeting Theoretical and Practical Objections 
The biggest obstacle to the acknowledgment of a right to racially 
similar jurors is inertia. That obstacle can be surmounted only by con-
viction, persistence, and time. Another kind of obstacle, however, 
consists of people interested in the problem of racial bias, but dis-
turbed by the proposed remedy for specific reasons. Since these people 
can become allies, I will offer some tentative responses to the most 
likely objections. 
l. Equal Protection Concerns 
Although the proposed right to racially similar jurors is intended 
to prevent equal protection violations, concern that the remedy may 
also violate the fourteenth amendment is foreseeable. An analogous 
violation has been substantial and deliberate ... .' ") (emphasis added) (quoting Franks v. Dela-
ware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). 
470. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982). 
471. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) ("prophylactic standards" of Miranda 
must be balanced against law enforcement costs where violation of standards occurred before 
their promulgation). I do not mean to indicate support of the Johnson standard in cases not 
involving prophylactic measures. For example, I think that if and when the Court reverses 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), that decision should be retroactive, for where the prose-
cutor has used peremptory challenges in a racially selective manner, constitutional standards 
have been demonstrably violated. 
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objection is frequently raised regarding affirmative action programs 
and certainly has not been adequately resolved.472 I would contend, 
however, that the two aspects of affirmative action that have caused so 
much difficulty have no counterparts in the mandatory inclusion of 
racially similar jurors. 
The first difficulty presented by affirmative action is the question of 
the standard to be applied. Race conscious remedies do not always 
violate equal protection; the Court has upheld such remedies in the 
busing cases473 and the redistricting cases. 474 With these two remedies, 
the strict scrutiny standard is deemed met and the controversy re-
solved. 475 Most members of the Court, however, believe that affirma-
tive action measures generally fail strict scrutiny; shifting majorities 
are created as the three members who believe that affirmative action 
sometimes meets this most stringent standard476 alternately ally them-
selves with those who· believe it never can and that all such measures 
must be struck down477 and with those who contend that a more leni-
ent standard, heightened scrutiny, should be applied to affirmative ac-
tion programs and can be quite often satisfied.478 
This difficulty is avoided with a requirement of racially similar ju-
rors because the strict scrutiny standard can be met. Avoiding the con-
viction of the innocent479 is a compelling governmental interest.480 
472. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
473. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
474. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977). 
475. For other examples of race-conscious remedies, see James v. United States, 416 F.2d 
467, 472 (5th Cir. 1969) (purposeful inclusion of blacks in grand jury permissible to extinguish 
effects of earlier racially discriminatory practices), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); Brooks v. 
Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); Long Warrier v. 
Peacock, Civil No. 69-122 (W.D.S.D. filed Aug. 14, 1969) (ordering jury commissioners to take 
necessary steps, including identification of potential jurors' races, to insure fair representation of 
Native Americans on juries). 
476. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980), Burger, C.J., writing for the Court, 
found that the affirmative action program survived even the strict scrutiny test articulated in 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Powell, J., applied the strict scrutiny 
test in his concurring opinion. 448 U.S. at 498. Stevens, J., agreed that affirmative action pro-
grams might pass strict scrutiny, but applied a more stringent, "unquestionably legitimate" test, 
which the Fullilove program failed. 448 U.S. at 535. 
477. Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting in Fullilove, expressed their view that govern-
mental racial classifications are never permitted by the Constitution. 448 U.S. at 522-32. 
478. Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., believe that racial classifications may be 
justified by showing "an important and articulated purpose for its use." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361. 
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., also applied this "heightened scrutiny" test to the affirm-
ative action program at issue in Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 519. 
479. For a consideration of what should be encompassed by the term "innocent," see text 
following note 18 supra. 
480. But see Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (university practices re-
quiring at least two minority race students to be appointed or elected to student legislature and 
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Remedying past economic discrimination (and prophylactically 
preventing future discrimination through the use of quotas?) is also a 
good candidate for a compelling governmental interest. But to call 
any affirmative action measure "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" 
stretches these phrases sorely and to many, stretches them beyond rec-
ognition, thus threatening the vitality of the strict scrutiny standard. 
Under affirmative action programs some minorities who have not been 
the victims of discrimination will receive benefits, and at a cost to 
some nonminorities who have not benefited from discrimination.481 
Moreover, the distribution of the compensation cannot be tailored to 
individual grievances; most victims of discrimination will not benefit 
at all from affirmative action programs and a few will benefit enor-
mously. In contrast, granting defendants racially similar jurors is both 
necessary and narrowly tailored. The right is not bought at the ex-
pense of other possibly blameless individuals;482 neither white defend-
ants nor white jurors "lose" anything. The "amount" given to each 
defendant is the same, and is tailored to prevent wrongful conviction; 
no one gets "more" than he deserves. And, at least at the present 
time, there are no racially neutral measures available to accomplish 
the same end. 483 
The second difficulty with affirmative action programs is not, 
strictly speaking, an equal protection concern, but is closely connected 
to the values protected by the equal protection clause. It is often ob-
giving student defendant in disciplinary proceedings the right to require a majority of the judges 
on his panel of the student honor court to be of his race denied white students right to equal 
protection in the absence of a showing that these practices were necessary to achieve a compel-
ling state interest). 
481. But see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588 (1984) (limit-
ing court-ordered preferential treatment to identified victims of discrimination); EEOC v. Local 
638, 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976) (allowing preferential treatment only when its effect is not 
concentrated upon a relatively small ascertainable group of nonminority persons). 
482. See Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & Pun. AFF, 3, 
8 (1974) (distinguishing busing cases from affirmative action cases on this basis). 
It is possible that this system might impose additional burdens on blackjurors, although that 
seems unlikely. What is more likely is that some black jurors who would have sat out their jury 
service waiting to be selected for a jury will instead serve as jurors and that some black jurors 
who would have sat on civil juries will instead serve on criminal juries. Should acknowledgment 
of this right occasionally serve to increase the burden of jury service upon black jurors, the 
validity of their complaints can be assessed. Perhaps overburdened black jurors should be 
viewed as are the black children selected for busing: innocent and unfortunate but necessary. 
Alternatively, some special compensation might be offered them. 
483. Recognizing a right to a bench trial (which defendants do not now possess, see Singer v. 
United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)) would not accomplish the same goal. Judges too may factor 
race into their determinations of guilt, not consciously, but unconsciously. Even if we were sure 
that judges would not let race affect their verdicts, a bench trial is not a substitute for a racially 
neutral jury because the rate of acquittals in jury trials is substantially higher. H. KALVEN & H. 
ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 59. With bench trials as their only alternative, black defendants would 
still be disadvantaged due to their race. 
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jected that affirmative action programs do not promote, but actually 
retard, the goal of racial equality. Opponents argue that despite their 
laudable purposes, the programs inadvertently increase the level of 
hostility directed toward minority group members484 and reinforce 
stereotypes of minorities as inferior.485 Whether these empirical as-
sumptions concerning the majority's reaction to the enactment of such 
programs are correct is open to question,486 and whether they override 
other policy concerns is hotly debated.487 In any event, these possible 
drawbacks clearly do not afflict a proposal to inclqde racially similar 
jurors on criminal juries. Because the allocation of scarce goods is not 
at issue (as it is in affirmative action programs), one would not expect 
the acknowledgment of this right to increase hostility toward minori-
ties; because minorities could not be seen as being "handed" special 
benefits instead of "earning" them, no implications concerning their 
abilities would be rational. 
That this reform would draw the population's attention to the per-
sistence of racial prejudice seems to me a desirable side effect, rather 
than one to be avoided. The goal of racial equality is unlikely to be 
reached absent awareness that it does not yet exist. 
2. Resistance to a Judicially Created Remedy 
Some critics might concede the desirability of the proposed inclu-
sion of racially similar jurors, but object to any judicial role in bring-
ing it about. It might be argued that my concession that the details are 
somewhat arbitrary is a concession that the job of fashioning a remedy 
is more properly left to legislators; compromises are their forte. 
This position misses the fact that absent judicial action there will 
be no relief from ongoing constitutional violations. Legislative action 
would be less problematic, but it is extremely unlikely. The minority-
race criminal defendant - unlike the minority-race entrepreneur, la-
borer, or student - has virtually no lobbyists. He can and will be 
forgotten by all but the courts, for very few will wish to be counted in 
484. See, e.g., Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 
CALIF. L. REv. 3, 18 (1979); Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution: 
Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 12-13. 
485. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 484, at 8, 18; Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice 
Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 21, 59 (1979); Kitch, supra note 484, at 13; see also 
Rice, The Legality of De Facto Segregation, IO CATH. LAW 309, 320 (1964) (any consideration of 
racial balance in schools implies inferiority of black children). 
486. See Jacobson, The Bakke Decision: White Reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court's Test of 
Affirmative Action Programs, 27 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 687 (1983). 
487. Compare Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1043 (1979), with Kitch, supra note 484; compare Gegan, De Jure Inte-
gration in Education, 11 CATH. LAW 4, 14 (1965), with Rice, supra note 485, at 320. 
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his camp. Furthermore, although prophylactic remedies in general are 
better left to the legislature, the Court has often been forced to devise 
its own remedies in the criminal procedure sphere.488 The alternative 
is the acceptance of repeated violation of the Constitution - a result 
no American court should be willing to tolerate.489 
Furthermore, the proposed remedy does not foreclose legislative 
initiative.490 It may even spur legislatures to consider alternatives. 
Until they do, a judicially created remedy is required to protect minor-
ity-race defendants from unconstitutional convictions. 
3. Reluctance to Rely upon Social Science Data 
The feeling that courts should not rely upon social science data 
may stem from several different sources.491 A specific objection to re-
lying upon social science data in a particular case may arise from lack 
of confidence in the profferred data. Social science reasoning was 
prominent in the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education492 
opinion and this gave critics the opportunity to point out the sparsity 
of data supporting that case's reasoning. 493 Questions about the relia-
bility of any kind of evidence are always legitimate, but in this case the 
empirical evidence, as discussed in Part I, is consistent and 
convincing. 
A second source of reluctance to rely upon social science data in-
heres in the fear that litigants have misrepresented the implications of 
that data. Persons not trained in social science methodology may feel 
caught in a double bind: if they draw their own conclusions, they risk 
embarrassing errors, but if they rely on those with expertise for con-
clusions, they risk the incorporation of the experts' biases. Such fears 
are rational in many circumstances. For example, the Supreme 
488. See note 445 supra and accompanying text. 
489. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also United 
States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule necessary 
because judiciary must avoid participation in constitutional violations). 
490. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), often criticized as usurping the legislature's role 
in balancing the rights of pregnant women and fetuses. See, e.g., Dixon, The ''New" Substantive 
Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84-87; Ely, 
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
491. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887-90 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (discussing 
the limitations inherent in social science research evidence), petition for cert. filed, No. 84-6811 
(U.S. May 28, 1985). 
492. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
493. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (1955); Gregor, The Law, Social 
Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. R.Es. L. REV. 621 (1963); van den Haag, 
Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases - A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 
VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960); see also Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972) (reviewing more recent data). 
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Court's conclusion that reducing jury size to less than twelve does not 
affect the likelihood of acquittal494 has been harshly criticized as an 
entirely illogical inference from the jury size experiments cited by the 
Court.495 But this second source of reluctance to rely upon social sci-
ence data also is inappropriate in considering whether to acknowledge 
a right to racially similar jurors. Here only the first step in reasoning 
to this remedy depends upon social science principles; once the exter-
nal validity of the mock jury studies is established, the remainder of 
the argument for racially similar jurors depends largely upon legal 
principles. Because the argument concerning external validity is 
neither technical nor complicated,496 the risk of a naiye blunder is 
small. 
The last reason lawyers often regard social science data with suspi-
cion is that such data are subject to change as social conditions 
change. This fact may be disconcerting, for holdings based upon that 
data must then be revised, but it need not threaten the legitimacy of 
earlier decisions; doctrine is not properly viewed as unstable simply 
because its application to today's facts produces different outcomes 
than its application to yesterday's facts. Moreover, given the histori-
cal stability of racial prejudice, drastic changes in the social science 
data relevant to the right to racially similar jurors are quite unlikely. 
Certainly the cost of periodic reviews of holdings based upon social 
science data is preferable to immutable holdings premised on intuitive 
and erroneous assumptions about the nature of social reality. 
4. Implementation Problems 
Finally, there will be those whose protest is based on practical con-
siderations. How could such a right be implemented? Undoubtedly, 
assuring the inclusion of racially similar jurors would be somewhat 
inconvenient. In most cases, it would be no more than that, for crimes 
by minority-race defendants most often will occur where significant 
numbers of the minority group reside.497 That surmounting ordinary 
implementation difficulties is unlikely to be an enormous burden is 
494. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
495. Kaye, supra note 464; Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical 
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975); Zeise! & Diamond, "Convincing 
Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1914);seea/so Saks, supra 
note 464; Zeise), • . • And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971). 
496. See Part I. B. 2. supra. 
491. See Note, The Case for Black Juries, 19 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (arguing that this 
fact should be used to advantage by drawing vicinage lines around racial communities). 
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suggested by the English and African experiences. 498 Occasionally a 
substantial problem of obtaining enough jurors of the defendant's ra-
cial background will arise. When it does, there are several alterna-
tives. The prosecution might seek a waiver from the defendant, 
perhaps by offering the defendant additional peremptory challenges or 
extraordinary voir dire privileges, or perhaps by offering something 
uniquely suited to the particular case. Alternatively, states might seek 
to develop safeguards of other sorts that would be routinely imple-
mented in such cases and hope to satisfy the courts that these meas-
ures were adequate protection against racially biased verdicts; one 
might expect that courts would view such substitutes more generously 
where provision of racially similar jurors had been attempted but 
proved impossible. 
Substantial inconvenience has been suffered to prevent minorities 
from serving on juries, at one time by deviously excluding them from 
the jury rolls, and currently by exercise of the peremptory challenge. 
If the goal of racially unbiased juries is truly valued, substantially 
more inconvenience should be countenanced to assure its achievement 
than was expended to thwart its accomplishment.499 Furthermore, the 
inclusion of racially similar jurors has desirable side effects that in part 
offset any inconvenience it creates. First, it obviates the need to re-
spond to an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the racially selec-
tive use of peremptory challenges. Although the California and 
Massachusetts courts have demonstrated that direct regulation of the 
peremptory challenge is possible, such regulation is more intrusive, 
more difficult, and more time-consuming to enforce than is a right to 
the inclusion of racially similar jurors. Second, the inclusion of ra-
cially similar jurors increases the likelihood of accurate assessment of 
the evidence. Racially similar jurors are more likely to interpret the 
demeanor of the defendant correctly than are racially different ju-
rors500 and may be able to supply relevant insights about neighbor-
hoods and subcultural patterns that are unavailable to racially 
different jurors.501 Finally, the inclusion of racially similar jurors is 
likely to increase perceptions of fairness, both by the defendant and by 
498. See notes 451-54 supra and accompanying text. 
499. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (requiring consid-
eration of substantially inconvenient remedies to correct past constitutional violations). 
500. See LaFrance & Mayo, Racial Differences in Gaze Behavior During Conversations: Two 
Systematic Observational Studies, 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 547 (1976); Turner, 
Beidel, Hersen & Bellack, Effects of Race on Rating of Social Skill, 52 J, CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 474 (1984). 
501. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 33; see also Peters v. Kilf, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) 
(opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, J.J.), discussed in text at supra notes 
214-17; Broeder, supra note 23, at 24, 30; Davis & Lyles, Black Jurors, 30 GUILD PRAC, 111, 
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courtroom observers. Confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice 
system is valuable in itself, 502 and it may also pay dividends in citizen 
cooperation with law enforcement. 503 
CONCLUSION 
The reader may suspect that the method of looking to other disci-
plines to gain understanding of how prejudice operates has applica-
tions beyond the realm of criminal trials. Does this approach presage 
a new form of argument for mandatory minority participation in other 
spheres? Should "Black Aptitude and the White Teacher," "Black 
Merit and the White Manager," or "Black Sanity and the White Psy-
chiatrist" be anticipated? 
Although the empirical evidence on the changing nature of preju-
dice provides an additional policy rationale for supporting affirmative 
action programs, I do not think that analogous constitutional argu-
ments for including minorities will be compelling with respect to other 
decisionmaking positions. This is in part because the seriousness of 
the consequence at stake here argues more strongly for prophylactic 
intervention by the courts than do the prospects of lost job or scholar-
ship opportunities, and in part because a remedy in this area does not 
have the same tailoring problems as does one in areas where scarce 
benefits must be assigned. Moreover, the empirical evidence demon-
strating that bias alters judgment other than guilt attribution has not 
yet been systematically compiled. Perhaps it never will be. The con-
tent of stereotypes about racial minorities may make the effect of race 
on guilt attribution much stronger than the effect of race on judgments 
of competence or intelligence. Or, unconscious stereotypes may be re-
inforced by the setting of a criminal trial; jurors may have had latent 
biases concerning propensity to commit crime that are activated by the 
fact of a criminal accusation. Even if race has an equally strong im-
pact on other decisions, the interest of social scientists in those other 
decisions may never be intense enough to generate convincing evi-
dence of that impact. 
In any event, the issues of whether prophylactic measures to pre-
vent discrimination in other contexts are constitutionally compelled, 
113, 118, 119 (1973); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1417, 1418-1419 (1969). 
502. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (community participation in the ad-
ministration of criminal law, through jury service, critical to pubic confidence in the criminal 
justice system). . 
503. Certainly confidence in the police is widely thought to increase citizen cooperation. See, 
e.g., C. SILBERMAN, supra note 423, at 204. 
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and what such measures might be, can be left for another day. Action 
on the problem of racially biased guilt adjudication, however, need not 
and must not be postponed. It might be argued that more conserva-
tive measures ought to be tried first: Swain and Ristaino should be 
overruled and then the situation reassessed. But for the reasons dis-
cussed in the body of this Article, such modest reforms cannot elimi-
nate the influence of racial bias on jury verdicts. Certainly they are 
more desirable than no action, but to propose them as adequate pro-
tection for the minority-race defendant is disingenuous. Further delay 
before the adoption of a comprehensive solution buys only more 
wrongful convictions. The dissent in People v. Payne, s04 an Illinois 
case rejecting the Wheeler/Soares doctrine, recounts a revealing story: 
In Cobb, another capital case, the defendant's first two trials ended in 
hung juries. Injury selection at those trials the prosecution cumulatively 
exercised 28 out of 41 peremptory challenges against prospective black 
jurors and succeeded in limiting participation by black persons on each 
jury to one. At the third trial the prosecution used 8 out of 11 peremp-
tory challenges against black people and finally succeeded in obtaining a 
conviction by an all-white jury. sos 
The dissenting judge is undoubtedly correct in his conclusion that 
this cannot be justice. Nevertheless, one wonders why he deems the 
actions of the prosecutor the central fact in this sequence of events. 
Suppose that black jurors participated in the defendant's first two tri-
als, both of which ended in hung juries, but at the third trial, by 
chance, an all-white jury were selected and a capital conviction ob-
tained. The process might be less wicked, but the result would not be 
more just. 
Focus on the motives of the perpetrators of discrimination is mis-
placed. Just as the equal protection clause does not extend to a prom-
ise of equal results, it is not limited to an assurance of positive affect. 
The fourteenth amendment aims to eliminate unfair treatment. That 
there is less hostility toward minorities and less deliberate discrimina-
tion is a good sign, but it is not the end of the road. The road to 
equality of treatment is long, and the fact that we no longer stand at 
the beginning of that road is hardly a reason to call a halt. 
504. 99 III. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983). 
505. 99 Ill. 2d at 153, 457 N.E.2d at 1211 (Simon, J., dissenting). 
